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My dissertation studies the design of contracts in different contexts. It con-
tains two theoretical investigations about contracting under ambiguity: in the con-
text of research partnerships and venture capital financing; and an experimental
study to examine delegation of decision rights within organizations.
The first chapter studies contract design for innovation under ambiguity. Out-
sourcing of research is a large and growing trend in knowledge-intensive industries
such as the biotechnology and software industries. I model innovation as an am-
biguous stochastic process and assume that the commercial firms and research labs
differ in their attitude towards ambiguity. I characterize the optimal sequence of
short-term contracts and examine how the features of this contract facilitate am-
biguity sharing: the dynamic moral hazard problem is mitigated under ambiguity;
experimentation stops earlier than is socially optimal; the project may be liquidated
even after being granted a patent. I find that redesigning the patent law can not
implement the Policymaker’s desired optimum.
vii
The second chapter analyzes venture capital investment under ambiguity. A
central feature of venture capital financing is the extensive use of control rights as
an instrument. In this chapter, I present a model of venture capital financing where
investment is allowed to depend on an intermediate ambiguous signal. I show how
the presence of ambiguity explains the allocation of control rights if the investor is
more ambiguity averse than the entrepreneur.
In the third chapter, I discuss how delegation of decision rights can be used
as a signal of trust that can be reciprocated by cooperation. First, I theoretically
show that in a principal-agent framework, using delegation as a signal is the only
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that survives forward induction criterion. Then I use
experimental methods to test this theoretical prediction. I find that the players do
not use delegation very often, thus the forward induction logic is not supported by
the observed data. However, once the players are given information about the past
sessions, they choose the forward induction equilibrium more often. This suggests
that information affects the formation of beliefs and equilibrium selection in Bayesian
games.
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Chapter 1
Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity
1.1 Introduction
Outsourcing of research is a growing and prevalent trend in knowledge in-
tensive sectors (e.g. Biotechnology, Information Technology, and Software sectors).
In these industries, big commercial firms often outsource their research to smaller
research oriented firms. These inter-organizational research alliances are generally
voluntary agreements between firms involving exchange, sharing or co-development
of products, technologies, or services, and play an important role in organizing R&D
in the innovation-intensive industries. For example, in Biotechnology sector, 650
new alliances formed in 2006 alone, with related financial commitments of over $90
billion [56]. During 1996-2007, the industry-university strategic partnerships alone
resulted in $457.1 billion worth of patented innovations [133]. In Pharmaceutical
industry, more than 70% of the U.S. companies are involved in research partner-
ships, and each year on average 25% of the 26bn industry-financed R&D is invested
in research alliances [1]. Information technology sector, accounting for 37% of all
strategic research partnerships, registered 254 technology agreements in the year
1996 alone([120], [82]). This chapter studies these research partnerships and evalu-
ates them as modes of organizing research.
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In the context of innovation, the projects in question are unique in nature.
So, sufficient amount of data from very similar situations are generally not available
to form a reliable estimate of the true profitability of the project. Thus, it is often
difficult to form a unique single-valued probability measure about the profitability.
Such situations can be modeled as “Knightian Uncertainty,” or, “Ambiguity,” using
Knight’s definition [103]:
“The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncer-
tainty, is that in the former the distribution of the outcome in a group of
instances is known (either through calculation a priori or from statistics
of past experience), while in the case of uncertainty this is not true, the
reason being in general that it is impossible to form a group of instances,
because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique.”
In innovation contexts, then, we can assume that the researching entities know
only a partial description of the underlying probability distribution associated with
the choices. Here innovation is modelled as a stochastic ambiguous process, with
the research labs, specialized in dealing with ambiguity are less ambiguity averse
than the commercial firms. The strategic partnerships between the commercial firms
and the research firms aim to exploit the gains from this specialization to deal with
ambiguity.
Given the importance of research alliances in innovation-based industries as
demonstrated above, it is important to examine how these alliances optimally or-
ganize R&D. To this end, this chapter provides a theoretical model to analyze the
2
strategic partnerships carrying out innovation in ambiguous environment. The main
focus is on the dynamic contracts that govern these partnerships.
The questions that we can address in the present framework are: what is
the optimal sequence of short term contracts governing innovation in these strategic
partnerships? How does the optimal investment in the project evolve over time?
When does the research alliance stop experimenting? Assuming that the Policymaker
is a risk and ambiguity neutral entity and cares only for the payoffs the project
generates, we analyze how the Policymaker sets the Patent Law. Then, the natural
question is: how does the optimal contractual outcome in the strategic partnerships
compare to the Policymaker’s desired optimal outcome? Also, is it possible to re-
design the patent laws so as to implement the Policymaker’s desired optima?
We consider a dynamic principal-agent framework to address these questions.
In particular, we examine a sequence of short term contracts where the contractees
differ in their attitude towards ambiguity.
We characterize the optimal sequence of short term contracts conducting the
innovation, and show how the contractual terms facilitate ambiguity sharing. How-
ever, the contractual optimal outcome diverges from the desired outcome by the
Policymaker: the strategic alliance stops experimenting earlier than the Policymaker
deems optimal, sometimes liquidates the project even after being granted a patent,
also invests less in the project. We can show that it is never possible to implement
the Policymaker’s optima by restructuring the patent law.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I include some ex-
3
amples of strategic partnerships. The following section reviews the existing body of
literature related to the questions addressed in this chapter. Section 4 develops the
model and analyzes Policymaker’s Optimum. In Section 5 I characterize the contrac-
tual optimum. Section 6 provides a comparison between the contractual outcome
and the Policymaker’s optima and discusses the policy implications of the results of
this chapter. In section 7 I consider some generalizations and robustness checks of
the model. Section 8 reflects on the general implications of the results. The last
section summarizes the findings of this chapter and concludes.
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1.2 Motivating Examples
The contracts within the research partnerships take a special form: they are
generally of short duration, designed to overcome the problems that may arise in
inter-organizational collaborations and use a mix of explicit (legally enforceable) and
implicit (legally unenforceable, e.g. , allocation of decision rights, property rights,
etc.) terms (Gilson et al., 2003). In this subsection, we will study a contracts gov-
erning a research partnership. From this case study, we make note of the contractual
features, so that in the theoretical model, we can retain these properties and show
how they help organizing research in this context.
1.2.1 Example 1: Warner- Lambert-Ligand agreement
Let us examine the “Warner- Lambert-Ligand agreement” (September 1,
1999): a research, development, and license agreement between Warner-Lambert, a
large pharmaceutical company, and Ligand Pharmaceuticals, a much smaller biotech
company.
The Warner-Lambert-Ligand partnership was engaged in directed research to
discover and design small-molecule compounds that act through the estrogen recep-
tors, to develop those compounds into pharmaceutical products, and to take those
products through the FDA approval process and through commercialization [140].
They started off with almost 10,000 compounds, out of which only 250 compounds
reached the pre-clinical stage1. During the research stage, Ligand engaged in directed
1During the drug-development process, the initial screening of compounds and pre-clinical work
takes, on average, three to six years. During that period, the number of compounds under consid-
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research, with Warner-Lambert providing the bulk of the funding2. The research
stage consisted of three periods with duration of fifteen months to three years, after
each of the periods Warner-Lambert had the option of unilaterally abandoning the
project with little or no direct cost.
Once a successful compound was identified, the project moved from the re-
search to the development stage, and regulatory and market experience became more
important. The cost of the project, all of which will be borne by Warner-Lambert,
also increased exponentially. As a result, both responsibility and decision making
shifted to Warner-Lambert, who had the option to develop the project3.
The gap between contract formation and the appearance of a marketable
drug was more than a decade. So, Ligand’s compensation was carefully structured.
First, it was paid for some fraction of the resources assigned to the task. Second,
the agreement established a number of specific milestones, and, upon reaching each
eration is winnowed from 5,000-10,000 down to a quite small number through scientific and animal
testing. At that point, an application for an Investigational New Drug is filed with the FDA. If the
FDA approves, the drug can move to clinical testing on humans. Clinical testing takes another six
to seven years. If the drug surmounts these hurdles, the sponsoring company submits a New Drug
Application (NDA) with supporting documentation. FDA review of the NDA can take another six
months to two years. If the FDA approves, the drug can be brought to market. Estimates are that
out of 5,000 to 10,000 compounds, only 250 enter pre-clinical testing, and only about twenty percent
of drugs that begin phase one testing are ultimately approved by the FDA. Only upon approval
does the pharmaceutical company discover whether the drug will be successful commercially.
2If the project ultimately succeeds, only a small fraction of costs would be associated with the
research phase. The major costs of bringing a drug to market are incurred in the later stages, in
which the manufacturer must prove efficacy and safety through clinical studies in the FDA approval
process.
3In the contract, Warner-Lambert promises to “use diligent efforts to pursue the Clinical Devel-
opment and commercialization of each Collaboration Lead Compound at its own expense;” however,
it “shall have the sole discretion to determine (a) which Products to develop or market or to con-
tinue to develop or market, (b) which Products to seek regulatory approval for, and (c) when and
where and how and on what terms and conditions, to market such Products in the Territory.”
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milestone, Ligand received an additional payment. Finally, after the research pro-
duced marketable products, Ligand received royalty payments on sales. However, if
Warner-Lambert chose to abort the project at any time, they retained the property
rights.
This example illustrates the unique features of a typical contract governing
a strategic alliance that operates in an innovation-intensive industry. Our model
retains these features as well.
1.2.2 Modelling the Dynamic Contracts:
• Short Term Contracting: In Warner-Lambert-Ligand agreement, each con-
tracting phase lasted for fifteen months up to three years, whereas the partner-
ship lasted for more than a decade. Likewise, many of the collaborative R&D
ventures are governed by short term contracts, with the contracting terms being
renegotiated after every contracting phase. This chapter studies the optimal
sequence of short term contracts with the contractees having no commitment
power.
• Rich forms of collaborating: The Warner-Lambert agreement, containing rich
braiding of explicit and implicit terms, shows that often the contracts governing
innovation process are quite complex in structure. On one hand there is an
elaborate description of the payments under various possible contingencies (e.g.
, the milestone bonuses, the royalty rate), which are legally enforceable. On the
other hand, the contract specifies the control rights and property rights, which
gives unilateral decision power to one of the contracting parties. To mimic this
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interesting blend of explicit and implicit contracting terms, the present model
assumes a contract structure containing both the state contingent payment
structure and the movement of unilateral decision power.
• Learning about the Project’s Prospects: The project started off with almost
10000 possible candidates for the molecule to be developed into a commercial
drug. Only through a series of experiments the true potential of the project is
learned. At each contracting phase, Ligand conducts a series of experiments on
a particular subset of molecules, at the end of which a report summarizes the
results: if there is a molecule fit to be taken to the clinical trials. The present
model considers innovation as a learning process, where at the end of each
period, a binary signal is publicly realized which contains information about
the true state of the project.
• Moral Hazard: In the R&D conducted by Warner-Lambert partnership, the
public signal depends on the resources devoted to the project. For example,
if Ligand does not carry out the experiments using the expensive laboratory
testing procedure, and instead, to save time and money, uses some cheaper and
unreliable methods of testing, then it is unlikely that they will find a molecule
suitable for clinical trial among the subset of molecules to be tested at that
period. This possible diversion of resources to cross-subsidize other projects
or used for personal gain underlines the existing moral hazard concern in this
context. Since Warner-Lambert cannot perfectly monitor Ligand’s activity,
such cross-subsidization possibility gives rise to potential moral hazard problem
in the contractual relationship.
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In the dynamic relationship between the two firms, the moral hazard problem is
more severe. Apart from the one-time gain by diverting resources, the research-
ing party can also appropriate a dynamic gain from diversion. Once Ligand
diverts resources, the test results turn out to be negative. Observing this public
signal, Warner-Lambert’s perception about the project’s profitability changes
accordingly. However, Ligand, who privately observed its own action, disre-
gards this signal as it contains no information. Thus, following a diversion
of resources, the learning paths for the two firms diverge. Warner-Lambert,
who could not observe the diversion, updates its beliefs about the project’s
prospects differently than Ligand. Hence Ligand evaluates the next period’s
contracting terms using a different, and more optimistic, belief. This gives rise
to a further incentive to cheat and is referred to in the literature as the “dy-
namic moral hazard” problem. In this model we consider dynamic contracting
environment, so dynamic moral hazard problem arises here.
• Innovation as an Ambiguous Process: Finally, we discuss why the innovation
activity carried out in Warner-Lambert agreement can be considered an am-
biguous, rather than risky process.
In the strategic partnership between Warner-Lambert and Ligand, the research
could have ended in one of the three possible ways:
(a) They could have found a molecule which passes all the clinical trials and is
found fit to be developed into a drug. This can be modeled as the case when
the true state (or, profitability) of the project is “Good.”
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(b) They could have failed to find a suitable molecule even after testing all the
candidate molecules. This case can be modeled as the true state being “Bad.”
(c) Apart from these two states, the research could have ended in finding a
molecule which is capable to work through the estrogen receptors, but, given
the state of the present pharmaceutical technology, can not be developed into
a drug. If the research finds such a molecule, it is not presently known if in the
future the pharmaceutical technology will ever improve and the molecule can
be developed into a drug. So, in this case, even after conducting the decade-
long research, we stumble upon an “Open question.” We model this case as
a new epistemic state and call it “Unknowable” or “Amalgamated,” because if
the research ends up here, the true profitability of the project is simply not
known.
We follow the ambiguity framework developed in [54], which shows that this
new state captures the idea of ambiguity. It can be considered as an alter-
native interpretation of the multiple prior model. Appendix B contains the
preliminaries of this framework.
In the present model, the binary signal observed at each contracting term
reveals information about the true state, which can be “Good,” “Bad,” or, “Un-
knowable.” For example, if at any period, Ligand finds that a molecule among the
ones being tested is suitable for conducting clinical trial, that may indicate that it
is more likely that the true state is “Good” or “Unknowable,” rather than “Bad.”
We also assume that Ligand, being a research firm, prefers this “Unknowable” state
10
more than Warner-Lambert. For Ligand, this presents an opportunity to work on
developing new pharmaceutical technology which might earn them revenue in fu-
ture, but for Warner-Lambert, reaching the “Unknowable” state does not generate
any immediate payoff.
Let us look at another example to illustrate the interpretation of ambiguity
we will deal with in this chapter.
1.2.3 Example 2: Cancer Genome Anatomy Project (CGAP)
Cancer Genome Sequencing refers to the laboratory method of characteriza-
tion and identification of genetic sequencing of cancer cells. Funded in 1997, the
Cancer Genome Anatomy Project (CGAP) published their first Cancer Genome Se-
quencing report in 2003, which enables identification and characterization of all the
genetic and epigenetic mutational changes that happen in the process of tumorigen-
esis. Before the CGS, such an exhaustive list of all possible variants of cancer cells
was not available, thus different variants and subtypes of cancer were not identified
(Cancer Genome Sequencing Report, 2003).
Now, let us consider a Biotechnology research venture aiming to find a medicine
to treat Acute Myeloid Leukemia (AML), a particular type of cancer, before this CGS
report was made available . The CGS identified several new subtypes of variants of
carcinogenic mutational changes associated with AML. Before CGS, then, the re-
search could have ended in one of the three states:
(a) The research venture could have found a medicine which can treat one of
the already identified subtype of carcinogenic cells, which can be considered as the
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case when the true state (or, profitability) of the project is “Good.”
(b) The project could have ended in discovering that the medicine is not even
biologically active on the epigenetic mutational changes. This case can be identified
with the true state being “Bad.”
(c) The research could have found a medicine which is biologically active, but
can not treat any identified variant of cancer. However, it could have been possible
that there are epigenetic changes in cancer cells which are not yet identified (before
CGS), and the medicine might be useful to treat those not-yet-identified variants.
This state can be considered as the “Unknowable” or “Amalgamated” state, where
the true profitability of the research venture is yet unknown4.
Thus, from the two examples, it can be seen that in the innovation-intensive
sectors, we can consider a new epistemic state: “Unknowable,” which captures the
idea that the true probability distribution associated with the choices may not be
completely known, so innovation can be considered to be an ambiguous process. This
chapter provides a model of how these research alliances operate under ambiguity and
examines the contractual structures that govern these inter-organizational research
partnerships.
Specifically, we consider innovation to be an ambiguous process where invest-
ing in research every period generates informative signals which enable the research-
4Indeed, much later, after the CGS report was available, targeted drugs like vemurafenib
(ZELBORAF R©) were discovered (approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2011)
for the treatment of some specific mutation in the BRAF gene as detected by an FDA-approved
test using CGS.
12
ing parties to learn about the true nature of the project. This process is organized in
a research alliance through a sequence of short term contracts with both explicit and
implicit contracting terms, which take care of the existing moral hazard problem. In
this set up, we characterize the optimal contract, analyze its properties, and show
how this research alliances fail to implement the Policymaker’s desired optima.
13
1.3 Related Literature
This chapter is primarily related to the literature discussing Optimal Con-
tracts for Innovation. It is most closely related to the seminal work by Bergemann
and Hege ([16],[17]), which characterize the optimal contract for experimentation un-
der risk. These two papers model innovation as a risky stochastic optimal stopping
time problem, where an entrepreneur and a capitalist invest funds every period to
learn about the project’s true profitability and if the project succeeds, the game ends
immediately. In this framework, the authors document the potential dynamic moral
hazard problem and how it makes the funding conditions more stringent in the earlier
rounds. In their setting, they find the possibility of in-equilibrium delay of funding
(in a finite horizon version of the game) and in the infinite horizon, they find that
the investment volume may increase over time. Ho¨rner and Samuelson [95] examine
a similar framework of experimentation and characterize all possible equilibria.
There are two significant differences between these papers and ours. Firstly,
here we consider innovation as an ambiguous process, rather than a risky one. Thus,
the central problem of this chapter is the characterization of the optimal contract in
presence of ambiguity. We show that the introduction of ambiguity and the different
attitudes towards ambiguity among the contractees alleviate the dynamic moral haz-
ard problem, preventing in-equilibrium delay in funding in the finite horizon case,
and in the infinite horizon this leads to a monotonically decreasing level of invest-
ment. Also, in the current chapter we model innovation as a two stage game, where
at the first stage, in each period the firms experiment to observe an informative
binary signal, and depending on the signal realization, may enter the development
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stage, where the true quality of the project is finally revealed. This modelling frame-
work with non-conclusive signals gives rise to a positive option value of waiting and
changes the optimal contract structure. It illustrates the role of patent laws, which
enables us to analyze the role of government policies in innovation.
Bonatti and Horner [26], and Campbell et al. [32] study experimentation in
teams with unobservable actions and they also find the possibility of delay. In a two
period model with the principal having the commitment power, Manso [113], and
Ederer and Manso [55], show that the contracts that foster experimentation greatly
differ from the standard pay-for-performance contracts. Halac et al. [84] examine
long term contracting for experimentation with moral hazard and adverse selection,
and show that the optimal contract implements low effort from the low ability agent.
Adrian and Westerfield [2] develop a model in which the principal and the agent
disagree about the resolution of uncertainties and show that this disagreement risk
sharing leads to an endogenous regime shift. He et al. [88] introduce uncertainty
in the seminal work by Holmstrom and Milgrom [92], and show that the optimal
contract displays a front-loading pattern. Optimal contracting for experimentation
under moral hazard or adverse selection concerns has been studied in a growing body
of literature ([118], [76], [70]).
In contrast, this chapter studies innovation under ambiguity and in an infinite
horizon stopping time problem, characterizes the dynamic contract organizing the
research activities.
This chapter is part of the literature examining the impact of ambiguity in
the contracting environment. Similar to this study, the paper by Besanko, Tong and
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Wu [21] considers delegated experimentation under ambiguity. However, while their
paper examines the adverse selection problem in the experimentation context and
using maximum likelihood updating, shows the optimality of a pooling contract in a
perfect objectivist equilibrium, here I focus on the moral hazard problem.
In a static context, Lopomo, Rigotti and Shannon [110] examine the moral
hazard problem under ambiguity and show how simple contract structures turn out
to be optimal. In a static general equilibrium framework, Amarante et al. [6] discuss
the effects of ambiguity and heterogeneous belief among the decision makers and the
entrepreneur. Rigotii et al. [122] characterize the diffusion profile of a new technology
under ambiguity. Byun [31] characterizes the optimal incentive scheme for innovation
in a static game. In contrast, we analyze ambiguity in a dynamic environment and
using dynamically consistent Bayesian updating, we show how the optimal contract
structure facilitates ambiguity sharing.
There is also a growing strand of literature that analyzes dynamic contracts
and mechanism design problem and illustrates the importance of dynamic agency
costs. This chapter, discussing the dynamic agency cost under ambiguity, is related
to that strand of literature as well. Bergemann and Pavan [18] contain a detailed
survey of this literature. The importance of dynamic agency cost has been well
documented in literature using both the continuous time framework ([50], [126], [51],
[25], [67]) and discrete time models ([24], [23], [106]). In this chapter, we analyze the
dynamic agency cost arising from the diversion of resources by the researcher and
show that the presence of ambiguity and difference in attitude towards ambiguity
among the contracting parties alleviate the dynamic moral hazard problem.
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Following Gilboa and Schmeidler’s seminal work on ambiguity [72], multiple
prior models of ambiguity have been applied to various dynamic decision making con-
texts. However, with multiple priors, prior-by-prior updating of belief using Bayes
rule usually leads to dynamic inconsistency. There are different approaches to mod-
elling ambiguity averse preferences in a dynamically consistent way. Some papers
take the approach that deals with recursive extensions (e.g. , [58], [111], [102]), others
posit dynamic inconsistency and adopt assumptions, such as backward induction or
naive ignorance of the inconsistency, to pin down behavior (e.g. Siniscalchi, 2008)
, yet another approach uses non-consequentialist updating rules ([112])5. In this
chapter, we use the ambiguity framework developed in [54], which characterizes a
vNM approach to ambiguity and uses Bayes rule to obtain dynamically consistent
updating of beliefs. Thus, this chapter fits in the literature of decision making with
ambiguity in a dynamic framework.
Apart from these strands of literature, there is a vast body of literature in
Economics, Management, Law and Organization design that discusses the strategic
partnerships, their governance structure, and the role of government policies in in-
novation. Gilson, Sabel and Scott [74] analyze the specific features of the strategic
partnerships and underline the importance of Knightian uncertainty in innovation
context. Baker et al. [10] show how all possible governance structures may emerge
in such contexts. Van de Ven [137] discusses how the management of innovation
can overcome the problems associated with the innovation process. Lerner and Mal-
mendier [107] show how incomplete contracts can be used as the optimal contractual
5For a more complete survey, refer to [61].
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design to solve the problem of moral hazard in Biotechnology research partnerships.
Hagedoorn et al. [83] underline the importance of research partnerships and suggest
that the patent granting authority should be aware of the benefits and shortcomings
of these partnerships in conducting R&D. A vast body of literature discuss various
related issues in the context of different industries ([81], [82], [120], [133], [123]).
This chapter, analyzing the research alliances from a theoretical point of view and
showing how the observed contract structure optimally organizes innovation, fits in
this strand of literature as well.
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1.4 Model and Analysis
In this section I first set up the model, characterize the Policymaker’s optimum
and then examine the contractual equilibrium.
1.4.1 General Set-up
States: The innovation activity is centered around a project, success of which
depends on the true state or true profitability of the project: θ ∈ Θ. The true state
is not known; moreover, it is not possible to form a single probabilistic assessment
about it. In a multiple prior setting,
Θ = {Good,Bad}
Pr(θ = Good) = [r0, s0] ; 0 ≤ r0 < s0 ≤ 1.
Using the framework of ambiguity developed in [54] (described in greater
detail in Appendix B of this chapter), we observe that the interval [r0, s0] has
a unique representation as a convex combination of extreme sets given by Θ′ =
{Good,Bad, Unknowable}, where the new epistemic state “Unknowable” is moti-
vated in Section 2.
Thus, each [r0, s0] is represented as:
[r0, s0] = r0[1, 1] + (1− s0)[0, 0] + (s0 − r0)[0, 1]
The state Unknowable is represented as [0, 1], the state at which the decision maker
knows only that the probability of θ = Good is someplace between 0 and 1.
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Thus, in this framework, we can alternatively represent this set-valued prior
by a three state expected utility model, where the true state of the project lies in
Θ′ :
Θ′ = {Good,Bad, Unknowable}
Pr(θ = Good) = r0
Pr(θ = Bad) = 1− s0
Pr(θ = Unknowable) = s0 − r0
0 ≤ r0 < s0 ≤ 1.
That is, with probability r0, at the end it will be revealed that the project is
profitable, with probability 1−s0 it will be revealed that the project is not profitable,
but with probability s0 − r0, the true profitability of the project will turn out to be
“Unknowable,” or, Not Yet Known, depending on the current state of technology
and knowledge. Notice that s0− r0 captures the idea that the decision maker knows
only a partial description about the underlying distribution; if r0 = s0 then we are
back to the “risky” context.
If the payoff for θ = Good is uG, for θ = Bad is uB < uG, then the payoff
associated with the new state θ = Unknowable is computed as:
u(θ = Unknowable) =
1
2
(uG + uB)− v
2
(uG − uB);
where the ambiguity aversion parameter v captures the attitude towards am-
biguity. v > 0 refers to the decision maker being ambiguity averse. The higher v
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is, the more the decision maker dislikes the state θ = Unknowable, hence can be
considered as more ambiguity averse. Here, I assume v ∈ (0, 1).
Innovation Time line: To finish the project, one must go through two
distinct stages:
1. Experimentation stage: At this stage of innovation, at every period t, some
fund Kt ∈ [0, K] ⊂ [0, 1) is invested in the project and at the end of the period
an informative signal St is realized. The signal is binary: St ∈ {sH , sL}, with
the distribution to be specified below. Only if the signal is “high enough,” i.e.
it surpasses the quality threshold determined by the patent-granting authority,
the project is allowed to move to the next stage: the Development stage. This
threshold can be interpreted as the Patent Law or the FDA approval criterion.
If the signal fails to clear the threshold, the researching authorities may con-
tinue experimenting (move to period t + 1 in the experimentation stage), or
abandon the project forever (gross return= 0).
2. Development stage: If the signal is high enough to clear the patenting threshold,
the project is enters the Development stage. Here, the researcher(s) can choose
to develop the project by making a fixed investment of the amount I > 0 ,
after which the true state will be revealed. If the true state is θ = Good, the
project yields a return of R > I, otherwise the gross return is 0. However,
instead of investing I to reveal the true state, the researching authority may
want to liquidate the project as well, collecting a liquidation value of L > 0.
The general time line is represented in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Innovation Process
Signal Structure: The signal structure assumed throughout this chapter
is given below. At any period t, the signal is conditionally independent and jointly
distributed with the state θ ∈ Θ′ .
At any period t, investment flow increases signal precision.
Pr(St = sH |θ = G) = λG(Kt)
Pr(St = sH |θ = U) = λU(Kt)
Pr(St = sH |θ = B) = λB(Kt) (1.1)
The parametric restrictions we impose on the signal structure are:
Assumption1 :
1 > λG(Kt) > λU(Kt) > λB(Kt) ≥ 0 ∀Kt ∈ [0, K]
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Assumption2 :
λ′G(Kt) > λ
′
U(Kt) > λ
′
B(Kt) ∀Kt ∈ [0, K]
Assumption 3 :
λG(Kt)
1− λG(Kt) >
λU(Kt)
1− λU(Kt) >
λB(Kt)
1− λB(Kt) ∀Kt ∈ [0, K] (MLRP)
While the first assumption ensures that λθ(Kt) is a valid probability measure
defined on Θ′, the second assumption states that higher investment increases the
signal precision. The third assumption is called the Monotone Likelihood Ratio
Property and is defined as follows:
Definition 1.4.1 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property). The signal structure sat-
isfies Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) if the probability of observing
St = sH relative to that of observing St = sL is increasing in the true state, when
the states are ordered Good  Unknowable  Bad. Mathematically, it is captured
by equation MLRP.
Now, the conditional distribution associated with this binary signal is char-
acterized below:
Signal Structure
St sH sL
θ = G (1, 1) rt−1λG(Kt) rt−1(1− λG(Kt)) rt−1
θ = Unknowable (0, 1) (st−1 − rt−1)λU(Kt) (st−1 − rt−1)(1− λU(Kt)) st−1 − rt−1
θ = B(0, 0) (1− st−1)λB(Kt) (1− st−1)(1− λB(Kt)) 1− st−1
µt 1− µt 1
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So that,
Pr(St = sH) = µt(Kt)
= rt−1λG(Kt) + (st−1 − rt−1)λU(Kt) + (1− st−1)λB(Kt)
After observing the binary signal, at the end of each period, the beliefs are
updated using Bayes Law.
After observing a high signal St = sH , the updated posterior puts weight on
the three states as follows:
Pr(θ = G|St = sH) = rt−1λG
µt
= rHt
Pr(θ = B|St = sH) = (1− st−1)λB
µt
= 1− sHt
Pr(θ = U |St = sH) = (st−1 − rt−1)λB
µt
= sHt − rHt
Thus, in the multiple prior interpretation, the set valued posterior after observing a
high signal St = sH is:
Pr(θ = G)|St=sH = [rHt , sHt ] =
[
rt−1λG(Kt)
µt
, 1− (1− st−1)λB(Kt)
µt
]
Similarly, after St = sL, posterior becomes:
Pr(θ = G)|St=sL = [rLt , sLt ] =
[
rt−1(1− λG(Kt))
1− µt , 1−
(1− st−1)(1− λB(Kt))
1− µt
]
To save on notation, let us define the average of the posterior belief as the posterior
mean:
posterior mean =
rt + st
2
= pt
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and the average spread of the posterior belief as the posterior ambiguity:
posterior ambiguity =
st − rt
2
= qt
Note that, by MLRP, after observing St = sH , posterior mean pt increases and
posterior ambiguity qt decreases; and after St = sL, pt decreases and qt increases.
Intuitively, the signals can be thought of as random draws from a Bernoulli
distribution:
St ∼ Bernoulli(λG(Kt)) if θ = Good
St ∼ Bernoulli(λU(Kt)) if θ = Unknowable
St ∼ Bernoulli(λB(Kt)) if θ = Bad
Then, after observing each binary signal, the decision maker updates his belief
about the true parameter. The following graph (Figure 1.2) depicting 30 simulations
of signals for each of the three true states (with parameters: λG = 0.7, λU = 0.5, λB =
0.1, K = 1) shows how repeated sampling for a long time eventually reveals the state,
as the posterior converges to one of the states with almost certainty. However, due to
the positive cost of experimenting, it is not optimal to experiment forever. Then the
problem for the decision maker becomes an optimal stopping problem: the decision
maker has to follow an optimal rule about when to stop experimenting, depending
on the observed sequence of signals.
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of Beliefs for 30 Consecutive Signals
In the main body of this chapter, we will assume linear signal structure, i.e.
Pr(St = sH |θ = G) = λG(Kt) = λGKt
Pr(St = sH |θ = U) = λU(Kt) = λUKt
Pr(St = sH |θ = B) = λB(Kt) = λBKt (1.2)
with
Pr(St = sH) = µt = Ktλt
= Kt[rt−1λG + (1− st−1)λB + (st−1 − rt−1)λU ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
λt
(1.3)
In section 8, we discuss the case with general non-linear signal structure and
show that qualitatively the results hold in that case.
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The next subsection discusses how the patent law is set, depending on the
signal structure described above.
1.4.2 Patent Law
Assume that the patent law is set by the Policymaker (the patent-granting
authority, or the regulatory agency), who is a risk and ambiguity neutral entity. The
Policymaker values the “open questions,” or the “Unknowable” state more than the
commercial firms do, hence is less ambiguity averse (for simplification, I assume am-
biguity neutrality). Assume that the Policymaker cares only for the payoffs generated
from the project6. The Policymaker sets the patent law to reflect his own desired
outcome: the “Policymaker’s Optimum,” or, the “Risk and Ambiguity Neutral
Optimum (RAN Optimum).”
After observing the signal at the end of each period, the Policymaker chooses
whether to develop (aRANt = Dev), or to liquidate the project (a
RAN
t = Liq), or to
continue experimenting further (aRANt = Continue).
The payoffs associated with the actions are:
Payoffs
aRANt =Dev a
RAN
t =Liq
θ = Good R− I L
θ = Bad −I L
θ = Unknowable 1
2
R− I L
6It might be argued that it is more natural to assume that the Policymaker would internalize the
positive externalities the project might generate as well. However, to make the comparison between
the contractual outcome and the outcome desired by the Policymaker, here I do not consider the
externalities. In Section 5, I discuss how including the externalities make the contractual outcome
diverge further from the risk and ambiguity neutral benchmark outcome.
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Thus, after observing a signal at period t, with the updated posterior [rt, st],
the expected payoff to the Policymaker from choosing action aRANt = Dev is:
EuRANt (a
RAN
t = Dev, (rt, st))
= rt(R− I) + (1− st)(−I) + (st − rt)(1
2
R− I)
=
rt + st
2
R− I = ptR− I
The expected payoff from choosing aRANt = Liq is L.
The Policymaker’s optimal stopping rule identifies the regions of posterior
beliefs where it is optimal to stop experimenting and develop the project: ∆H , and
the region where it is optimal to stop experimenting and liquidate the project: ∆S.
Then, at the beginning of each period, the problem can be formulated recursively
using the optimality equation or Bellman equation:
V RANt (rt−1, st−1) = max
∆H ,∆S ,K
RAN
t
Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆H)(ptR− I) + Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆S)L−Kt
+ δEtV
RAN
t+1 (rt, st) (RAN)
where the regions ∆H ,∆S are defined as follows:
∆H = {(rt, st) ∈ K∆[0,1]| aRANt = Dev}
∆S = {(rt, st) ∈ K∆[0,1]| aRANt = Liq}
Lemma 1.4.1. There exists a unique solution to the RAN optimization problem.
Proof. The proof involves showing that the optimality equation satisfies the Black-
well sufficiency conditions, hence is a contraction. Then a direct use of the Contrac-
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tion Mapping Theorem gives the existence and uniqueness of the result. Details in
Appendix A.
Now, let us examine the optimal stopping rule. After observing the signal,
based on the updated posterior [rt, st], the expected payoff is:
max{ptR− I, L, δEtV RANt+1 (rt, st)}
In order to solve for the RAN optima, let us define:
Fj(rt, st) = based on [rt, st], the maximum expected value if experimentation stops at j
= Et
[
δj−t max{pjR− I, L} −
j−1∑
s=t
δs−tKs
]
(1.4)
Define:
At = {Ft > (Ft+1|(rt, st)} t = 1, 2, ..
we show that At s form a monotone sequence.
Lemma 1.4.2. If Ft(rt, st) ≥ Ft+1(rt, st), then Ft+1(rt, st) ≥ Ft+2(rt, st), i.e. A1 ⊂
A2 ⊂ .. ∪∞1 An , hence the region where stopping immediately is optimal forms a
monotone sequence.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Then, the “One-stop ahead” rule is optimal, i.e. , if stopping the experimen-
tation process today is better than continuing experimenting for exactly one more
period, then it is always optimal to stop today ([37]). Using that, we obtain the
optimal stopping rule, given in the next proposition.
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Proposition 1.4.3. The RAN optima, or, the “Policymaker’s Optimum” is given
by the stopping rule
aRANt (rt, st) =

Dev if (rt, st) ∈ ∆H
Liq if (rt, st) ∈ ∆S
Continue otherwise
where the optimal stopping thresholds are:
∆H : = {(rt, st)|βH1rt + βH2st ≥ βH3};
∆S : = {(rt, st)|βS1rt + βS2st < βS3}
The stopping time is:
TRAN = inf{t|(rt, st) ∈ ∆H ∪ (rt, st) ∈ ∆S}
Also, the project receives full funding in every period it is continued.
Kt = K ∀t ≤ TRAN
Proof. In Appendix A.
Thus, the Policymaker’s value from this innovation project becomes:
V S0 = E0
[
TS∑
t=1
δt−1
(
Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆H)(ptR− I) + Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆S)L−K
)]
(1.5)
The Policymaker sets the region ∆H as the patent threshold. According to
the patent law, the project has to clear this threshold in order to be granted a patent.
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Only after the patent is granted, the property rights are recognized; hence the project
can be liquidated for a positive liquidation value L > 07.
The patent law threshold is depicted in the Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Policymaker’s Optimum and the Patent Law
Note that, once the posterior belief [rt, st] ∈ ∆H , so that the project is granted
a patent, according to the RAN optima, it is optimal to stop experimenting and de-
velop the project. However, we will see in the next sections that the contractual
outcome between an ambiguity neutral research lab and a ambiguity averse commer-
cial firm may differ from this RAN optimal stopping rule.
7The patent law mandates that before clearing the patenting threshold, the project is not worth
any positive value. This loss of value associated with the patent law reflects the social cost of
granting monopoly power to the patent owners.
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1.5 Contractual Outcome
Given the patent law set by the Policymaker, now let us focus on the contrac-
tual problem. The two parties forming the research alliance are: a big commercial
firm (henceforth CF ) and the smaller research-oriented firm or research lab (hence-
forth RL). Both the parties are risk-neutral and initially share a common prior about
the true profitability of the project:
Pr(θ = Good) = [r0, s0]; 0 ≤ r0 < s0 ≤ 1.
[r0, s0] /∈ ∆H
RL owns the project, but is liquidity constrained, so CF funds the project.
At the experimentation phase, RL conducts the research activities, but after the
project moves to the development phase, CF takes over the clinical trial and/or
commercialization process (“development of the project”).
The two parties, however, differ in their attitude towards ambiguity. RL likes
the “open questions,” or the “Unknowable” state more than the commercial firm,
so is less ambiguity averse than CF . It can be justified by arguing that identifying
open questions can open up the avenue of further research and help RL, or, “learning
by doing” might add to the existing knowledge base of RL, whereas the commercial
firm, which cares only for current profits, dislikes this state more, because the project
does not yield a stream of payoffs if the true state is “Unknowable.” To simplify, we
assume that RL is ambiguity neutral while CF is ambiguity averse8.
8In section 5, I discuss how the ability to write a contract on the knowledge generated from the
research can change the ambiguity attitude of the two firms.
32
Now, let us describe the contracting time line, as captured in the figures 1.4
and 1.5 below. At the beginning of each period t, RL makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
to CF specifying
(a) xt: : the proportional share of the final return RL receives, if the project
is developed till the end
(b) bt : the bonus that RL gets once the project clears the threshold, i.e. , is
granted a Patent, and,
(c) Kt : amount of investment to be disbursed in the t
th period9.
CF accepts or rejects the offer. If accepted, the funds are disbursed and then
RL privately decides whether to invest the fund or divert it for personal benefit (or
cross-subsidization). At the end of the period, the signal St is publicly realized and
beliefs are accordingly updated. If the signal is high enough, i.e. , [rt, st] ∈ ∆H ,
then the project is allowed to move to the Development Stage. In the Development
stage, CF unilaterally decides whether to continue developing the product, liquidate
the project, or keep experimenting further. If the project is continued till the end,
after investing the fixed amount I, the true state θ is realized and returns accrue to
the contracting parties. If the project is liquidated, CF appropriates the property
rights, therefore obtains the liquidation value L > 0.
If the signal is not high enough , i. e. , [rt, st] /∈ ∆H , then CF decides whether
9Here, it is assumed that the research lab owns the project and faces a competetive market of
commercial firms for that project, hence enjoys all the bargaining power. In real life, such contexts
feature multiple commercial firms as well as research labs, so in any contracting environment, no
party enjoys the full extent of the bargaining power. However, this assumption, while simplifying
the calculations, does not qualitatively change the results.
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to continue experimenting at period t + 1 with updated beliefs, or to abandon the
project, earning a return of 0 forever. The time line is depicted in the two figures
below.
Figure 1.4: Contracting Time Line: Experimentation Stage
After observing the signal, with posterior[rt, st] , the expected payoffs for the
contracting parties are:
Payoffs of RL
a(CF ) =Dev a(CF ) =Liq
θ = Good Rxt bt
θ = Bad 0 bt
θ = Unknowable 1
2
Rxt bt
Payoffs of CF
a(CF ) =Dev a(CF ) =Liq
θ = Good R(1− xt)− I L− bt
θ = Bad −I L− bt
θ = Unknowable 1
2
R(1− xt)(1− v)− I L− bt
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Figure 1.5: Contracting Time Line: Development Stage
Thus, the expected payoffs:
CF :
Eu(CF )(a(CF )) = Dev, (rt, st)) = (pt − vqt)R(1− xt)− I
Eu(CF )(a(CF )) = Liq, (rt, st)) = L− bt
RL :
Eu(RL)(a(CF )) = Dev, (rt, st)) = ptRxt
Eu(RL)(a(CF )) = Liq, (rt, st)) = bt
The contracting parties do not have the power to commit to a long term
contract. Then, RL, who has the full bargaining power in this model, always offers a
contract that ensures CF only the minimum payment required to keep investing, so
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CF always breaks even. After observing [rt, st] ∈ ∆H , CF obtains a payoff of ptR(1−
xt)− I if he develops the project, L− bt if he liquidates, and an expected payoff of 0
from future experimentation. Clearly, CF always chooses to stop experimentation as
soon as [rt, st] ∈ ∆H10. Thus, at any period t, if the observed signal induces a posterior
belief higher than the patenting threshold, CF never continues experimentation.
Before discussing the infinite horizon model, let us first analyze the two period
contracting game, which will illustrate the intuitions behind the main results of this
chapter. The findings from this two period example are readily extendable to the
finite horizon contracting problem, and they will provide the intuitive understanding
about the model in the general infinite horizon setting.
1.5.1 Two Period Example
In this example, the project is exogenously terminated after t = 2. Let us first
describe the problem, then using backward induction, we will analyze the optimal
contract.
If the project is continued till t = 2, at the beginning of the last period, RL
chooses the contractual term considering CF ′s optimal action choice after the signal
clears the patent threshold: a(CF )|[r2,s2]∈∆H. ∈ {Dev, Liq}.
At t = 2, the state variables on the equilibrium path are [r1, s1], the updated
10If we relax the assumption that RL has limited liability, then RL can make a payment to CF
in order to continue experimenting even after clearing the patenting threshold. I discuss this case
in section 6 and show that qualitatively the results do not change.
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belief after observing last period’s signal. RL solves:
V2(r1, s1) = max
a(CF )
{V Dev2 , V Liq2 }
where
V Dev2 =
RL′s expected payoff from period 2 if, given the contractual terms,
CF develops the product after reaching ∆H.(a(CF ) = Dev)
V Liq2 =
RL′s expected payoff from period 2 if, given the contractual terms,
CF liquidates the product after reaching ∆H.(a(CF ) = Liq)
Now,
V Dev2 = max
x2,b2,K2
Pr((r2, s2) ∈ ∆H)[Rp2x2]
Pr((r2, s2) ∈ ∆H)[Rp2|(r2,s2)∈∆Hx2] ≥ K2 (IC2, Dev(RL))
Pr((r2, s2) ∈ ∆H)[R(p2 − vq2)|(r2,s2)∈∆H (1− x2)− I] ≥ K2
(PC2, Dev(CF ))
R(p2 − vq2)|(r2,s2)∈∆H (1− x2)− I ≥ L− b2 (IC2, Dev(CF ))
x2 ∈ [0, 1]; b2 ≥ 0;K2 ∈ [0, K]
And,
V Liq2 = max
x2,b2,K2
Pr((r2, s2) ∈ ∆H)[b2] (1.6)
Pr((r2, s2) ∈ ∆H)[b2] ≥ K2 IC2, Liq(RL)
Pr((r2, s2) ∈ ∆H)[L− b2] ≥ K2 (PC2, Liq(CF ))
R(p2 − vq2)|(r2,s2)∈∆H (1− x2)− I ≤ L− b2 (IC2, Liq(CF ))
x2 ∈ [0, 1]; b2 ≥ 0;K2 ∈ [0, K]
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Let us take a closer look at the constraint set. The first constraint is the
standard incentive compatibility constraint for RL, which ensures that the expected
payoff for RL at t = 2 has to be greater than or equal to the static gain that RL
might enjoy by diverting the investment, thereby implementing no diversion on the
equilibrium path. Notice that, in this setting, if any partial diversion is beneficial,
so is the full diversion, that is why it is sufficient to consider the incentive constraint
only for the full diversion case. The second constraint is the participation constraint
for CF , guaranteeing CF an expected return to cover the investment cost. Without
loss of generality, CF ′s outside option is normalized to 0. The last constraint shows
that after the signal realization, it is sequentially optimal for CF to develop the
project in the first case and liquidate in the second.
Solving the problem, we get three regions of posterior belief: ∆D,∆L , such
that
∆D = {(rt, st) ∈ ∆H | a(CF )|∆H = Dev
i.e. , CF chooses to develop the project once being granted a patent
Remark 1.5.1 (Ambiguity Sharing). Observe that, as v increases, i.e. , CF becomes
more ambiguity averse, the share he receives, 1− x2, goes up. Thus, the contractual
payment rule effectively shares ambiguity.
Remark 1.5.2 ((Evolution of Share)). As experimentation continues, the contracting
parties grow more pessimistic as posterior belief declines. The share CF demands
goes up accordingly over time to compensate.
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Thus, RL solves:
V2 = λ2 max
KDev2 ,K
Liq
2
{
KDev2 p2
(
R− 1
p2 − vq2
(
I +
1
λ2
))
, KLiq2
(
L− 1
λ2
)}
(1.7)
subject to the constraint:
KDev2 p2
(
R− 1
p2 − vq2
(
I +
1
λ2
))
≥ K
Dev
2
λ2
if (r2, s2) ∈ ∆D
KLiq2
(
L− 1
λ2
)
≥ K
Liq
2
λ2
if (r2, s2) ∈ ∆L
So, KDev2 = K , and K
Liq
2 = K , if
max
{
p2
(
R− 1
p2 − vq2
(
I +
1
λ2
))
, L− 1
λ2
}
≥ 1
λ2
(1.8)
If this condition is satisfied, the expected value to RL from t = 2 is:
V2(r1, s1) = λ2K
{
p2
(
R− 1
p2 − vq2
(
I +
1
λ2
))
,
(
L− 1
λ2
)}
(1.9)
The regions where the project is developed till the end, and where it is liqui-
dated are identified as:
∆D =
{
(r2, s2) ∈ ∆H | p2
(
R− 1
p2 − vq2
(
I +
1
λ2
))
≥
(
L− 1
λ2
)}
(1.10)
∆L =
{
(r2, s2) ∈ ∆H | p2
(
R− 1
p2 − vq2
(
I +
1
λ2
))
<
(
L− 1
λ2
)}
(1.11)
Remark 1.5.3 (Patent Troll). Observe that, in the absence of ambiguity, or, if both
the parties were ambiguity neutral (v = 0), then
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p2R− I > L ∀(rt, st) ∈ ∆H ,
so, ∆L = φ.
In ambiguous context, however, there exists vm such that for v ∈ (vm, 1) 11,
∆L = ∆H\∆D 6= φ.
This region resembles Patent Troll12 behavior, where even after being granted
a patent, the research alliance liquidates the project. Patent troll happens because
of the ambiguity aversion of CF, who acts more pessimistically after observing each
low signal. So, even if the posterior ensures that a risk and ambiguity neutral entity
would optimally choose to develop the project, CF decides to liquidate.
Now, let us go one step backward at t = 1.
At t = 1, RL solves:
V1(r0, s0) = max
a(CF )
{V Dev1 , V Liq1 }
11vm =
(r0+s0)((r0+s0)R−L−I)λ0
λ0[(s0−r0)((r0+s0)R−L]+1)
12 Technically, the term ”patent troll” refers to the entities which obtain and enforce patent
rights but do not manufacture products or supply services based upon the patent in question, thus
engaging in economic rent-seeking.
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where
V Dev1 = max
x1,b1,K1
K1λ1[Rp1x1] + δ(1−K1λ1)E1V2(r1, s1)
K1λ1[Rp1x1] + δ(1−K1λ1)E1V2(r1, s1)
≥ K1 + δE1V2(r1, s1; r0, s0) (IC1(RL))
K1λ1[R(p1 − vq1)(1− x1)− I] ≥ K1 (PC1(CF ))
R(p1 − vq1)(1− x1)− I ≥ L− b1 (IC1(CF ))
x1 ∈ [0, 1]; b1 ≥ 0;K1 ∈ [0, K]
And,
V Liq1 = max
x1,b1,K1
K1λ1b1 + δ(1−K1λ1)E1V2(r1, s1)
K1λ1b1 + δ(1−K1λ1)E1V2(r1, s1)
≥ K1 + δE1V2(r1, s1; r0, s0) (IC1, Liq(RL))
K1λ1[L− b1] ≥ K1 (PC1, Liq(CF ))
R(p1 − vq1)(1− x1)− I ≤ L− b1 (IC1, Liq(CF ))
x1 ∈ [0, 1]; b1 ≥ 0;K1 ∈ [0, K]
In period 1, compared to the problem at t = 2, the participation constraint
for CF remains same with the corresponding posterior belief at t = 1; however
the incentive constraint for RL requires a closer look. The incentive constraints
(IC(RL)) and (IC(RL)) highlight the two sources of gain from cheating: the static
gain and the dynamic gain. The static gain is similar as in the second period,
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stemming from the benefit RL derives by diverting the investment amount (K1),
so the IC at t = 1 has to ensure that RL′s expected payoff from t = 1 has to be
greater than the investment. However, there is a dynamic gain from cheating as well,
captured by the dynamic cheating value: which arises from the fact that following
a diversion of funds at t = 1, the posterior belief of RL and CF diverge. Because
of the diversion, the signal S1 is always sL, observing which CF is prompted to
update his belief to [r1, s1]|S1=sL , with posterior mean p1 and ambiguity q1. The next
period’s contract will then be based on this public belief [r1, s1]. However, RL has
perfectly observed his own action, so even after the low signal he does not update
his belief and evaluates the future contracting terms using his private belief [r0, s0].
This constitutes the dynamic agency cost:
DAC2 = δ[V2(cheat)− V2(no cheat)]
= δ[E1V2(r1, s1; r0, s0)− (1−K1λ1)E1V2(r1, s1)]
= δ

[
λ1p1
λ2p2
− (1−K1λ1)
]
V2(r1, s1) if (r2, s2) ∈ ∆D[
λ1
λ2
− (1−K1λ1)
]
V2(r1, s1) if (r2, s2) ∈ ∆L
> 0
Under some parametric conditions, the dynamic agency cost leads to delay in
funding as well, so that it is optimal for the project to receive funding at t = 2 but
no contract with positive funding satisfies both the participation and moral hazard
constraints. Let us analyze all possible cases separately to see the region of posteriors
where in-equilibirum delay might occur.
Case 1: (r1, s1) ∈ ∆D and (r2, s2) ∈ ∆D :
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With δ = 0, delay never occurs, since:
λ1
(
p1R− p1
(p1 − vq1)λ1 −
Ip1
p1 − vq1
)
≥ λ2
(
p2R− p2
(p2 − vq2)λ2 −
Ip2
p2 − vq2
)
≥ 1
However, if δ > 0, dynamic moral hazard makes funding the project at t = 1
more difficult than at t = 2. As a result, in-equilibrium delay happens if
1 + λ1p1
(
1
(p1−vq1)λ1 +
I
p1−vq1
)
− δ
(
λ1p1 − (1− µ1)λ2p2
(
1
(p2−vq2)λ2 − Ip2−vq2
))
λ1p1 − δ (λ1p1 − (1− µ1)λ2p2)
> R ≥
1 + λ2p2
(
1
(p2−vq2)λ2 +
I
p2−vq2
)
λ2p2
(1.12)
The possibility of in-equilibrium delay due to dynamic agency cost is well
documented in the literature of dynamic contracts ([16], [26]). In this chapter, we
find that in the presence of ambiguity, the commercial firm’s ambiguity aversion reins
in this dynamic moral hazard problem. Intuitively, CF, being ambiguity averse,
becomes much more cautious and pessimistic after each low signal. So, following
a low signal, CF has to be guaranteed a greater share of the final return in order
to keep investing. This ambiguity sharing agreement disciplines RL and lowers his
dynamic expected value from cheating (DAC2) which, in turn, eases the funding
constraint at t = 1 and possibility of in-equilibrium delay falls.
The next proposition summarizes the finding that, in this two period context,
under Case 1, the dynamic value of cheating decreases with v and in-equilibrium
delay happens for a smaller range of R , and, in fact if v ≥ v˜ , where v˜ ∈ (0, 1) is
characterized below, then delay in funding does not happen on the equilibrium path.
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Proposition 1.5.1. For discount rate δ ≤ δ, ∃v˜ ∈ (0, 1), such that ∀v ≥ v˜, in-
equilibrium delay never happens in the basic two period model.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Also, in this case, if funding condition is met at t = 1, full funding is disbursed,
because of the linearity of signal structure.
In the next two cases, there is no possibility of in-equilibirum delay.
Case 2: (r1, s1) ∈ ∆D and (r2, s2) ∈ ∆L :
Here, funding at t = 2 requires
L− 2
λ2
≥ 0 (1.13)
Now, at t = 1,
p1
[
R− 1
p1 − vq1
(
I +
1
λ1
)]
−
(
λ1
λ2
− (1−K1λ2)
)(
L− 2
λ2
)
>
(
L− 2
λ2
)[
1−
(
λ1
λ2
− (1−K1λ2)
)]
≥ 0 (1.14)
so, full funding is always available at t = 1 is always met if 1.13 is satisfied.
Similarly, in Case 3: (r1, s1) ∈ ∆D and (r2, s2) ∈ ∆L,
since
L− 2
λ1
−
(
λ1
λ2
− (1−K1λ2)
)(
L− 2
λ2
)
>
(
L− 2
λ2
)[
1−
(
λ1
λ2
− (1−K1λ2)
)]
≥ 0
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there is no possibility of in-equilibrium delay.
The contractual terms at t = 1 are otherwise similar to those at t = 2.
Thus, from analyzing this two period problem, we observe that
Remark 1.5.4 (Result 1:). With ambiguity averse CF and ambiguity neutral RL,
dynamic moral hazard problem is alleviated. As a result, under some parametric
restrictions, in-equilibirium delay does not happen.
Remark 1.5.5 (Result 2:). The research alliance may liquidate the project even after
being granted a patent.
1.5.2 Infinite Horizon Model
In this section we analyze the infinite horizon sequential contracting game
between CF and RL and derive the equilibrium contractual outcome. Let us first
formally define the equilibrium.
At any period t, the observable, or, public history consists of the past con-
tracts offered, the past realizations of signals and CF ′s decision whether to develop,
liquidate or continue the project. Potentially, this public history can be different
than the private history of RL, who observes his own decision to divert the fund as
well.
Formally, let HPt denote the set of all possible public histories up to, but not
including, period t. Each element hPt ∈ HPt contains
(a) the past contractual terms: {xj, bj, Kj}t−1j=1
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(b) past strategic choices of CF to accept or reject the contract offered at
each period: {ζj}t−1j=1 (ζt = 1 if CF accepts an offer at period t, 0 otherwise)
(c) past realized values of the signals: {Sj}t−1j=1
(d) past strategic choices of CF after observing the signal realizations at every
period: {a(CF )}t−1j=1.
In contrast, the set of possible private histories is denoted by Ht, where each
element ht ∈ Ht , in addition to hPt , contains {dj}t−1j=1, the past realizations of the
strategic choices of RL whether to divert the fund (dt = 1 if the fund is invested in
period t and 0 if diverted).
The true history leads to the posterior belief formed by RL at the beginning
of period t : [rt−1, st−1] : Ht → K∆[0,1] . In consequence, CF also has a belief about
the true history, captured by the belief about the true posterior formed by CF :
[r′t−1, s
′
t−1] : H
P
t ×D′t → K∆[0,1] , which depends on the public history as well as the
belief CF has about RL′s past investment behavior: {d′j}t−1j=1. D′t contains the set of
all beliefs {d′j}t−1j=1.
Then, a contract (xt, bt, Kt) by RL is a mapping from the true history Ht into
the sharing rule xt , bonus rule bt and investment flow Kt.
xt : Ht → [0, 1]
bt : Ht → R+
Kt : Ht → [0, K] ⊂ [0, 1]
A decision rule by CF whether to accept or reject the contract is then a mapping
from the perceived history: {xj, bj, Kj, ζj, a(CF ), d′j}t−1j=1, and the contract proposed,
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into a binary decision to reject or accept the contract:
ζt : H
P
t × [0, 1]× R+ × [0, K]→ {0, 1}
An investment policy by RL is:
dt : Ht × [0, 1]× R+ × [0, K]× {0, 1} → {0, 1}
A decision rule by CF after observing the signal at the end of period t is a
mapping from the public history, contractual terms, perceived belief about diversion
strategy of RL given the incentives provided by the contract, and the realized signal
St ∈ {sH , sL} into the choice to develop, liquidate, continue, or abandon the project
at the end of period t.
a(CF ) : HPt × [0, 1]× R+ × [0, K]× {0, 1} ×K∆[0,1] → {Dev, Liq, Abandon, Cont}
In this model, we are in a Markovian world, because all the payoff rele-
vant history can be captured by the four state variables: (rt−1, st−1, r′t−1, s
′
t−1) :
the true posterior belief held by RL : [rt−1, st−1] and the belief of CF about the true
posterior:[r′t−1, s
′
t−1]. In this context, let us define the suitable Markov equilibrium
concept.
Definition 1.5.1 (Markov Sequential Equilibrium). A Markov sequential equilib-
rium is a sequential equilibrium {xt, bt, Kt, ζt, a(CF ), dt}∞t=1, if
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(rt−1, st−1)(ht) = (rt−1, st−1)(hˆt) =⇒
xt(ht) = xt(hˆt)
bt(ht) = bt(hˆt)
Kt(ht) = Kt(hˆt)
(r′t−1, s
′
t−1)(h
P
t ) = (r
′
t−1, s
′
t−1)(hˆ
P
t )
(xt, bt, Kt) = (xˆt, bˆt, Kˆt)
}
=⇒ ζt(hPt , xt, bt, Kt) = ζt(hˆPt , xˆt, bˆt, Kˆt)
(rt−1, st−1)(ht) = (rt−1, st−1)(hˆt)
(xt, bt, Kt) = (xˆt, bˆt, Kˆt)
ζt = ζˆt
 =⇒ dt(ht, xt, bt, Kt, ζt) = dt(hˆt, xˆt, bˆt, Kˆt, ζˆt)
(rt−1, st−1)(ht) = (rt−1, st−1)(hˆt)
(xt, bt, Kt) = (xˆt, bˆt, Kˆt)
ζt = ζˆt
dt = dˆt
 =⇒ a(CF )(h
P
t , xt, bt, Kt, ζt, dt) =
ˆa(CF )
∀ht ∈ Ht; ∀hPt ∈ HPt ;∀hˆt ∈ Hˆt;∀hˆPt ∈ HˆPt ;∀(xt, bt, Kt), (xˆt, bˆt, Kˆt);∀ζt, ζˆt,∀dt, dˆt
The Markovian sequential equilibrium ensures that the continuation strate-
gies are time consistent and identical after any history with identical updated true
posterior belief [rt−1, st−1] and CF ′s belief about the posterior: [r′t−1, s
′
t−1]. It imposes
that on the equilibrium path CF has the true belief given the incentives, i. e., on the
equilibrium path [rt−1, st−1] = [r′t−1, s
′
t−1], but allows for the possibility of divergence
of posterior beliefs off the equilibrium path.
The stopping regions are defined as before:
∆D = {(rt, st) ∈ ∆H | a(CF ) = Dev}
∆L = {(rt, st) ∈ ∆H | a(CF ) = Liq}
∆CS = {(rt, st) ∈ K∆[0,1] | a(CF ) = Abandon}
Now, at every period t, RL solves:
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Vt(rt−1, st−1) =
max∆D,∆L,∆CS ,(xt,bt,Kt)∈Ct Prt((rt, st) ∈ ∆D)ptRxt + Prt((rt, st) ∈ ∆L)bt
+δ(1−Prt ((rt, st) ∈ ∆D)−Prt ((rt, st) ∈ ∆L)−Prt ((rt, st) ∈ ∆CS ))EtVt+1(rt, st)
(1.15)
where the contract space Ct is given by:
Ct = {(xt, bt, Kt) ∈ [0, 1]× R+ × [0, K]|
Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆D)(ptRxt) + Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆L)bt
+δ(1− Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆D)− Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆L)− Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆CS ))EtVt+1(rt, st)
≥ Kt + δEVt+1(rt−1, st−1, rt, st) (ICRt L)
Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆D)[(pt − vqt)R(1− xt)− I] + Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆L)(L− bt)
≥ Kt (PCCt F )
if (rt, st) ∈ ∆D, (pt − vqt)R(1− xt)− I ≥ L− bt (ICCt F )
if (rt, st) ∈ ∆L, (pt − vqt)R(1− xt)− I < L− bt
Now, by the same logic as in the two period example, we observe that the ex-
perimentation stops the first time (rt, st) ∈ ∆H . Thus, the problem can be simplified
as:
Vt(rt−1, st−1) = max
∆D,∆L,∆
C
S ,(xt,bt,Kt)∈Ct
µt1t((rt, st) ∈ ∆D)(ptRxt)+µt1t((rt, st) ∈ ∆L)bt
+ δ(1− µt)EtVt+1(rt, st)
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where the contract space Ct is:
Ct = {(xt, bt, Kt) ∈ [0, 1]× R+ × [0, K]|
if (rt, st) ∈ ∆D
µtptRxt + (1− µt)δEVt+1(rt, st)
≥ Kt + δEVt+1(rt−1, st−1, rt, st) (ICRt L(Dev))
µt[(pt − vqt)R(1− xt)− I] ≥ Kt (PCCt F (Dev))
(pt − vqt)R(1− xt)− I ≥ L− bt (ICCt F (Dev))
if (rt, st) ∈ ∆L
µtbt + (1− µt)δEVt+1(rt, st)
≥ Kt + δEVt+1(rt−1, st−1, rt, st) (ICRt L(Liq))
µt[L− bt] ≥ Kt (PCCt F (Liq))
L− bt ≥ (pt − vqt)R(1− xt)− I (ICCt F (Liq))
if (rt, st) ∈ ∆CS
EtVt+1(rt, st) = 0
Lemma 1.5.2. There exists a unique Markov sequential equilibrium in the dynamic
contracting game.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 1, the Bellman equation satisfies monotonicity and dis-
counting properties with the discount factor δ(1−µ), hence is a contraction mapping
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by Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions (Theorem 3.3 in [132]) . Then, by contracting
mapping theorem (Theorem 3.2 in [132]), it has a unique solution.
Now let us find the optimal contracting terms.
At every period, by the same logic as in the two period example, the partici-
pation constraint for CF holds as an equality, so
if (rt, st) ∈ ∆D
xt = 1− 1
R(pt − vqt)
(
I +
1
λt
)
; (1.16)
bt ≥ L− 1
λt
and
if (rt, st) ∈ ∆L
bt = L− 1
λt
(1.17)
xt ≥ 1− 1
R(pt − vqt)
(
I +
1
λt
)
;
From 1.16, we can observe how the contracting terms facilitate ambiguity sharing
among the ambiguity neutral RL and ambiguity averse CF.
Then, the optimal stopping regions are13 given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1.5.3. The strategic alliances develop the project after being granted
patent if (rt, st) ∈ ∆D, liquidate the project after being patented if (rt, st) ∈ ∆L, and
13Note that due to the linearity of the signal structures, the stopping decision does not depend
on the investment amount at the last period.
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abandon the project forever if (rt, st) ∈ ∆CS , where
∆D =
{
(rt, st) ∈ ∆H |
[
ptR− pt
(pt − vqt)
(
I +
1
λt
)]
≥ L− 1
λt
}
∆L =
{
(rt, st) ∈ ∆H |
[
ptR− pt
(pt − vqt)
(
I +
1
λt
)]
< L− 1
λt
}
∆CS =
{
(rt, st) ∈ K∆[0,1] | L <
2
λt
}
Let T be the optimal stopping time:
T := inf{t|(rt, st) ∈ ∆H ∪ (rt, st) ∈ ∆CS }
Proof. In Appendix A.
Figure 1.6: Contractual Equilibrium
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Now we will turn to the funding pattern. We need to characterize the optimal
investment schedule to answer the questions:
a) is it possible that the project will obtain full funding till the end, i.e. till
the time the posterior (rt, st) ∈ ∆CS ,
b) if full funding is not available at all times, how does the funding flow evolve
over time?
To examine the funding flow, first let us look at the incentive constraint RL
faces at any t.
If (rt, st) ∈ ∆D, the dynamic incentive constraint is:
µtptRxt + (1− µt)δEVt+1(rt, st) ≥ Kt + δEVt+1(rt−1, st−1, rt, st)
Substituting for the optimal share xt from 1.16, rewrite it as:
µtpt
(
R− 1
pt − vqt
(
I +
1
λt
))
+ (1− µt)δEVt+1(rt, st)
≥ Kt + δEVt+1(rt−1, st−1, rt, st)
Now, the dynamic expected payoff to be collected by RL in future periods following
a diversion can be expressed as:
EVt+1(rt−1, st−1, rt, st) =
λt−1pt−1
λtpt
EVt+1(rt, st)
So, the dynamic IC can be rewritten as:
µtpt
(
R− 1
pt − vqt
(
I +
1
λt
))
−Kt ≥ δ
[
λt−1pt−1
λtpt
− (1− µt)
]
EVt+1(rt, st) (1.18)
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where the RHS captures the dynamic agency cost.
Similarly, if (rt, st) ∈ ∆L, the dynamic incentive constraint can be rewritten
as:
µt
(
L− 1
λt
)
−Kt ≥ δ
[
λt−1
λt
− (1− µt)
]
EVt+1(rt, st) (1.19)
and it does not depend on CF ′s ambiguity aversion.
We show that under a sufficient condition on the initial parameters, the
project will never receive full funding till the end. In that case, there will be a
switching point, captured by a range of posterior beliefs such that if the posterior
belief lies below that locus then full funding is no longer available. Then, we show
that for the range of posteriors where full funding is not available, the funding vol-
ume decreases with posterior belief over time. Also, as CF becomes more ambiguity
averse, the dynamic moral hazard problem is alleviated, resulting in a longer horizon
of full funding. The investment pattern is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1.5.4. The project does not receive full funding till the end if:
λ0 <
2− δ
L
(
1− δ
2
) (1.20)
If 1.20 holds, then there is a region of posterior beliefs ∆F where the project does not
receive full funding:
∆F := {(rt, st) ∈ K∆[0,1]\∆CS |
the region of posterior beliefs where full funding is not available} (1.21)
Then, there exists a δL such that
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a) If λ0L−2
λ0(L2 +K)−1
≤ δ ≤ δL,∆D ∩ ∆F = φ; so full funding is available for all
(rt, st) ∈ ∆D.
b) If 1 > δ ≥ δL,∆D ∩ ∆F 6= φ; the project does not receive full funding for
all (rt, st) ∈ ∆D. In this case, as v increases, the project receives full funding for a
longer time horizon, i.e. ∆D\∆F expands.
After full funding stops, investment volume monotonically decreases over time.
Proof. In Appendix A.
From the proposition 1.5.4, we observe how the different components of the
model interact with each other to determine the investment level.
1. Discount factor (δ) : For higher discount factor, δ ≥ δL full funding horizon
shrinks. There exists a range of posteriors for which the project is developed
after being patented, still only restricted funding is available. This is intuitive
because as RL becomes more patient, he values the future gains more, so the
dynamic moral hazard problem is more severe and the incentive constraint is
more difficult to hold. As a result, only partial funding is available for a large
range of posterior belief.
2. Prior belief (r0, s0) : If the prior belief that the true state θ = Good is high, i.e.
initially the belief about the profitability of the project is favorable enough,
the project can receive full funding till the end.
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3. Ambiguity aversion coefficient (v): If CF is more ambiguity averse (v increases)
the dynamic moral hazard problem is alleviated. The intuition is similar to the
two period example. CF, being ambiguity averse, becomes much more cautious
and pessimistic after each low signal. So, following a low signal, CF has to
be guaranteed a greater share of the final return in order to keep investing.
Thus, the contractual terms sharing ambiguity also discipline RL and lower
his dynamic expected value from cheating which, in turn, eases the funding
constraint towards the beginning. Thus, if the project receives full funding till
ΦD(rt, st) = 0, as v increases, full funding horizon increases. After the project
stops receiving full funding, the investment flow is monotonically decreasing
over time. This result is in contrast with the result in [17], where it is possible to
have monotonically increasing investment pattern over time due to the severity
of the dynamic agency problem.
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1.6 Policy Recommendations
In this section, we will compare the equilibrium outcome of the strategic
partnerships to the Policymaker’s optima derived in section 3.2. Notice that in the
contractual scenario, there are three possible sources of deviation from the RAN out-
come, i.e. the risk and ambiguity neutral Policymaker’s preferred outcome. Firstly,
the static and dynamic moral hazard can potentially distort the incentives and make
it harder for the project to obtain funding at every period, thereby creating a diver-
gence from the optima the Policymaker intends to implement. Also, the presence of
ambiguity and CF ′s ambiguity aversion creates a divergence in preferences among
the strategic alliance and the Policymaker, thus contributing to the difference from
the RAN optima. Lastly, the short term contracting and lack of commitment can
result in the contractual outcome being different that the RAN optima. Let us first
examine how the two outcomes differ and then we will analyze the effects of each of
these possible sources of inefficiencies.
The Policymaker’s optimal value from the project is given by:
V S0 = E0
[
TS∑
t=1
δt−1
(
Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆H)(ptR− I) + Pr
t
((rt, st) ∈ ∆S)L−K
)]
(1.22)
whereas the Policymaker’s value from the project carried out by the strategic part-
nership is given by:
V SC0 =E0
 T∑
t=1
δt−1[Prt((rt, st) ∈ ∆D)(ptR− I) + Prt((rt, st) ∈ ∆L)L
−(1− Prt((rt, st) ∈ ∆F ))K − Prt((rt, st) ∈ ∆F )Kt]
 (1.23)
The contractual outcome diverges from the Policymaker’s outcome in three ways:
57
(a) Patent Troll: If the posterior belief (rt, st) ∈ ∆L ⊂ ∆H , the risk and
ambiguity neutral Policymaker finds it optimal to develop the product, but because
of CF ′s ambiguity aversion v > 0, the strategic partnership liquidates the product
even after being granted patent. So, every time the posterior lies in this region, there
is a loss of value ptR− I − L > 0 to the Policymaker. This loss is attributed to the
difference in ambiguity attitude of the Policymaker and CF.
(b) Less experimentation: The Policymaker optimally stops experimentation
and abandons the project as soon as the posterior belief enters ∆S, while the research
alliance abandons it when the posterior lies in ∆CS . Algebraically, it can be shown
that ∆S ⊂ ∆CS , so the research alliance abandons the project for a larger range
of posterior beliefs, compared to the Policymaker. This result is due to the short
termism, lack of commitment power of the research alliance, and the moral hazard
problem.
(c) Partial Funding: The Policymaker optimally invests the maximal funding
in the project till the end, whereas the research partnership, if the prior belief is not
too high ( if 1.20 is not satisfied), does not receive full funding till the end. The lower
investment flow is driven by the static and dynamic moral hazard problem, which
makes the incentive constraints harder to satisfy. However, as we have noted in
Proposition 1.5.4, dynamic moral hazard problem is alleviated as v goes up, causing
the project to receive maximal funding for a longer time horizon.
The next proposition captures how the equilibrium contractual outcome di-
verges from the Policymaker’s optimal outcome.
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Proposition 1.6.1. Compared to the Policymaker’s optima, the equilibrium con-
tracts governing the research alliances result in (a) liquidation of the project even
after being patented, (b) less experimentation, and (c) lower investment flow.
Proof. In Appendix A.
The following figure (Figure 1.7) illustrates the difference between the two
outcomes.
Figure 1.7: Two Sources of Welfare Loss
Given that the contracts governing the strategic partnerships fail to imple-
ment the Policymaker’s optima, next we examine if the Policymaker can restructure
the patent law in order to implement its desired optima. Specifically, if the patent
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law is designed to internalize the possible response from the research alliances, is it
possible to alleviate the three sources of inefficiency discussed above? Analyzing the
effects of changing the patent law, we find that if the patent law is made stricter, i.e.
∆H is set at a higher level, it will shrink ∆L, so it is less likely that the project will
be liquidated after being granted patent. However, this would lower the incentive
to experiment as well, because Prt((rt, st) ∈ ∆H) decreases, causing the research
alliance to abandon the project even earlier (for a larger range of posteriors) than
before. In fact, setting ∆H = ∆D eliminates the possibility of patent troll, but in-
creases the range of posteriors for which the project is abandoned forever; i. e. , ∆CS
expands.
On the other hand, if the patent policy is relaxed, that boosts the incentive
to invest in the project, increasing Prt((rt, st) ∈ ∆H) at every period, and results in
longer experimentation and higher level of investment. However, it also results in
an expansion of ∆L, so patent troll problem becomes more severe. Thus, changing
the patent law can never fully implement the Policymaker’s optima and eliminate all
three sources of efficiency. If initially ∆L is large, i.e. patent troll is a severe problem
to start off with, then making the patent law more stringent benefits the Policymaker
more, whereas if the inefficient stopping proves to be a more severe concern, then
relaxing the patent policy would be beneficial. So, depending on the initial parameter
values, the patent policy should be redesigned to consider the possible effects on the
innovation conducted in the strategic alliances.
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1.7 Generalizations
First, we will discuss how the model behaves under a few possible extensions
and alternative assumptions.
Non-linear signal
In this model, we used the simplifying assumption of linearity in the signal
structure. This resulted in the Policymaker’s optima characterized by full funding
at all times.
With a more general signal structure satisfying only the Assumptions 1-3,
we can characterize the optimal contractual outcome as well as the Policymaker’s
optima using similar technique. Instead of full funding, the optimal outcomes are
characterized by a partial investment flow that decreases over time for the Policy-
maker as well as the strategic partnership. The regions ∆D,∆L, and ∆
C
S can be
characterized likewise. The main results qualitatively stays the same:
(a) ∆L 6= φ, so Patent Troll happens if posterior lies in ∆L.
(b) Optimal funding in strategic alliances decreases with time. As v increases,
dynamic moral hazard is alleviated.
(c) Restructuring the patent law can not implement the Policymaker’s out-
come.
It is also interesting to examine a more general signal structure instead of
the binary signal discussed in this chapter. Indeed, in some real life contexts, the
information flow that arrives at each period of experimentation can not be encoded
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into a simple binary signal. For example, assuming a continuous signal structure will
generalize the model and consequently change the optimal contract structure.
No Limited Liability of RL
In the present model, the research lab is assumed to be liquidity constrained,
thus always requires non-negative payment in each period. However, in many real life
scenario, the research based firms, though smaller in comparison to the commercial
giants, can afford to put forth some investment, in the form of collateral , in order
to continue experimentation even after clearing the patent thresholds.
Under this assumption, experimentation continues even after clearing the
patenting threshold, the patent troll region shrinks, and the alliance experiments
longer.
Long Term Contracts
In some situations, firms can attain commitment power through brand rep-
utations, press releases and a variety of other ways. If the contracting parties can
commit to long term relations, the participation constraint of CF will not have to
be met in every period, so intertemporal transfer of payments will be possible. This
relaxes the funding condition at every period and results in longer experimentation.
In this case, experimentation may continue even after being granted a patent and the
patent troll region shrinks. It is interesting to compare the optimal outcome in long
term contracting with the one in this chapter and analyze the effect of commitment.
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Partially Observable Signal
In many scenario, the informative signal is not publicly revealed. Sometimes,
the financing firm hires experts to evaluate the reports given by the research firm,
whose evaluation criteria varies from the research firm. It is also possible that the
results from the experimentation can be mis-reported. In these cases, the assumption
that the signal at each period is publicly observed breaks down. A very interesting
question will be to characterize the contract under this partial observability and
possible mis-reporting of the signals, using a mechanism design approach to this
contracting environment.
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1.8 Discussion
In the innovation intensive industries, we observe that research partnership is
increasingly becoming an important mode of organizing research. The results from
this chapter suggest that the policy making organizations should recognize the fact
and be aware of how the innovation activity conducted in the research alliances is
affected by the patent policy. Using the predictions from the theoretical model, we
observe that relaxing the patent criteria is likely to result in longer experimentation,
but at the same time the possibility of patent troll like cases increases; whereas if
the patent law is made more stringent then the patented projects are more likely to
be developed, but the research alliances stop experimenting inefficiently early. This
result suggests that studying the present state of the industry, the patent authority
should decide on the patent criterion.
Also, comparing the optimal contractual outcome and the Policymaker’s op-
tima, we can see that it is never possible to implement the Policymaker’s optima.
As the contextual ambiguity associated project increases, the divergence of the con-
tractual outcome and the desired outcome increases. This suggests that the projects
with high level of ambiguity can not be satisfactorily organized by research partner-
ships. Indeed, there can be projects, which the Policymaker deems profitable enough
to invest in, that can be never funded in a research partnership. In innovative indus-
tries, the concern about important innovations not being carried out has long been
voiced (Clayton Christensen, ITExpo, 2011). The industry’s Internal Rate of Re-
turn Criterion and lack of foresight, are often blamed for not investing in innovative
technologies.
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This suggests a potential role of a regulatory body or the “State” as an en-
trepreneur. State intervention in innovation in the form of funding programs for
smaller research oriented firms can support innovation organized in research firms.
State programs for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and New Biotechnology
Firms (NBFs) like Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), 1982, Small Busi-
ness Technology Transfer (STTR), 1992 have been able to fund numerous ventures
by smaller research firms and touted as success(SBIR/STTR Impact Report, 2012).
In the US, 57% of “basic research” is supported through Federal funding (2008)
(source: NSF report, 2008). Programs such as these, providing funds to the research
oriented smaller firms, lead to the development of the projects not otherwise funded
(Mazzucato, 2013).
Another mode of organizing innovation when the research alliances can not ef-
ficiently carry it out is direct state initiative. There are several examples where State
as an entrepreneur has participated in innovation and led to successful development
of projects. In UK, Medical Research Council (MRC), funded by the Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) has been leading the Pharmaceutical in-
novation and was behind the development of monoclonal antibodies, widely used in
Pharmaceutical industry since then. In the US, National Institute of Health (NIH)
has been key funding source for research in Biotechnology, spending $30.9 bn in 2012
alone. Another example of State’s entrepreneurial venture is National Nanotechnol-
ogy Initiative (NNI), which, funded in 2000, strives to engage in cutting edge research
in Nanotechnology. According to the famous adage by Polanyi (1944):
“The road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enor-
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mous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled interven-
tionism.”
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1.9 Summary and Conclusion
Research alliances are responsible for a major share of innovation activity in
the research-intensive industries. The innovation processes they undertake is often
characterized by ambiguity rather than risk. Given the prevalence of these research
alliances in these sectors, it is important to examine the optimal research outcome
that is generated in these R&D partnerships, understand the strategic incentives of
the contracting parties and how these interact to shape the optimal choices, and
to evaluate the research alliance as a mode of organizing research in the ambiguous
environment. This chapter provides a theoretical model to analyze these partnerships
and compare it to the optimal outcome that a risk and ambiguity neutral Policymaker
wants to implement.
In this chapter, we consider a dynamic principal-agent model with moral
hazard where the contracting parties differ in their attitude towards ambiguity. The
contractees use short term contracts to organize innovation in the research alliances.
To model the ambiguous preference, I follow a dynamically consistent framework of
ambiguity that uses Bayes rule to consistently update ambiguous belief. We focus
on Markov sequential equilibrium to characterize the optimal contract in this model
of strategic experimentation with moral hazard.
Analyzing the optimal sequence of short term contracts, we find that the
contractual terms facilitate ambiguity sharing and thus prevents in-equilibrium delay.
The investment flow that the project receives decreases over time. We have shown
that the Policymaker’s optimal outcome can never be implemented in the research
alliances. This leads us to suggest policy recommendations regarding the patent law.
67
Apart from the different extensions and robustness issues mentioned in the
previous section, this research can open up the path of further research on strategic
partnerships. It will be interesting to study multi-lateral strategic partnerships in the
innovation-based industries as networks and examine the optimal network structure
that emerges under ambiguity with different parametric assumptions. Also, ana-
lyzing different patent policies in this context under ambiguity constitutes another
interesting direction for future research.
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Chapter 2
Venture Capital Investment Under Ambiguity
2.1 Introduction
Venture capital plays an important role in the financing of start-ups firms
with potentially high-reward projects. It provides the young firms with a source
of independent, professionally managed, dedicated pool of capital. This mode of
financing has seen rapid growth since the 1970s. In the first quarter of 2013, 863 new
deals were signed by the U.S. based venture capitalists, and the total fresh investment
in that quarter amounted to $5.9 billion, 21% of U.S. GDP [115].
Venture capital (hereafter, “VC”) financing is more prominent in Software,
Biotechnology, and Clean Technology sector and 40% of the entire investment by the
VCs is devoted to these sectors. Now, in these sectors, the projects in question are
often unique in nature. So, sufficient amount of data from very similar situations
are generally not available to form a precise estimate of the true profitability of the
project. Thus, it is often difficult to form a unique single-valued probability measure
about the profitability. Such situations can be modeled as “Knightian Uncertainty,”
or, “Ambiguity,” using Knight’s [103] definition.
In VC financing contexts, then, it can be assumed that only a partial descrip-
tion of the underlying probability distribution associated with the choices is known.
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I capture this ambiguity by the assumption that the investors and entrepreneurs
involved in VC financing have multiple priors about the true distribution. However,
the entrepreneurs specialize in dealing with this ambiguity, so they are less ambigu-
ity averse than the venture capitalists. In this chapter, I show that the presence of
ambiguity and the difference in ambiguity attitude explains the allocation of control
rights, which is a salient feature observed in VC financing.
One of the most important and well-discussed features of VC financing is the
use of control rights. The financial contracts between the venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs put a lot of stress on the allocation of control rights. Control rights
typically include voting right, liquidation right, rights to choose the management
team , etc., liquidation right being arguably the most crucial [5]. The commonly
observed patterns regarding control rights found in venture capital financing are:
(A) Control rights are frequently contingent on the observable measures of
financial and non-financial performance;
(B) If the project performs poorly, the VCs obtain full control. As the per-
formance improves, the entrepreneur retains / obtains more control rights. If the
company performs very well, the VCs retain their cash flow rights, but relinquish
most of their control and liquidation rights [99].
While the role of control rights has been extensively discussed in the existing
literature in Economics and Corporate Finance, only a few of them consider the
dynamic structure of venture capital financing and the staged infusion of capital
observed in this context. In VC financing context, the investment volume is often
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contingent on the observable performance measures. The existing static theories
of control rights allocation which do not account for this staged infusion of capital
can not fully explain the movement of control rights. In contrast, here I present a
two-stage contracting model with staged financing, and show that the allocation of
control rights can be explained by the presence of ambiguity and the difference in
ambiguity attitude between the VC and the entrepreneur.
Formally, in this chapter I analyze the financing problem of a new venture
characterized by
(i) two stages of investment (the “start-up” or “seed” stage, and “expansion”
stage) with a public signal arriving in between the financing stages, and
(ii) an ambiguity-neutral entrepreneur (E) and an ambiguity-averse investor
(V C), who share a common set-valued prior about the venture.
V C and E sign a two-period contract at the beginning specifying the funds
to be invested in both stages and the future earnings1. However, the contract struc-
ture is inherently incomplete; it is not possible to specify a-priori the liquidation
contingencies as a function of the intermediate signal.
In this environment I show that the differential attitude towards ambiguity
may create a hold-up problem for the venture capitalist. The entrepreneur, being
ambiguity neutral and protected by limited liability, always wants to continue the
project. However, if the realized signal turns out to be “bad,” then after observing it
1Note that no revenue is generated before the end of the two stages and investment is mostly in
intangible assets, with small liquidation value. Hence, bank-like financial contracts are not feasible.
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the investor may want to liquidate the project. This gives rise to an agency conflict.
Then, under entrepreneurial control, the investor may face a hold-up problem and is
more reluctant to invest initially. In such a scenario, if the investor is very ambiguity
averse, the entrepreneur is better off relinquishing control rights to the investor.
Thus, this model explains the features of VC investment using the assumption that
VCs operate in an environment of ambiguity rather than risk.
The famous success stories of venture capital financing are consistent with
the results of our model. During 1970-80, Apple Inc. went through three rounds
of venture capital financing, starting with $.5m investment in round 1, with the
investor having almost 50% ownership. In round 2, investment increased to $.7m,
and in round 3 in increased further to $2.3m. FedEx also benefitted from venture
capital financing (1973− 76), where round 1 raised $12m with the venture capitalist
having 37.5% control rights but after an unfavorable performance signal, investment
in round 2 decreased to $6m, with the investor acquiring 84.5% ownership [124]. The
prominence of control rights and the shift of capital flow are common in these success
stories. In this chapter I attempt to explain these features, under the assumption of
ambiguity.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the remaining part of this section,
we will discuss some stylized facts of VC financing and how the model attempts to
capture these features. In the next subsection we will examine a case study which
motivates our framework. Section 2 contains a review of the existing literature. In
Section 3 presents the model and the results. Section 4 analyzes the results and
suggests some possible extensions. The concluding section summarizes the findings.
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2.1.1 Features of Venture Capital Financing
• Stage Financing:
In VC financing, the infusion of capital occurs in stages, matching investment
decisions based on the information that arrives over time. In between these
financing rounds, the venture capitalist monitors the short-term performance
indicators to gather more information about the potential of the venture. This
feature, according to many, is the “most potent control mechanism” of venture
capital financing [124]. Typically, we observe that the capital flow is lower in
the initial round of investment and later it may increase or decrease depending
on the performnace measures.
To capture this, we have two-period (“seed stage” and “expansion stage”)
model with the VC and the entrepreneur signing a contract at the beginning
of the two stages. Capital flow is chosen ex-ante contingent on the interim
signal. The results of the current model exhibits the evolution of the capital
flow which is consistent with the observed phenomenon.
• Monitoring:
The venture capitalists often identify important areas to monitor at the begin-
ning of a project and engage in information collection and monitoring once the
project is under way. This monitoring helps them to avoid any potential moral
hazard problems and gives them an accurate idea of the intermediate perfor-
mance measures of the project. This is why in this model we assume that the
investment decisions are publicly observable and verifiable, so there is no moral
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hazard concern. The interim performance measure, modelled as a continuous
signal, is also considered to be publicly observable in our framework.
• Control Rights Allocation:
VC financing is characterized by separation of cash flow rights and control
rights. In this mode of financing, control rights are not associated with assets;
they are used as an independent instrument aimed to complement the cash flow
rights. The allocation of control rights is frequently contingent on the observ-
able measures of financial and non-financial performance. If the project does
not show signs of success, the VCs obtain full control. As the project performs
well, the entrepreneur is able to retain and obtain more control rights. This
feature strongly suggests that despite the prevalence of contingent contracting,
VC financing contracts are inherently incomplete.
In this chapter, I seek to explain this movement of control rights. In order
to do so, I use the incomplete contracting approach and assume that control
rights can not be specified ex-ante. I consider liquidation rights as the only
aspect of control rights. This theoretical abstraction simplifies the contracting
environment and helps us to understand the interaction of the allocation of
control rights and the contextual ambiguity.
• Ambiguity in VC Financing:
VC financing operates in an environment where the true probability distribu-
tion governing the innovation process is only partially known. To understand
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the presence of contextual ambiguity, let us examine the following real life
example of VC financing.
2.1.2 Motivating Example: Eli Lily and Capital Funds Portfolio
Biotehnology is one of the major industries which depend heavily on VC
financing. In 2010, in this sector the venture capitalists contributed $3.7 billion in
460 deals.
Eli Lily, a leading Biotechnology firm, has raised funds from the venture cap-
ital firm Capital Funds Portfolio for carrying out research in finding a medicine for
Alzheimer’s disease. The lead compound to be tested is LY2062430 (solanezumab)
which is a biologic entity that binds to soluble monomeric forms of amyloid ß (Ab)
after it is produced. LY2062430 is being studied for its potential to slow the progres-
sion of Alzheimer’s disease. This disease affects the patients in two ways: it destroys
the patients’ cognitive ability, and at the same time it also impairs the functionality
of the patients’ brain and other organs. Any drug claiming to “cure” Alzheimer’s
disease has to show significant improvement in delaying cognitive and functional
endpoint. While testing for cognitive improvement by carefully designed large scale
trials yields more reliable results, functional improvement can not be tested reliably
given the current designs. Lily has carried out two large scale trials in Phase II and
in the pooled secondary sample, has registered a significant improvement in delaying
the cognitive endpoint, but the functional improvement has not been much tested.
So, after their entire research on this drug solanezumab, the project may end in one
of the three ways:
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(a) A new technique to test the functional improvement is invented before
Phase III is completed and the drug solanezumab is shown to significantly improve
functionality. In this case the true state or profitability of this project is definitely
“Good.”
(b) A new technique is invented to test the functional improvement which
conclusively shows that this particular drug has no effect on functionality of the
patients’ brains. This case can be identified with the true state being “Bad.”
(c) The medicine can produce results showing a significant cognitive improve-
ment but inconclusive evidence about the functional end-point delay. No new tech-
nique to test the functional improvement is invented, and in absence of enough
indication that the drug improves functionality, FDA does not grant permission to
go ahead in research. Now, at this state. it is possible that the reason behind this
confusing results is the lack of a carefully designed medical test to assess functional
improvement. It is possible that in future, once this test is devised, this medicine
may prove to cure Alzheimer’s disease. But at the same time, it is also possible that
this drug has no effect in functional improvement associated with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease2. This state can be considered as the “Unknowable” or “Amalgamated” state,
where the true profitability of the research venture is yet unknown.
This new epistemic state, where the causal interpretations are not fully un-
derstood, captures the idea of ambiguity in this framework of ambiguity by Dumav
and Stinchcombe [54]. As we will discuss in Section 3, it can be considered as an
2Since most of the scientists claim that functional improvement is the key to curing Alzheimer’s
disease, this will be a bad news for the project.
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alternative interpretation of the multiple prior model, where the range of prior beliefs
reflect the initial belief that the true state will turn out to be “Unknowable.”
In the context of this example, the two players: Eli Lily (E) and Capital
Funds (V C) start the venture containing multiple stages. Even after ending up at
the “Unknowable” state, Eli Lily learns about the disease in general, which may help
them in a future project on this same disease. So, Eli Lily like this “Unknowable”
state more than Capital Funds Portfolio does. Hence, we can consider Lily as less
ambiguity averse than Capital Funds.
After each Phase, the observed data is examined and tested if there is a sig-
nificant difference compared to a placebo. The standardized reduction in cognitive
and functional end-point delay serves as a signal. This signal, drawn from a contin-
uous distribution, induces posterior belief about the true state. So, after the start
up stage, the signals are revealed, but the uncertainty prevails. Only after the ex-
pansion stage the true state is realized and returns accrue. The theoretical model
presented here attempts to capture this environment and explain the allocation of
control rights in such a venture operating under ambiguity.
The contract, signed at the beginning of the two stages, specify (a) the cash
flow rights once the true state is finally observed, (b) the investment volume in stage
1 and stage 2 (which depends on the interim results), and (c) the liquidation rights.
Now, the ambiguity-averse investor, unlike the ambiguity-neutral Lily, is more
pessimistic about the first round results. If the results from the first round turn out
to be bad according to the investor (his net return from continuing investment is
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negative), he may want to opt out of this project before funding another round.
However, Eli Lily, protected with limited liability and attaching a higher value to
the “Unknowable” state, most often does not agree to give up. This results in a
hold-up problem, which potentially leads to some viable projects not to be financed.
To solve this problem, at the beginning, the parties can allocate control rights,
which gives the authority to liquidate the project after the first round. Clearly, if
the venture capitalist holds the control rights, he quits the project after observing
a “bad” result. Under certain conditions, relinquishing control rights to the venture
capitalist actually makes the scientist better off in ex-ante expected terms.
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2.2 Literature Review
There is an extensive literature discussing control theories in financial con-
tracts. The incomplete contracts approach, pioneered by Hart and Moore [86],
Aghion and Bolton [4] develop the theory of control rights based on incomplete-
ness of contracts. In spirit, our model is the closest to the chapter by Aghion and
Bolton [4]. They show the optimality of state-contingent allocation of control rights
under contractual incompleteness. They consider a one-period investment scheme
with fixed investment requirement, where uncertainty (“risk”) is resolved in an in-
terim stage before taking action. In their framework, the risk-neutral principals
face hold-up issues because of non-verifiability of action. In this context they show
that, if renegotiation is allowed, then state-contingent control allocation achieves
the first best outcome. In contrast, in the current chapter I introduce ambiguity
as the source of agency conflict. In this chapter I assume that uncertainty about
the true state persists till the end of the game. Also, this model relaxes the fixed
investment requirement and considers stage financing, where investment is allowed
to depend on the performance indicators of previous round. In such an environment
with contingent capital flows, agency conflict can arise only through the difference
in ambiguity attitude. Thus, this chapter attempts to explain control rights in a
dynamic contracting environment under ambiguity.
Incomplete contracts are used in various studies to explain control rights.
Berglof [19], Hellman and Puri [89], and Gebhardt and Schmidt [69] interpret con-
trol right as the right to replace the management. With assumptions similar to
Aghion and Bolton [4], they show that allocation of control right can be used to
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solve the moral hazard problem that arises due to non-verifiability of action3. In the
chapter, I do not consider moral hazard. Also, I use a unidimensional control right,
which is interpreted as liquidation right instead of considering the right to chose
the management So, in my model the agency conflict occurs regarding liquidation
decision.
Secondly, this chapter is related to the literature on the financing of innovation
(e.g. , [53], [16], [17]). These papers consider infinte-horizon investment problems
characterized by moral hazard, where the principal (venture capitalist) chooses the
optimal stopping time. They find that short term contract results in premature
stopping, and the venture capitalist invests the maximum amount as long as the
project continues. In this model, in contrast, I consider a finite horizon investment
scheme under ambiguity and our central focus is to explain the allocation of control
rights in venture capital financing.
A growing body of literature studies venture capital investments using em-
pirical methodology. Papers like [99], [100], [12], [19], [77], [79], [98], [124] provide
important evidence about the working of the VCs and how they add value. They also
examine the contractual structures adopted in VC financing. These papers thus mo-
tivate our framework and identifies the importance of control rights in VC financing.
Specifically, Kaplan and Stromberg [99] examine how well the current theoretical
work on VC financing fits the observed phenomena and identifies the caveats in the
theoretical predictions. They find that while the incomplete contract approach (pio-
3For an extensive review, see [135], [15] and [5].
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neered by [4], [86]) seems to be most consistent with the observed regularities, there
is a need for a unifying theory to explain control rights in a dynamic environment
with contingent capital flows. In this chapter, we have a two period framework and
seek to explain how control rights are allocated in the contractual setting. Our re-
sults largely support the empirical findings: the optimal evolution of the capital flows
and control rights match the real life data.
This chapter is also related to the strand of literature on optimal security
design in venture capital financing (e.g. , [121], [129], [44], [34]). These papers fo-
cus on the incentive properties of the conditional allocation of cash flow rights and
assess the performance of different financial instruments like debt, equity and con-
vertibles in situations characterized with both-sided moral hazard. This chapter talks
about compensations in a much more abstracted way, but we discuss how the opti-
mal contract derived in our model can be implemented using financial instruments.
The sharing rule in our optimal contract resembles the commonly observed financial
mechanisms such as preferred stock options.
Lastly, following Gilboa and Schmeidler’s seminal work on ambiguity [72],
multiple prior models of ambiguity have been applied to various dynamic decision
making contexts. However, with multiple priors, prior-by-prior updating of belief
using Bayes rule usually leads to dynamic inconsistency. There are different ap-
proaches to modelling ambiguity averse preferences in dynamic setting. Some papers
take the approach that deals with recursive extensions (e.g. , [58], [111], [102]), others
posit dynamic inconsistency and adopt assumptions, such as backward induction or
naive ignorance of the inconsistency, to pin down behavior (e.g. Siniscalchi, 2008) ,
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yet another approach uses non-consequentialist updating rules (Machina [112])4. In
this chapter, we use the ambiguity framework developed in Dumav and Stinchcombe
[54], which characterizes a vNM approach to ambiguity and uses Bayes rule to obtain
dynamically consistent updating of beliefs. Thus, this chapter fits in the literature
of decision making with ambiguity in a dynamic framework.
The most important contribution of this chapter is the introduction of am-
biguity in the dynamic investment environment operated by venture capitals and
analyzing its role as a source of agency conflict and allocation of control rights. The
model incorporates the aspects of stage financing and obtains an optimal investment
path which is consistent with the empirical findings.
4For a more complete survey, refer to [61].
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2.3 Model and Analysis
This section describes the ingredients of our model of venture capital finance.
In the first part, I will lay out the model: describe the agents, the time-line, the
environment and the nature of agency conflict. In the next subsection I will use
an example of binary signal structure to illustrate the effect of ambiguity on the
allocation of control rights. Next I will present the results for the general model.
• States:
The innovation activity is centered around a project, success of which depends
on the true state or true profitability of the project: θ ∈ Θ. The true state is
not known; moreover, it is not possible to form a single probabilistic assessment
about it. In a multiple prior setting,
Θ = {Good,Bad}
Pr(θ = Good) = [a, b] ; 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1.
Using the framework of ambiguity developed in [54] (described in greater detail
in Appendix A), we observe that the interval [a, b] has a unique representation
as a convex combination of extreme sets given by Θ′ = {Good,Bad, Unknowable},
where the new epistemic state “Unknowable” is motivated in the previous ex-
amples.
[a.b] = a[1, 1] + (1− b)[0, 0] + (b− a)[0, 1]
The state Unknowable can be represented as [0, 1], the state at which one
knows only that the probability of θ = Good is someplace between 0 and 1.
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Thus, in this framework, we can alternatively represent this set-valued prior
by a three state expected utility model, where the true state of the project lies
in Θ′ :
Θ′ = {Good,Bad, Unknowable}
Pr(θ = Good) = a
Pr(θ = Bad) = 1− b
Pr(θ = Unknowable) = b− a
0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1.
That is, with probability a, at the end it will be revealed that the project is
profitable, with probability 1 − b it will be revealed that the project is not
profitable, but with probability b− a, the true profitability of the project will
turn out to be “Unknowable,” or, Not Yet Known, depending on the current
state of technology and knowledge.
If the payoff for θ = Good is uG, for θ = Bad is uB < uG, then the payoff
associated with the new state θ = Unknowable is computed as:
u(θ = Unknowable) =
1
2
(uG + uB)− v
2
(uG − uB);
where the ambiguity aversion parameter v captures the attitude towards am-
biguity. v = 0 implies ambiguity neutrality; v > 0 indicates that the decision
maker is ambiguity averse, or, dislikes the state θ = Unknowable. The higher v
is, the more the decision maker dislikes the state θ = Unknowable, hence can
be considered as more ambiguity averse. Here, I assume v ∈ (0, 1).
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• Players:
There are two decision makers: an entrepreneur (hereafter “E”) and a venture
capitalist (hereafter “VC ”) making choices in a dynamic investment scenario.
E owns a project, so has the full bargaining power5. Both the parties start off
with the same prior about the true state as described above. However, VC is
more ambiguity-averse than E. For simplification, assume that E is ambiguity
neutral whereas VC is ambiguity averse with the ambiguity aversion parameter
as v ∈ (0, 1].
• Time-line:
The investment project takes two periods to complete: the “seed stage” and
the “expansion stage.” The return from the investment is stochastic; it depends
on the investment amounts as well as the true profitability of the project: θ.
After the first round of investment, an informative signal is publicly revealed.
Due to the irreversible nature of the investment, the contract has to be signed
at the beginning. This long term contract specifies
(a) K1 : the amount to be invested in period 1 or the start up stage,
(b) K2(·) : the amount to be invested in period 2 or the expansion stage, as a
function of the intermediate signal,
(c) t : the monetary transfer to E after the final return has been realized, and
(d) α ∈ {0, 1} : the allocation of “control rights” or “liquidation rights.”
5This is a simplifying assumption. Considering a Nash bargaining solution with both the parties
having intermediate bargaining power qualitatively does not change the results.
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Here we assume contractual incompleteness, because of which the liquidation
rights can not be pre-specified. The party who holds the control rights decides
whether to liquidate the project after the public signal is realized.
The time-line is as follows. The entrepreneur offers the investor a contract.
The venture capitalist can accept or reject this offer. If he rejects the offer,
he will receive his outside option worth L > 0. If the offer is accepted, the
project gets underway and K1 amount is invested. At the end of the first
period, an informative signal is publicly revealed. After observing the signal,
the party endowed with control rights chooses whether to continue or liquidate
the project. Liquidation yields a return of 06. If the project is continued to
the second period, the pre-determined amount K2(·) is invested depending on
the signal. At the end of the second period, the true state θ is revealed, final
return pi is realized and the profits accrue according to the contract.
The time-line is given below (Figure 2.3):
• Signal Structure:
After the first round of investment, an informative signal R is publicly revealed.
This signal can be thought of as an independent random draw from a distribu-
tion whose parameter depends on the true state θ. Real life examples of such
signals include the first stage profits, market research, or the seed stage results.
Thus, the signal R induces a posterior distribution over the true state
Pr(θ = Good| R) = [r, s]
6The results remain same if we assume a positive liquidation value.
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Figure 2.1: Time Line
where the posterior is drawn from a non-atomic continuous distributionQ(r, s; θ)
such that ∫∫
(r,s)∈K∆(0,1)
(r, s)dQ(r, s; θ) = (a, b)
For notational simplicity, we use:
r + s
2
= p = posterior mean
s− r
2
= q = posterior ambiguity
and
a+ b
2
= p0 = prior mean
b− a
2
= q0 = prior ambiguity
Right now we do not put any further assumption on the signal distribution.
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• Investment Project:
The project yields a positive return according to a known investment function
if θ = Good, but if the state is Bad then the project fails, yielding a normalized
return of 0. The final return in the event of success is given by Π(K1, K2). Let
us put some regularity conditions on the functional form of pi.
Assumption 1: The return function is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in both the arguments. Moreover, it is additively separable in K1 and K2. i.e.
,
Π(K1, K2) = pi(K1) + pi(K2);
where pi
′′
> pi′ > 0 > pi′′ for all K1, K2.
Also, there exist K1 > 0 and K2 > 0 such that
lim
K1→K1
pi′(K1) = 1
lim
K2→K2
pi′(K2) = 1 (2.1)
So there is a maximum efficient scale of investment7; thusK1, K2 ∈ [0,max{K1, K2}].
Assumption 2: The return function satisfies the Inada conditions, i.e.
lim
Ki→0
pi(Ki)→∞, lim
Ki→∞
pi(Ki) = 0∀i = 1, 2 (2.2)
Assumption 3: The return functions satisfy:
Et=0[pi(K1) + pi(K2(a, b))−K1 −K2(a, b)] > L (2.3)
7In a single agent decision problem with observable states, the optimal investment amounts
would be K1 and K2.
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The separability in the arguments is a simplifying assumption and relaxing this
will not qualitatively change the analysis. Assumption 2.3 puts some restric-
tions on the slope and curvature of the return function. The third assumption
can be viewed as a viability condition, which says that even if the intermediate
signal adds no new information, the expected return from the project under
the optimal policy will always be greater than the outside option.
• Contract
The entrepreneur owns the project but has initially no wealth and seeks to
obtain external funds to realize the project. Financing is available from a
competitive market of venture capitalists, which is represented in the model
by a single investor who can only accept or reject the take-it-or-leave-it offer
made by the entrepreneur8.
The set of ex-ante contracts includes all contracts specifying:
i) a control rights allocation:
An important feature of this contract is its inherent incompleteness, which
is often observed empirically. In the relevant body of literature it is often
observed that in the venture capital financing liquidation decision is the most
frequent source of conflict9. In this model. the “control rights” is assumed
to be unidimensional and identified with the liquidation rights. I define the
8Assuming a different distribution of bargaining power yields qualitatively similar results. The
assumption that the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power exacerbates the possible hold-up
problem faced by the venture capitalists.
9Kaplan and Stromberg (2003)
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measure of control as:
α ∈ {0, 1}
where α = 0 indicates E holding the control rights and α = 1 implies VC holds
the control rights10.
ii) a compensation schedule for the entrepreneur:
I adopt the convention that the venture capitalist is the residual claimant
and the entrepreneur is compensated with a monetary transfer (t) once the
true state is revealed. Because of the entrepreneur’s limited liability, t(θ) ≥ 0.
Clearly, the optimal contract always specifies t(θ = Bad) = 0, t(θ = Good) > 0.
Abusing the notation, I denote t(θ = Good) = t.
In the three-state interpretation, thus, the payoff of E after observing the signal
is:
Payoffs of E
Continue Liquidate
θ = Good t 0
θ = Bad 0 0
θ = Unknowable 1
2
t 0
Similarly, the payoff for the VC after observing the signal R can be captured
by:
Payoffs of V C
Continue Liquidate
θ = Good Π(K1, K2(r, s))−K1 −K2(r, s)− t 0
θ = Bad −K1 −K2(r, s) 0
θ = Unknowable 1−v
2
[Π(K1, K2(r, s))− t]−K1 −K2(r, s) 0
10I do not consider joint control rights.
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iii) investment schedule:
The contract specifies the amount to be invested in period 1: K1 and the
investment schedule upon observing the signal with posterior [r, s] : K2(r, s).
This captures the flavor of stage financing, which is a unique feature of venture
capital investments [99].
2.3.1 Binary Signal Example
First let us consider an example with binary signal structure with specific
parametric environment, which will illustrate the effect of ambiguity on the allocation
of control rights. While all other features of the model remain the same, this example
considers a signal structure given by:
R ∈ {H,L} ; Pr(R = H) = µ.
Starting with the prior Pr(θ = Good) = [a, b], the posterior after observing R be-
comes:
Pr(θ = Good|R = H) = [rH , sH ]
Pr(θ = Good|R = H) = [rL, sL]
Assume: rH+sH
2
> rL+sL
2
and sH−rH
2
< sL−rL
2
.
Let us also assume a functional form of the return function, for the ease of
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solving explicitly.
pi(K) = K1/2
At the beginning, the contract specifies (t,K1, K2(·), α).
Thus, ex-ante payoff of E can be calculated as:
VE = µ
[
rHt+ (1− sH)0 + (sH − rH) t
2
]
+ (1− µ)
[
rLt+ (1− sL)0 + (sL − rL) t
2
]
= µ
rH + sH
2
t+ (1− µ)rL + sL
2
t
=
a+ b
2
t = p0t (2.4)
Similarly, the ex-ante payoff for V C :
VV C = µ
rH + sH − v(sH − rH)
2
[
Π(K1, K2(r, s))
−K1 −K2(rH , sH)− t
]
+(1− µ)rL + sL − v(sL − rL)
2
[
Π(K1, K2(r, s))
−K1 −K2(rL, sL)− t
]
= (p0 − vq0)[
√
K1 − t]
+µ[(pH − vqH)
√
K2H −K2H ]
+(1− µ)[(pL − vqL)
√
K2L −K2L] (2.5)
If E holds the control rights,i.e. , α = 0 , E solves:
Pα=0

max(t,K1,KH2 ,KL2 ) [p0t]
st (p0 − vq0)[
√
K1 − t]
+µ[(pH − vqH)
√
K2H −K2H ]
+(1− µ)[(pL − vqL)
√
K2L −K2L] ≥ L
t ≥ 0
K1, K
H
2 , K
L
2 ∈ [0,max{K1, K2}]
(2.6)
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Where the constraints are: (a) participation constraint for V C, and (b) limited
liability condition for E. First note that since E has full bargaining power, the
participation constraint for V C will always hold as an equality. So, the problem can
alternatively be written as:
max
(K1K2H ,K2L)
p0
√
K1
+
p0
p0 − vq0
 µ(pH − vqH)√K2H − µK2H+(1− µ)(pL − vqL)√K2L − (1− µ)K2L
−K1 − L
 (2.7)
We use first order approach to solve for the optima. Ignoring the non-
negativity constraints, the FOCs take the form:
1
2
√
K1
=
1
p0 − vq0
1
2
√
K2H
=
1
pH − vqH
1
2
√
K2L
=
1
pL − vqL
The optimal contract with α = 0 then satisfies this set of FOCs and leaves
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the investor with zero net payoff. Optimal contract becomes:
K1 =
(p0 − vq0)2
4
K2H =
(pH − vqH)2
4
K2L =
(pL − vqL)2
4
t =
(p0 − vq0)
4
− L
(p0 − vq0)
+
1
8(p0 − vq0)
[
µ(pH − vqH)2 + (1− µ)(pL − vqL)2
]
From this optimal contract, we observe:
Remark 2.3.1. Observation 1: K2H > K1 > K2L: Investment flow increases after
a high signal and decreases after a low signal.
Observation 2: t decreases as v increases, i.e. , as VC becomes more ambiguity
averse, he is compensated by a higher share of future profit. This shows that
in this contractual environment, ambiguity sharing takes place11.
Under this contractual agreement, after observing the signal, the net expected
return (excluding the sunk cost K1) for the investor from continuing is:
gvV C(ri, si) = (pi − vqi)
(√
K1 +
√
K2i − t
)
−K2i (2.8)
∀i = H,L
11 ∂t
∂v < 0 because
∂
∂v
[µ(pH−vqH)2+(1−µ)(pL−vqL)2]
8(p0−vq0) < 0
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If this net expected return is negative, the investor faces a hold up problem
after observing the signal, because he would want to quit but it is always weakly
optimal for E to continue investing in the project because t ≥ 0.
In this example,
gvV C(ri, si) =
(p0 − vq0)(pi − vqi)
4
+
(pi − vqi)2
4
+
L(pi − vqi)
(p0 − vq0)
− (pi − vqi)
8(p0 − vq0)
[
µ(pH − vqH)2 + (1− µ)(pL − vqL)2
]
Next Lemma shows that gvV C(ri, si) is always non-negative if v = 0 (i.e. ,
under no ambiguity). So, under risk, agency conflict does not arise12. Here, the only
source of agency problem is the contracting parties’ differential attitude towards am-
biguity. Under ambiguity, with v > 0, agency conflict can arise. If V C is sufficiently
ambiguity averse, i.e. v ≥ v for a v ∈ (0, 1], E would want to continue the project
but VC is better off liquidating. In that case, control rights will be important to
decide whether the project is continued till the end.
Lemma 2.3.1. gvV C(ri, si) ≥ 0 ∀i = H,L if v = 0.
There exists a v ∈ (0, 1] such that for v ≥ v, gvV C(rL, sL) < 0.
Proof. In the Appendix B.
12This is a consequence of the assumption that both the agents are risk neutral. There will
be non-empty conflict regions if the venture capitalist is more risk-averse than the entrepreneur.
However, conventionally, the investor, having more wealth than the entrepreneur, is assumed to be
less risk-averse.
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Using the following set of parameters
[a, b] =
[
1
3
,
2
3
]
;µ =
1
2
;L =
1
50
[rL, sL] =
[
0,
1
3
]
; [rH , sH ] =
[
2
3
, 1
]
The next figure (Figure 2.2) show that gV C(H) ≥ 0 for all v ≥ 0, whereas gV C(L) < 0
for v ≥ v = .91.
Figure 2.2: Net Return from t = 2: Binary Signal Example
The ex-ante expected value to E under α = 0 :
Vα=0 =
p0(p0 − vq0)
4
+
p0[µ(pH − vqH)2 + (1− µ)(pL − vqL)2]
4
− Lp0
p0 − vq0
Now, if V C holds the control rights, i.e. , α = 1, after observing R = Low,
he will abandon the project. So, under α = 1, E solves:
Pα=1

max(t1,K11,KH21) [µ[(pH − vqH)t1]
st µ[(pH − vqH)
(√
K11 +
√
K2H1 − t1
)−K2H1]
−K11] ≥ L
t1 ≥ 0
K11, K
H
21 ∈ [0,max{K1, K2}]
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Now, solving the FOCs similarly, we obtain:
K11 =
µ2(pH − vqH)2
4
< K1
K2H1 =
(pH − vqH)2
4
= K2H
t1 =
(pH − vqH)
2
− L
µ(pH − vqH)
Comparing the two solutions, we observe the following patterns of capital
flow:
Observation 3: Under VC control, investment levels are non-increasing compared
to E control.
Observation 4: Given the parameter values,
t1 T t⇔ L(pH − vqH) T µ(pH − vqH)2 + (1− µ)(pL − vqL)2
A sufficient condition for t1 > t is:
v >
p0 − LpH
q0 − LqH = v0
For the given parametric example, v0 = 0.61.
Define the optimal ex-ante expected payoff of E from both these problems as:
VE(α = 0) = p0t
VE(α = 1) = µpHt1
If v > v0, there is a trade-off in determining the optimal way to allocate the
control rights. On one hand, ex-ante success probability decreases. However, on the
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other hand, the compensation in the event of success is also higher. We show in
the following proposition that if V C is very ambiguity averse in nature, the effect
of increase in t outweighs the possible liquidation loss and VE(α = 1) > VE(α = 0).
Comparing the ex-ante expected values of E under entrepreneur-control and V C
control, we reach the following proposition. It identifies the range of ambiguity
aversion of V C for which E obtains higher ex-ante expected payoff under α = 1 than
under own control, and hence it is optimal for her to relinquish control rights to V C.
Proposition 2.3.2. There exists v˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that, if v ≥ v˜, then VE(α = 1) ≥
VE(α = 0), so it is optimal for E to relinquish control rights to V C.
In the numerical example discussed above, for all v ≥ max{v¯ = 0.91, v0 =
0.61}, VE(α = 1) ≥ VE(α = 0), as shown in Figure 2.3.1.
Figure 2.3: Ex-ante Expected Payoff for E
Even without any information asymmetry or hidden actions, allocation of
ambiguity thus provides an explanation for the importance and use of control rights
allocation observed in VC investment context.
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In the next section we look at the general signal structure and characterize the
optimal contract structure in that environment. We show that the similar intuition
holds in the general case as well and thus ambiguity aversion can explain allocation
of control rights.
2.3.2 General Signal Structure
In this section we will look at a signal structure where the signal is drawn
from a non-atomic continuous distribution function. We model the posterior belief
[r, s] after observing the signal as following a continuous distribution Q(r, s), such
that the average of the posterior is always the prior:
∫
(r,s)∈K∆(0,1)
rdQ(r, s) = a;∫
(r,s)∈K∆(0,1)
sdQ(r, s) = b.
If α = 0, E solves the following problem:
Pα=0

max(t,K1,K2)
∫
(r,s)∈K∆(0,1)
(
r+s
2
)
tdQ(r, s)
s.t.
∫
(r,s)∈K∆(0,1)
{ (
r+s−(s−r)v
2
)
(Π(K1, K2(r, s))− t)
−K1 −K2(r, s)
}
dQ(r, s) ≥ L
t ≥ 0, K1 > K1 > 0, K2 > K2 > 0
(2.9)
Using the notations p = r+s
2
, q = r−s
2
; rewrite the problem as:
Pα=0

max(t,K1,K2) p0t
s.t.
∫
(r,s)∈K∆(0,1)
{
(p− vq) (Π(K1, K2(r, s))− t)
−K1 −K2(r, s)
}
dQ(r, s) = L
t ≥ 0, K1 > K1 > 0, K2 > K2 > 0
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Now, because of E ′s full bargaining power, the participation constraint will
hold as an equality. Then,
t =
1
(p0 − vq0)
[
(p0 − vq0) pi(K1) +
∫
(p− vq) pi(K2(r, s))dQ(r, s)
−L−K1 −
∫
K2(r, s)dQ(r, s)
]
So, ignoring the non-negativity constraints13, the problem becomes:
Pα=0
{
max
(t,K1,K2)
p0
(p0 − vq0)
[
(p0 − vq0) pi(K1) +
∫
(p− vq) pi(K2(r, s))dQ(r, s)
−L−K1 −
∫
K2(r, s)dQ(r, s)
]
(2.10)
First assume interior solutions to the program and later we will check that
it is indeed the case. Optimal contract under entrepreneur control is given by
(t∗, K∗1 , K
∗
2(·), α = 0) satisfying the necessary and sufficient conditions:
pi
′
(K∗1) =
1
(p0 − vq0) (2.11)
pi
′
(K∗2(r, s)) =
1
(p− vq) (2.12)
=
1
(s+ r)− v(s− r) ∀(r, s) (2.13)
t =
1
(p0 − vq0)
[
(p0 − vq0) pi(K∗1) +
∫
(p− vq) pi(K∗2)dQ(r, s)
−L−K∗1 −
∫
K∗2dQ(r, s)
]
(2.14)
Due to the concavity of the objective function, the SOCs are always satisfied.
Note: From the FOCs, pi
′
(K∗1), pi
′
(K∗2(r, s)) > 1 at every (r, s). So, we have
K1 > K1, K2 > K2.
13Later we check that the optimum derived using FOCs is indeed an interior optimum.
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Denote the optimal value of this contract for the entrepreneur as:
Vα=0 =
p0
(p0 − vq0)
 (p0 − vq0) pi(K
∗
1) +
∫
(r,s)∈K∆(0,1)
(p− vq) pi(K∗2)dQ(r, s)
−L−K∗1 −
∫
(r,s)∈K∆(0,1)
K∗2dQ(r, s)

(2.15)
Properties of the optimal contract under entrepreneur control:
The optimal contract under entrepreneur control is given by (t∗, K∗1 , K
∗
2 , α =
0), that satisfies the FOCs and leaves the investor with zero net utility. It is instruc-
tive to examine the properties of this optimal contract by analyzing the FOCs.
First, consider the range of posteriors for which investment goes up after
observing the signal. These signal realizations can be termed as “good” signals. If
V C were ambiguity neutral, if the signal induced a posterior mean p > p0, then
investment would go up. With ambiguity aversion, though, investment depends
on the ambiguity-adjusted posterior mean: p − vq. We find that the higher the
ambiguity-adjusted posterior mean, the higher the second period investment is.
r + s− (s− r)v
2
>
a+ b− v(b− a)
2
⇐⇒ K∗2(r, s) > K1
For “balanced” ambiguity attitude ( v < 1) , after observing the signal, a
sufficient condition for K2(r, s) > K1 is p − q > p0 − q0. In the following figure we
show how the region of “good” signals depends on the parameter v.
Since the return function satisfies Inada conditions, as the posterior ap-
proaches (0, 0), K2 → 0. So, for all signal realizations, second period’s optimal
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investment is positive. Also, the FOCs show that investment volume in both the
periods: K∗1 and K
∗
2 decrease as V C becomes more ambiguity averse. Moreover, K
∗
2
is a convex function of p− vq. This result is captured in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.3.3. As the V C becomes more ambiguity-averse, investment volume
K∗1 and K
∗
2(r, s) decrease ∀(r, s). K∗2(r, s) and r+s−v(s−r)2 pi(K∗2(·))−K∗2 are convex in
r+s−(s−r)v
2
.
Proof. From the FOCs,
Ψ(r, s) ≡ pi′(K∗2(r, s)) (p− vq)− 1 = 0
By Implicit Function Theorem,
∂K∗2
∂v
= −
∂Ψ(r,s)
∂v
∂Ψ(r,s)
∂K∗2
= − −qpi
′
(K∗2(r, s))
pi
′′
(K∗2(r, s))(p− vq)
< 0
because pi
′′
(K∗2(r, s)) < 0 by concavity assumption. Similarly, we can show that
∂K∗1
∂v
< 0. And
∂K∗2
∂(p− vq) = −
pi
′
(K∗2)
r+s−v(s−r)
2
pi′′(K∗2)
> 0
∂2K∗2
∂(p− vq)2 =
(
pi
′
(K∗2)
)2(
r+s−v(s−r)
2
)2
(pi′′(K∗2))
3
[
pi
′′
(K∗2)
2
pi′(K∗2)
− pi′′′ (K∗2)
]
≥ 0
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Hence K∗2 is convex in the ambiguity-adjusted mean: p − vq. The net return from
investing in period 2= NR2 =
r+s−v(s−r)
2
pi(K∗2(·))−K∗2 . By Envelope Theorem,
∂NR2
∂(p− vq) = pi(K
∗
2) > 0
∂2NR2
∂(p− vq)2 = pi
′(K∗2) > 0
Second, we examine how E ′s compensation depends on V C ′s ambiguity aver-
sion v. We find that under the given assumptions, as v increases, t decreases. Hence,
similar to the Binary environment, we observe that V C and E share ambiguity
through the financial contracting. The next proposition captures this.
Proposition 2.3.4. As the venture capitalist becomes more ambiguity averse, he is
compensated by a higher future cash flow. i.e. as v increases, t∗ falls.
∂t∗
∂v
< 0
Proof. In Appendix B.
Now, since E is protected by limited liability (t ≥ 0), she is always weakly
better off continuing the project till the end. However, for V C, after observing the
signal, if the expected return net of investment is less than the sunk first period
investment, it is better to liquidate the project. Let us define this net return as in
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the Binary Example:
gvV C(r, s) = (p− vq) (pi(K∗1) + pi(K∗2)− t∗)−K∗2
= (p− vq)(pi(K∗1) + pi(K∗2))
− p− vq
(p0 − vq0)
[
(p0 − vq0)pi(K∗1) +
∫
(p− vq)pi(K∗2)dQ(r, s)
−L−K∗1 −
∫
K∗2dQ(r, s)
]
Thus, under entrepreneur control, there exists a range of posteriors where
the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur have conflicting interests regarding the
liquidation of the project. In this region the hold-up problem faced by the investor
becomes apparent. Define this region as CZ (Conflict Zone):
CZ(v) =
{
(r, s) ∈ K∆(0,1) | gvV C(r, s) < 0
}
(2.16)
Proposition 2.3.5. If V C is ambiguity neutral, agency conflict does not arise. i.e.
if v = 0, CZ(v = 0) = φ. ∃v¯ ∈ (0, 1), such that as v > v¯, CZ(v) 6= φ. As v increases,
CZ(v) expands.
Proof. In Appendix B.
For a simulated example with the prior and the liquidation value as in the
binary example and with uniformly distributed signals, we find that
v¯ = .4351
In the simulated example with v = 0.5 , we identify the conflict zone in the
simplex, shown in Figure 2.4:
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Figure 2.4: Conflict Zone
If the observed signal realizations fall in this region CZ, agency conflict arises.
V C wants to liquidate the project but E wants to continue. In this region, control
rights become relevant.
Next we examine the case with V C control: α = 1.
First we characterize the optimal contract under α = 1 and show that in
the region where in equilibrium the project is continued till the end, the expected
payoff of the entrepreneur is higher. Thus, if V C is sufficiently ambiguity averse,
relinquishing control rights to the investor will be optimal for E.
Under V C control, let the optimal contract be denoted as (t˜, K˜1, K˜2, α =
1). Now, the venture capitalist will continue as long as his expected payoff from
continuation is higher than the sunk cost of first period investment. As before,
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denote the set of posteriors where the investor decides to liquidate at the optimal
contract as CZ, where
CZ = {(r, s) ∈ K∆(0,1)|gvV C(t˜, K˜1, K˜2) < 0} (2.17)
And let
∆0 := K∆(0,1)\CZ
= {(r, s) ∈ K∆(0,1)|gvV C(t˜, K˜1, K˜2) ≥ 0} (2.18)
denote the set of posteriors for which the venture capitalist decides to continue
the project till the end.
Under investor control, E solves the following problem:
Pα=1

max(t,K1,K2)
∫
{(r,s)∈∆0
ptdQ(r, s)
s.t.
∫
(r,s)∈∆0
{
(p− vq) (pi(K1) +K2(r, s)− t)
−K1 −K2(r, s)
}
dQ(r, s) ≥ L
t ≥ 0, K1 > K1 > 0, K2 > K2 > 0
(2.19)
Denote:
∫
(r,s)∈∆0
r + s
2
dQ = x
∫
(r,s)∈∆0
s− r
2
dQ = y
106
Since the participation constraint binds, we have:
t =
1
(x− vy)
 (x− vy)pi(K1)+ ∫
(r,s)∈∆0
[(p− vq)pi(K2(r, s))−K2(r, s)] dQ(r, s)
−K1 − L

Rewriting the problem:
Pα=1
 max(K1,K2) x(x−vy)
 (x− vy)pi(K1)+ ∫
(r,s)∈∆0
[(p− vq)pi(K2(r, s))−K2(r, s)] dQ(r, s)
−K1 − L

(2.20)
The necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize the optimal contract
under entrepreneur control are given by the FOCs.
pi
′
(K˜1) =
1
(x− vy) (2.21)
pi
′
(K˜2(r, s)) =
1
(p− vq)
=
1
( r+s
2
− v s−r
2
)
∀(r, s) ∈ ∆0 (2.22)
t˜ =
1
(x− vy)

(x− vy)pi(K˜1)
+
∫
(r,s)∈∆0
[
(p− vq)pi(K˜2(r, s))− K˜2
]
dQ(r, s)
−K˜1 − L
 (2.23)
Let us denote the maximized value of the objective function as:
Vα=1 = t˜x (2.24)
Note that: ∫
∆0
rdQ < a;
∫
∆0
sdQ < b
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Also, ∆0 is the region where the venture capitalist decides to continue the project till
the end. Now, gvV C(r, s) < 0 for high values of
(s−r)
2
. As a result, the continuation
region ∆0 contains posteriors with lower ambiguity:
x =
∫
∆0
r + s
2
dQ < p0
y =
∫
s−r
2
< 1
v
[ς(L,Q)]
s− r
2
dQ < q0
Since the venture capitalist no longer faces the hold up problem, the partic-
ipation constraint is now relaxed. E can exploit it to extract higher share of the
final return. Next proposition shows that compared to the optimal contract under
entrepreneur control, K1 decreases; second period’s investment stays the same in the
continuation region; but E ′s compensation increases. So, there is a trade-off between
the loss of early liquidation and the higher share of the return if the project succeeds.
The next proposition shows that as V C becomes sufficiently ambiguity averse, the
prospect of obtaining higher share dominates the loss of liquidation and the ex-ante
expected payoff for E under V C control is greater than that under E control.
Proposition 2.3.6. Under VC Control,
K˜1 < K
∗
1 ; K˜2(r, s) < K
∗
2(r, s)∀(r, s) ∈ ∆0;
t˜ > t∗ for v > v
Also, ∃v∗ > v, v∗ ∈ (0, 1), such that ∀v > v∗, xt˜ > p0t∗ , hence the entrepreneur
optimally relinquishes control rights to the venture capitalist.
Proof. In Appendix B.
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Figure 2.5: Range of v for which Vα=1 > Vα=0
In the figure above (Figure 2.3.2) in a simulated example we identify the
range of v for which relinquishing control rights is optimal for E. For the example,
v∗ = 0.762.
The intuition behind the result is straightforward. Since the venture capitalist
is more ambiguity-averse, under some signal realizations he wants to abandon the
project. Then, for the entrepreneur, holding on to the control right is more expensive.
Even though the entrepreneur does not want to abandon the project, the investor
is ready to forego future earnings in order to obtain control rights. If the investor
is very ambiguity averse, then he values the control rights even more. Proposition
2.3.6 shows that for high enough v, it is possible that the higher future earnings
for E outweighs the expected loss from abandoning the project under some signal
realizations.
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2.4 Discussion
Let us discuss some possible extensions of the model and how the results will
change under these generalizations.
No Limited Liability:
If E does not have limited liability, under “low” realizations of the signal, E
can compensate V C for the loss. The project will be continued for a larger set of
signal realizations. However, there may still be a range of v ∈ (0, 1) such that if
the ambiguity aversion of V C lies in that range, it will be too expensive for E to
retain control. In this case, similar to the results derived here, E will find it optimal
to relinquish control rights. Thus, relaxing this assumption will not qualitatively
change the results.
Multiple Stages of Financing:
Usually there can be more than two financing rounds in VC financing. If
we consider more financing stages, then using the same intuition as used in this
chapter, we can explain the movement of control rights over time. The results will
be consistent to the observed data: after high signal the control rights will move to
the entrepreneur, but even after that if the next period’s signal turns out to be low,
investor may obtain more control.
110
Moral Hazard:
If V C can not fully monitor if the disbursed funds are fully invested in the
project, then it can lead to possible moral hazard concern. This will provide another
rationale to the allocation of control rights. Since this can confound the effect of
ambiguity alone, we choose not to include this aspect.
Asymmetric Information:
If E does not perfectly observe V C ′s ambiguity aversion, it may give rise to
asymmetric information. Then E will offer menu of contracts to screen the V Cs
according to their preference. It will be interesting to see if a separating equilibrium
exists in this scenario and how this affects control rights allocation.
Apart from these possible generalizations, there are various other questions
that can be analyzed using this framework. The issue of control rights in VC context
is a broad and important question and we can look at the other aspects of VC
financing as well.
One broad area of research examines the optimal security design in VC con-
text. We can generalize this model to analyze how different security instruments can
be used to implement the control rights allocation and cash flows.
While liquidation rights is the most prominent aspect of control rights, it will
also be interesting to include other dimensions of control and see how the presence
of ambiguity affects them.
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2.5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter sheds light on venture capital contracting and shows that un-
der ambiguity, allocation of liquidity rights can be used as an instrument to share
ambiguity and mitigate the hold up problem the investor may face. I show that if
the investor is very ambiguity averse, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to relinquish
control rights.
In these two chapters, I have examined different contractual contexts under
ambiguity. The framework of ambiguity [54] can be used to analyze various real life
scenario where the causal interpretations are only partially known. Important issues
such as the environmental policies to fight the climate change, the patent policies
in innovation-based industries with competition constitute interesting directions for
future research.
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Chapter 3
Delegation as a Signal to Sustain Cooperation
3.1 Introduction
Inter-organizational delegation is a very important issue in economics. In
an organizational relationship between a principal and an agent, we often observe
decisions being delegated. Existing literature proposes a number of explanations
for why decisions are delegated. Some of the common explanations include: the
delegate might have lower opportunity costs, be better informed or equipped with
more adequate skills. In this paper we explore another potentially important role of
delegation, as a signalling device to facilitate cooperation.
First, using a theoretical model, I show that even if the agent does not have
superior skill or information about the project, the principal can delegate a task to
him, in order to facilitate cooperation at a later stage. The central idea is as follows:
consider an inter-organizational relationship between an agent and a principal, where
there are two separate tasks to perform. An example of such a relationship is the
organization relation between a doctor (principal) and a nurse (agent). The first
task (in the example, routine check-up of the patient) is a simple one and any one
of the doctor and the nurse can do it, while the second task, the surgery, requires
cooperation from both of them. The nurse may be trustworthy or not, but the
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doctor does not know his true type, she only has access to a private signal about the
nurse’s type. The doctor would benefit from cooperating with a trustworthy nurse
but not an untrustworthy nurse. A trustworthy nurse would like to help the doctor
but only if the doctor also helps the nurse, but an untrustworthy nurse would shirk.
If the doctor can delegate the first task (i.e. , let the nurse go through the check up
routine) , this Bayesian game has two equilibria which can be Pareto-ranked. In one
of the equilibria, delegation can be used to signal the doctor’s belief. If the doctor
believes the nurse to be trustworthy, she can delegate a task to the nurse to signal
her trust. Observing this signal, the trustworthy nurse will infer that the doctor
must have a higher belief about her trustworthiness, and is likely to cooperate in
the next task. In this equilibrium, delegation can bring about cooperation in the
second task1. The forward induction argument predicts that this equilibrium with
delegation as a signaling device will be chosen. However, because of the presence
of multiple equilibria in this game, whether this equilibrium is actually chosen by
decision makers is an empirical question.
Therefore I take the next step: in a controlled laboratory experiment I observe
how subjects make decisions in such a game theoretic situation. From the experi-
mental data we can test the theoretical predictions and examine how equilibrium is
selected in this Bayesian game. Through the experiments, we can simulate the exact
environment postulated in the theoretical model, so the generated data can be ana-
lyzed to test the theory. Thus, this experimental study can provide an explanation
1In a similar argument, using Intuitive Criterion, Herold [91] shows that contractual incomplete-
ness may arise to signal principal’s trust.
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of the observed phenomenon of inter-organizational delegation using a theoretical
prediction as well as empirical data. This paper also adds to the relatively new area
of experimental studies that deal with the principal-agent relationship.
At the same time this experimental study can complement another strand of
literature. In Bayesian games characterized by some uncertainty about an agent’s
type, theoretical models suffer from the phenomenon of multiplicity of equilibria.
It is important to know how economic agents choose between these equilibria to
obtain unique theoretical prediction. This paper studies a Bayesian game with two
equilibria which can be Pareto-ranked. So, the data on participants’ choices in this
game can add to the literature of equilibrium selection. Also, the standard theories of
Bayesian games define equilibria consistent with different beliefs, but do not explain
how economic agents actually form their beliefs. In this paper, I conduct several
sessions where I provide some information about past sessions to the participants,
and the results from these sessions suggest that the participants who received this
information behave significantly differently than the ones who did not. Hence, the
results indicate that the formation of belief depends on information. Thus, this study
not only sheds light on the issue of equilibrium selection, but also seeks to identify
the role of information in equilibrium selection. The results provide fresh insight and
can be used in future to formulate behavioral models to show how belief formation
in Bayesian games depends on the information environment.
From the experimental data I find that the subjects do not choose to delegate
very often; the Pareto inferior equilibria is chosen most of the times. However, when
the subjects are informed about the choices made in previous experimental sessions,
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they choose delegation as a signal of trust statistically more often than without such
historical information.
The next section describes how the paper is related to the existing liter-
ature. In section 3, I describe the formal theoretical model and state the theoretical
predictions. In section 4, I describe in detail the experimental design, along with the
description of the sessions. Sections 5 contains the analysis of the results. In section
6 I discuss the significance of the results and suggest possible explanations of the
observed behavior. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
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3.2 Literature Review
This paper is related to the strand of literature in economics that discusses the
reasons behind delegation. Bolton and Dewatripont [27] summarize the explanations
of delegation in principal-agent framework as discussed in the existing literature,
which include superior skill of the delegate or asymmetric information about the
task to be performed. Schelling [128] showed that delegation can also act as a
commitment device. Delegation of control rights is often discussed as an important
tool to provide incentives in the incomplete contract framework [3]. In the theoretical
and experimental literature a number of papers (e.g. , [14], [117]) attribute the choice
to delegate on the principal’s desire to shift the responsibility to the delegate. In
particular, in dictator games, they find that delegates are often punished less severely.
Hence, it can be shown that delegation can be used to shirk responsibility of an action.
Vetter [138] shows how in a political scenario delegation for anticipated rewards can
be used as an alternative to corruption. While these reasons do play crucial roles in
many real life delegation decisions, this paper proposes an alternative explanation of
delegation, where delegation can be used as a signal to facilitate cooperation later.
Here, I do not assume that the agent has superior skills or information about the
task. The experimental design followed in this paper makes it possible to isolate
all other factors, as there is only one asymmetry of information in this framework:
the principal does not observe the agent’s trustworthiness. In this context, the
experimental results examine if subjects use delegation of decision rights in order
to achieve cooperation. The results of this experimental study is thus aimed at
complementing the existing literature on delegation.
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In a broader way, this experimental study is part of the growing experimental
literature on equilibrium selection in signalling games. Bayesian games generally
suffer from multiplicity of equilibria. To obtain predictive power, different refine-
ments have been suggested theoretically. Mainly following Kohlberg and Mertens’
[104] concept of stability, these refinements pick equilibria from the set of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria which satisfy the stability criteria; hence they are more likely to
be chosen by a decision maker. In this paper, the theoretical prediction of the use of
delegation as a signal is consistent with a forward induction argument.
These refinements of Nash equilibria refine the beliefs of players about the
strategies selected by their opponents. However, since beliefs are inherently un-
observable, we need to validate these solution concepts using the observed play of
decision makers in a laboratory experimental environment. The laboratory results
can provide important insights to complement the theoretical debate about which
refinement is the most appropriate one. Since the early days of experimental eco-
nomics, various studies have presented mixed evidence on the predictive power of
the refinements (for an exhaustive review of these works, see [47] and [66]). Brandts
and Holt [28] found that in a signaling game with multiple equilibria, the Pareto
dominant Nash equilibrium is often chosen, which supports the Intuitive Criterion;
however, after gaining experience with different partners in a series of these signal-
ing games, behavior closer to the unintuitive equilibrium outcome is observed. Such
mixed predictions require us to further investigate the out-of-equilibrium adjustment
process. Cooper et al. [39] found evidence supporting forward induction argument in
coordination games, but only when the equilibrium chosen by the forward induction
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refinement coincides with the Pareto dominant equilibrium. In the battle of sexes
game, forward induction is shown to be effective along with a focal point argument
[42]. Another study [41] found that preplay communication can increase the pre-
dictive power of forward induction and solve the coordination failure problem. In
general, it is found that the outcomes are often game-specific (see [13], [29]) and a
small change in the parameter value can change the outcome even when the play
followed equilibrium prediction before [75] and even a small payoff asymmetry may
lead to coordination failure [46]2. This paper adds to this body of literature by inves-
tigating the predictive power of forward induction and suggesting how informational
environment can play a role in the formation of out-of-equilibrium path beliefs. I find
that the majority of the subjects choose the Pareto dominated equilibrium rather
than the Pareto superior one supported by the forward induction argument. How-
ever, this refinement performs better if the subjects are informed about past sessions.
Thus, this paper sheds light on the issue of equilibrium selection in signalling games.
2For an extensive review, see [125].
119
3.3 Theoretical Model
Consider a principal agent relationship: a principal (he) and an agent (she)
are engaged in a project that involves two separate tasks where monetary transfers
are not allowed. The first task requires effort from only one of the players, the
principal can do it himself or delegate it to the agent, while the second task involves
simultaneous choice of effort by both the principal and the agent where efforts are
complementary in nature. This second task represented by a coordination game
with two Nash equilibria: one of which Pareto dominates the other. If the players
coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium, we call it “cooperation” in this
context.
In this model, the agent does not have any superior skill or knowledge relevant
to the first task compared to the principal. The only information asymmetry is
about the agent’s “type”: she is either “Biased” (B) or “Unbiased” (U), which is
privately observed by the agent. A biased, or, untrustworthy agent does not care
about the project’s success whereas the unbiased or trustworthy agent has preferences
completely aligned with the principal. The proportion of unbiased agents in the
economy is known to be µ ∈ (0, 1). Let us describe the timeline of the game:
• At the beginning, Nature moves and chooses the agent’s type θ ∈ {U,B}.
The principal can not observe the true type, he gets a private binary signal
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s ∈ {H,L} about θ. The signal structure is given by:
Pr(s = H|θ = U) = pU
Pr(s = H|θ = B) = pB
Assumption 1: The signal structure satisfies Monotone Likelihood Ratio Prop-
erty (MLRP), i.e. , pU > pB.
Thus the posterior belief about the true type becomes
µH = Pr(θ = U |s = H) = µpU
µpU + (1− µ)pB
µL = Pr(θ = U |s = L) = µ(1− pU)
µ(1− pU) + (1− µ)(1− pB) ;
⇒ µH > µ > µL
For conducting the experiments, I use a set of parameters to simulate the signal
structure and the tasks. Here I state the theoretical results in terms of these
parameters.
The following parameters define the signal structure:
µ =
1
2
, µH =
3
5
, µL =
3
7
;
pU =
1
2
, pB =
1
3
Task 1: The principal can either perform Task 1 herself or delegate it to the
agent. Formally, in this task the active player chooses effort e1 ∈ {0, 1}. The
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payoffs of the players from this task are:
uP,1(e1 = 1) = 2 = uU,1(e1 = 1);
uB,1(e1 = 1) = 0
uP,1(e1 = 0) = 1 = uU,1(e1 = 0)
uB,1(e1 = 0) = 1
Thus, the unbiased agent’s preferences are closely aligned with the principal’s,
unlike the biased agent. Given a choice, the principal and the Unbiased agent
would choose e1 = 1 but the Biased agent would choose e1 = 0.
The effort choice in this task is not observable before the completion of task 2.
• Task 2: After task 1, both the principal and the agent have to choose efforts
simultaneously to complete task 2, where efforts are complementary in nature.
Task 2 involves simultaneous choice of effort e2P , e2A ∈ {0, 1} , which yields
payoff according to the following 2x2 matrix.
If the agent is Unbiased, the game becomes a coordination game:
P\AU 1 0
1 (9, 9) (1, 5)
0 (5, 1) (5, 5)
If, however, the agent is biased, the game becomes:
P\AB 1 0
1 (9, 1) (1, 5)
0 (5, 1) (5, 5)
Thus, a Biased agent always has a dominant action in Task 2: to choose eB2A =
0, whereas if the Unbiased agent and principal chose with complete information, the
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coordination game will have two pure strategy Nash Equilibria: (e2P , e
U
2A) = (1, 1)
and (e2P , e
U
2A) = (0, 0), with the former Pareto dominating the latter.
Total payoff of a player is the sum of his/ her payoffs obtained from both the
tasks.
Note that, in the second task, the complementarity of effort choices im-
plies that if the agent is unbiased then the principal would want him to choose higher
effort in task 2. The unbiased agent’s effort choice in task 2 in turn depends on his
belief about the principal’s “trust” in him (formally, belief about the principal’s pos-
terior after receiving the private signal). Thus, if delegating the first task can serve
as a signalling device, then the principal with a more favorable signal could use it to
induce higher effort from the unbiased agent in task 2. I look for Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria that in this context.
Definition 3.3.1 (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium). Consider a strategy profile for all
players: the principal, the Biased and the Unbiased agent; as well as beliefs about
the other players’ types at all information sets (after observing Delegation and after
observing No Delegation). This strategy profile and belief system form a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) if:
(1) sequential rationality—at each information set, each player’s strategy spec-
ifies optimal actions, given her beliefs and the strategies of the other players, and
(2) consistent beliefs—given the strategy profile, the beliefs are consistent
with Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Definition 3.3.2 (Forward Induction (van Damme, 1988)). A PBE satisfies Forward
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Induction if the following property is satisfied. In a generic 2 player game in which
player i chooses between an outside option or to play a game G of which a unique
and viable equilibrium e∗ yields the player more than the outside option, only the
outcome in which player i plays G and then e∗ is played is plausible.
Then, in the signaling game described above, the pure strategy PBE are:
Proposition 3.3.1. If the prior belief is such that
pU <
5
9
, µH >
5
9
> µL
then there exist two pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria:
(A) a separating equilibrium: principal with a high private signal chooses
to delegate Task 1, and then chooses high effort in the coordination game, and the
principal with low signal does not delegate the task 1 and chooses low effort in the
coordination game; Unbiased agent chooses High effort in Task 2 whenever he is
delegated Task 1 and chooses low effort in Task 2 whenever not delegated; Biased
agent always chooses low effort in Task 2.
(B) a pooling equilibrium: Both high and low signal principals choose not to
delegate; subsequently in Task 2, both the principal and the agent always choose low
effort, so cooperation fails to occur.
Under the parametric restriction, the separating equilibrium is the unique PBE
satisfying the forward induction refinement.
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Proof. Let us define the Unbiased Agent’s belief as:
αUi = Pr(P got a High Signal| own type, P chose i);
i = {Delegate,No Delegate}
The strategies are:
for Principal:
σ2j = Pr(P chooses Task 2 effort=1|Signal= j)
σDj = Pr(P chooses to Delegate|Signal= j)
j = {High, Low}
for Unbiased Agent:
σiU = Pr(A chooses Task 2 effort=1|P chose i)
i = {Delegate,No Delegate}
Then, a pooling PBE is given by:
for P:
(σ2H = σ2L = 0;σDH = σDL = 0)
for Unbiased A:
(αUD < pU , α
U
ND = pU ;σ
ND
U = σ
D
U = 0)
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For all parameter range, such a PBE exists. A separating equilibrium is given by:
for P:
(σ2H = 1, σ2L = 0;σDH = 1, σDL = 0)
for Unbiased A:
(αUD = 1, α
U
ND = 0;σ
ND
U = 0, σ
D
U = 1)
Given (αUD = 1, α
U
ND = 0;σ2H = 1, σ2L = 0), the ex-ante expected value of P with a
private signal j ∈ {H,L} : Then,
Vj(D) T Vj(ND)
⇔ µj T 5
9
For µH ≥ 59 > µL, σDH = 1 and σDL = 0. So, the only off the equilibrium belief
consistent with the forward induction argument is:
αUD = 1, α
U
ND = 0
Thus, this separating equilibrium satisfies Forward Induction refinement. It is easy
to see that off equilibrium belief αUD < pU is never consistent with Forward Induction
refinement, so the pooling PBE does not satisfy this refinement.
The experiment is intended to test Proposition 3.3.1, and reveal if decision to
delegate can be considered as a signalling device to facilitate cooperation, and how
the decision to delegate depends on information.
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3.4 Experimental Design
To examine the delegation behavior of subjects and which equilibrium
is chosen in the principal-agent game, I have conducted eight experimental sessions,
where a total of 174 subjects participated, creating a dataset with 2784 observations.
Four of the sessions feature the sequential game discussed above (I call this Treatment
NH ), and four sessions were conducted where the subjects were given information
about the behavioral trends observed in a past session (I call this Treatment H ).
Each experimental session consisted of two parts: in the first part the
players sequentially played Task 1 and Task 2, but the principals did not have the
option of delegation. So, in this part, the two tasks can be treated independently;
hence this part can be treated as the “Control Group.” Part Two gave the principals
the option to delegate the first task, and thus can be treated as the “Treatment
Group.” Below I describe the specific features of the experimental design followed in
this study.
• Within Subjects Design: In this experiment, I use the “within subjects”
design, where the same subject pool serves both as the Control Group and the
Treatment Group. This helps us increase the number of observations at a lower
budget. It also reduces the error variance due to individual fixed effects since
there are more observations for each participant.
• Role Switching: So that all the subjects are aware of the incentives faced
by both the roles, I use “role switching” in the design. At the beginning of
each experimental session, every participant randomly receives a role: either a
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principal or an agent with equal probability. After that, at the beginning of
each round the role switches, i.e. , if an individual is assigned as a principal in
round one, he/she will be an agent in round two, and so on.
• Random and Anonymous Matching: To implement the static nature of
the theoretical model, I use random and anonymous matching among the par-
ticipants in different roles in every round.
• Risk Neutrality: To simulate the theoretical set up, I conduct lotteries to pay
the subjects in order to impose risk neutrality. I follow the approach proposed
by Walker, Smith and Cox [139] and use their finding that risk neutrality can
be induced in subjects’ decisions by paying them in lotteries on money that
are linear in the outcome probabilities.
• Fair Payment Scheme: The payment scheme is designed to be fair and
efficient. While conducting the lottery, the computer takes care of the roles
and types the subject was assigned and adjusts the probability of winning
accordingly. At the lottery, for each participant, the computer randomly draws
an integer between 0 and the maximum payoff points that subject could have
earned, given the roles and types that he/she was assigned to in each round.
This ensures fairness of the lottery.
The experiment sessions are conducted in the Computer laboratory in
the Economics Department of UT Austin. For the baseline treatment (Treatment
NH ), there are three sessions with 24 participants each and one with 20 participants;
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for Treatment H, two sessions have 22 participants, one has 20 and the other has 18
participants participating. zTree software [64] is used to design the interface and
record the participants’ responses. At the beginning of a session, each participant
is assigned a random subject number generated by the computer. The experimental
instructions are then given verbally to the participants and a copy of the instructions
are also distributed among them. At the beginning of each round, every participant
receives a role: either a principal or an agent, with role switching in every round.
Then, the agents are randomly assigned as biased or unbiased types (with equal
probability) and randomly and anonymously matched to the subjects assigned as
principals in that round. The principals do not observe the type of the agent he/she
is matched to in that round, but receive a randomly generated signal sent by the
computer. The matching and signalling structures remain the same throughout the
session. To avoid any positive or negative connotations, I call the types Green (for
Unbiased) and Red (for Biased); the signals as Lime (high) and Pink (low).
Since the game consists of multiple tasks, it is imperative that the sub-
jects are trained in each of these tasks and have sufficient experience with them
before playing the sequential game. So, at the beginning, the players face the two
tasks separately. Stage One of Part One features four rounds of task 2, where in
each round the matched pair of a principal and an agent play the coordination game
described above. After that, instructions about task 1 are given and a short quiz is
conducted to ensure the subjects’ understanding of the task. Stage Two of Part One
features six rounds of the entire game, where each matched pair of a principal and
an agent will play task 1 and task 2 sequentially, but without the option to delegate
129
task 1. Thus, the data generated from Stage Two of Part One can be used as the
data from the Control Group. Part Two consists of ten rounds of the entire game,
with the principals having the option to delegate task 1 to the agents; thus this stage
provides the data from the Treatment Group. Henceforth, I use the terms
(a) Part One Group: to denote the Control Group in each session,
(b) Part Two Group: to denote the Treatment Group in each session,
(c) Treatment NH sessions: to denote the sessions where no historical infor-
mation was given (as described above), and
(d) Treatment H sessions: to denote the sessions where historical information
were given (as described next).
Apart from conducting four sessions with no historical information, I
also conduct five sessions with historical information given to the subjects. In these
sessions, termed as the Treatment H sessions, the Part One Group is conducted
similar to the Treatment NH sessions. However, before Part Two, the subjects are
given information about
(a) the proportion of principals who chose high effort after delegating Task 1
and after not delegating, and
(b) the proportion of Red (Biased) and Green (Unbiased) agents who chose
high effort after being delegated and after not being delegated.
In the first session with Treatment H , the information given was from
the previous Treatment NH session. The next Treatment H sessions were conducted
using information from the last Treatment H session. Hence, in the first Treatment H
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session, the subjects were informed about behavioral trends of others who, in turn,
were not given any information; whereas in the next Treatment H sessions, subjects
observed data generated from a session where historical information was given. This
may lead to inconsistency problems, so to maintain consistency, I do not use the data
from the first Treatment H session.
For the payment scheme, I use lotteries to implement risk-neutrality of
the players. In each round, depending on the choices made by a participant and
the matched partner, the participants were awarded payoff points specified in the
theoretical model. At the end of a session, two lotteries were conducted. In Lottery
One, a random integer was drawn by the computer from the interval of 0 to the
maximum number of points a participant could have earned in Part One, given
his/her roles and types. If the actual points earned was greater than the random
integer, the participant got $15, otherwise $2. In Lottery Two, a random integer was
drawn by the computer from the interval of 0 to the maximum number of points a
participant could have earned in Part Two and if the actual points earned was greater
than that random integer, the participant was rewarded $15, otherwise he/she got
$4. The detailed set of Instructions used to conduct the experimental sessions is
attached in Appendix
Hypotheses:
In the baseline treatment (Treatment NH ), I examine the data observed
to see if the subjects’ choices are consistent with any of the equilibrium predictions
of the theoretical game, and if the subjects indeed use delegation as a signaling
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device. Here I state the hypothesis, later on we will see if the results support these
hypothesis.
Firstly, the Part One Group (observations from subjects playing the en-
tire game without the delegation option) serves as a benchmark. In absence of any
connection between the two tasks, from the proportion of cooperation, I get a bench-
mark about the cooperation behavior of the subject pool. The Part Two Group data
will then shed light on the equilibrium selection behavior.
A Hypothesis NH (Part One Group): In the Part One Group of the baseline treat-
ment, in Task 1 the principal will chose high effort and in Task 2, (e2P , e2A) =
(0, 0) will be played irrespective of the principal’s signal or the agent’s types,
so the outcome will be consistent with the Pareto inferior outcome (5, 5).
B Hypothesis NH (Part Two Group): In the Part Two Group of the baseline
treatment, the separating equilibrium will be chosen, where the high signal
principal will delegate Task 1 and achieve cooperation in Task 2 if matched
with an Unbiased agent.
This hypothesis can be broken into several components:
B1 The principal with a high signal more frequently chooses to delegate the task
1 than the principal with a low signal.
B2 After delegating task 1 to the matched agent, the principal is more likely to
choose high effort in task 2 than when not delegating.
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B3 After observing delegation by the principal, the matched Unbiased agent chooses
high effort more often than after observing no delegation.
In the sessions where the subjects are given information about the past
session (Treatment H ), I test if there is a statistically significant difference in the
equilibrium selection behavior. In those sessions, in addition to testing the above
hypothesis, I test the following hypothesis as well:
C Hypothesis H: In the Part Two Group in Treatment H sessions , the separat-
ing equilibrium is played more often than in Treatment NH sessions. Also,
delegation is more frequently observed with Treatment H.
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3.5 Results
This section describes the results analyzing the data from the eight experi-
mental sessions.
Treatment NH : Part One Group
We need to closely examine the results from the Part One Group, with 552
observations. Apart from showing if the subjects’ play conforms to any equilibrium
behavior, the results also shed light on the natural cooperative tendency in the
subject pool. For each of the observations, besides presenting the proportions, I
also conduct t-tests to test the relevant hypothesis and present the t-statistics in the
parentheses.
1. Observation 1: The Unbiased agents choose high effort in Task 2 significantly
more often (t-stat: −8.3757). The following table reports the total number
and proportion of occasions where the agent chose high effort.
Type\Task 2 Effort High Low Total
Unbiased 68 (41.72%) 95 (58.28%) 163
Biased 2 (1.77%) 111 (98.23%) 113
Total 70 206 276
2. Observation 2: The principals choose high effort in Task 1 (which is the dom-
inant strategy) almost always (t-stat: 6.6641), indicating the consistency of
behavior in the subject pool.
Task 1 Effort: High Task 1 Effort: Low Total
20 (7.25%) 256 (92.75%) 276
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3. Observation 3: The principals choose low effort in Task 2 if they receive low
signal. They choose high effort in Task 2 significantly more often if the private
signal is high (t-stat: −6.3011).
Signal\Task 2 Effort High Low Total
High 50 (45.87%) 59 (54.13%) 109
Low 23 (13.77%) 144 (86.23%) 167
Total 73 203 276
4. The outcome (5, 5) is chosen significantly more often than the outcome (9, 9)
in Task 2.
Equilibrium Chosen Frequency Percent
Outcome (9, 9) 22 7.97%
Outcome (5, 5) 203 73.55%
Total Play 276 100%
Also, the subjects’ behavior mostly conforms to an equilibrium prediction;
only 18% of the times the behavior observed is different than predicted by an
equilibrium. Together, these four observations show support for Hypothesis A.
The following table (Table 3.1) shows the results of a t-test to check if the
outcome (9, 9) is chosen significantly less often than the outcome (5, 5) in Task
2 and the evidence suggests that the majority of the participants chose the
Outcome (5, 5) in the Part One Group data.
Finally, I ran basic logistic regressions to understand the factors that affect
the Task 2 effort choices by the principals and agents. In particular, I examine
if there is any subject-specific, session-specific or period-specific fixed effect on the
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Table 3.1: Outcome (5, 5) Chosen More Frequently in Part One
Two-sample test with equal variance
Group Obs Mean Std Er 95% Conf. Interval
Outcome (9, 9) 276 0.797101 0.0168825 0.0475575 0.1118628
Outcome (5, 5) 276 0.785507 0.0209859 0.3664887 0.787867
Combined 552 .4076087 .0209339 .3664887 .4487287
diff t = −21.0114 d.f.= 550
Ho: diff= 0
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff >0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
choice of Task 2 effort. The following table (Figure 3.1) summarizes the findings.
The principals’ choice of Task 2 effort depends only on the private signal, while
the agents’ choice depends on the type and the period. As the session proceeds,
the agents become pessimistic about cooperation possibilities and choose low efforts
increasingly often, but the effect is not statistically significant at 5% level. Overall,
these results support Hypothesis A1.
3.5.1 Treatment NH : Part Two Group
From the data collected from the Part Two Groups in the baseline treat-
ment sessions, analyzing the 920 observations, I observe the following trends. As
before, the t-statistics are reported within parentheses.
1. Principals after observing high (i.e. , Lime) signal delegate more often than
after low (i.e. Red) signal (t-stat: −4.1037). Thus, the private belief about
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Figure 3.1: Task 2 Effort Choices in the Part One Group of Treatment NH
the matched agent’s type influences the delegation decision, as posited in Hy-
pothesis B1.
Signal\Delegation Delegate No Delegate Total
High 55 (28.65%) 137 (71.35%) 192
Low 36 (13.43%) 232 (86.57%) 268
Total 91 369 460
2. After Delegation, principals more often follow with high effort choice in Task
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2 (t-stat: −5.0013). This supports Hypothesis B2.
Delegation\Task 2 Effort High Low Total
After Delegation 33 (36.26%) 58 (63.74%) 91
After No Delegation 52 (14.09%) 317 (85.91%) 369
Total 85 375 460
3. After observing Delegation, Unbiased agents are more likely to respond by
choosing High Effort in task 2, as posited in Hypothesis B3 (t-stat: −3.3962).
Delegation\Task 2 Effort High Low Total
After Delegation 24 (42.11%) 33 (57.89%) 57
After No Delegation 35 (20%) 140 (80%) 175
Total 59 173 232
Biased agents almost never choose high effort.
Delegation\Task 2 Effort High Low Total
After Delegation 0 (0%) 34 (100%) 34
After No Delegation 2 (1.03%) 192 (98.23%) 194
Total 2 226 228
4. After a delegation occurs, the proportion of plays choosing (High, High) in
Task 2 is significantly greater than after no delegation. The following table
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shows that after delegation it is ten times more likely to end up at (9, 9) in
Task 2.
Delegation\Task 2 Outcome Task 2 payoff : (9, 9) Total
After Delegation 11 (12.09%) 69
After No Delegation 6 (1.63%) 323
Total 17 392
A logistic regression attempts to explain the delegation decision and the
Task 2 effort choice. The results3 are described in the following table (Figure 3.2):
From the table, we observe that the agent’s effort choice significantly depends
on her type and also whether he was delegated. Also, as the sessions proceeds, he
chooses high effort less often. For the principal, delegation decision depends only
on the signal, though the variable “period” has a dampening effect (not significant
at 5% level). The principal’s Task 2 effort choice significantly depends on her own
delegation decision and private signal.
Equilibrium Selection
Next we test which equilibrium is selected more often in the observed play.
First, note that the Pareto-inferior PBE and the PBE satisfying Forward Induction
Refinement both predict a similar outcome if the Principal observes a low signal:
3I drop the variables “session”and “subject”, which were insignificant at 5% level.
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Figure 3.2: Task 2 Effort Choices in Part Two Group with Treatment NH
both equilibria predict that the Principal will not delegate Task 1 and subsequently
choose low effort in Task 2, and the matched Agent will respond by choosing low
effort in Task 2. So, we examine the proportion of times each of the equilibria is
chosen separately for each signal realization and put higher emphasis on the behavior
observed after a High signal is observed.
If a High Signal is observed, the Forward Induction equilibrium (termed
as “FI” hereafter) is chosen significantly less often than the Pareto-inferior PBE
(“ PBE” hereafter). The next table summarizes the proportions of plays conforming
to the two respective equilibrium predictions.
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Equilibrium Chosen \ Signal High Low Total
FI 19 (9.90%) 212 (79.10%) 231
PBE 105 (54.69%) 212 (79.10%) 317
Total Equilibrium Play 124 (64.58%) 212 (79.10%) 336(73.04%)
We conduct a t-test to test Hypothesis B and find that the FI equilibrium is
chosen significantly less often (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: FI is not Chosen Frequently
Two-sample test with equal variance
Group Obs Mean Std Er 95% Conf. Interval
PBE 192 .546875 .0360194 .4758281 .6179219
FI 192 .0989583 .0216064 .0563406 .1415761
Combined 384 .3229167 .0238928 .2759392 .3698941
diff t = 10.6640 d.f. = 382
Ho: diff= 0
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
Since t-tests use the normality assumption, I also use a non-parametric test,
viz. Mann-Whitney U test and obtain similar results (z-stat: 7.72, significant at
1% level). Combining the observations with High and Low signal realizations, we
observe that FI is chosen 50.21% of the times, while PBE is chosen 68.9% of the
times and the difference is statistically significant at 1% level (t-stat: 5.88).
This result clearly shows that the proportion of plays conforming to the Pareto
dominated PBE is significantly greater than the proportion conforming to the PBE
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that satisfies the forward induction criterion. This result contradicts Hypothesis B.
Also, the proportion of plays conforming to an equilibrium prediction is also
significantly lower (only 64.58%, as shown in the above table) compared to the same
if a Low signal is observed (79.10%). A t-stat shows that difference is significant
(Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Equilibrium Play Observed More Often with Low Signal
Two-sample test with unequal variance
Group Obs Mean Std Er 95% Conf. Interval
Low Signal 268 .7910448 .0248812 .7420564 .8400331
High Signal 192 .6458333 .0346057 .5775749 .7140917
Combined 460 .7304348 .0207117 .6897332 .7711363
diff t = 3.4070 d.f. = 368.979
Ho: diff= 0
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9996 Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.0007 Pr(T > t) = 0.0004
To sum up the results from this treatment, we observe that:
(a) The observed play mostly conforms to a PBE.
(b) After a delegation decision, the choices made by the principal and the
agent supports the theoretical prediction of forward induction.
(c) However, the PBE that survives the forward induction criterion is sel-
dom chosen. Principals do not delegate often. The Pareto inferior PBE is chosen
significantly more frequently, indicating that forward induction fails to predict the
142
outcome in this context. To explain these results, I use the next set of treatments to
check if history has any impact on the decisions and belief formation.
3.5.2 Treatment H
The question that I address in this section is: how does the delegation
choice depend on the information given to the participants? I use the data from the
last four sessions (I will call them History sessions, or Treatment H ) containing 1312
observations. In each session, before Part Two, the participants were given summary
statistics about the past History session4. Analyzing this data, I examine if this
additional information affects the decision making of the subjects and equilibrium
selection in general. The observations from these four sessions are listed below:
1. Observation 1: The data from the Part One Group in Treatment H sessions is
similar to the Part One Group data observed in Treatment NH sessions.
The Unbiased agents choose Task 2 effort in a similar way (t-statistic for com-
paring the Task 2 effort between Treatment NH and Treatment H is 1.63,
insignificant at 10% level), similar for the Biased agents (t-stat: −0.7303).
The principals choose Task 2 effort similarly (for low-signal principals, t-stat:
1.53, for high-signal, t-stat: 1.35). The cooperation achieved in Task 2 is also
similar (t-stat: 0.31). This is not surprising, given that the Part One Group was
not given any additional information. For the Part Two Group, we need to ex-
4In all of these sessions, the historical information given was from the last session conducted
with similar informational environment. For the sake of consistency, I do not use the first session
where the data given was from a session which was conducted without history.
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amine the results more closely. The tables (3.10.1) and the logistic regressions
(Figure 3.5)are given in Appendix A.
2. Observation 2: The principals who observe high signals delegate more often in
Treatment H than in Treatment NH (t-stat: −2.75).
Treatment\Delegation Delegation No Delegation Total
History 65 (42.76%) 87 (57.24%) 152
No History 55 (28.65%) 137 (71.35%) 192
Total 120 224 344
The result of the t-test is shown in the following table (Table 3.4). Here, we
test if the proportion of principals who delegate after observing high signal
is different between Treatment NH sessions and Treatment H sessions. The
test finds clear evidence of a significant difference in delegation behavior across
treatments.
Since t-tests use the normality assumption, I also use a non-parametric test,
viz. Mann-Whitney test to check if the proportion of delegation choices is
significantly different in Treatment H, and these results are also similar to the
t-test, as shown in the following table (Table 3.5).
3. Observation 3: The proportion of times the observed play conforms to the
forward induction equilibrium is significantly higher in Treatment H compared
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Table 3.4: Higher Delegation Frequency with History
Two-sample test with equal variance
Group Obs Mean Std Er 95% Conf. Interval
Treatment NH 192 0.2864583 .0327133 .2219327 .350984
Treatment H 152 .4276316 .040261 .348084 .5071792
Combined 344 .3488372 .0257341 .2982207 .3994537
diff t = −2.7503 d.f. = 342
Ho: diff= 0
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0031 Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.0063 Pr(T > t) = 0.9969
to Treatment NH. i.e. the separating equilibrium with delegation as a way to
achieve cooperation is chosen more frequently in Treatment H. The follow-
ing table captures the number (and proportion) of times the forward induction
equilibrium (FI ) and the Pareto-dominated PBE (PBE ) is chosen in Treatment
H. As discussed before, we put more emphasis on the results for the observa-
tions with High signal realization, since for Low signal, the two equilibrium
predictions converge.
Equilibrium Selection After High Signal
Equilibrium Outcome\Treatment H NH Total
FI 29 (19.08%) 19 (9.90%) 48
PBE 79 (51.97%) 105 (54.69%) 184
Total No of Equilibrium Plays 108 (71.05%) 124 (64.58%) 232 (67.44%)
Using t-test we examine if the frequency of choosing the respective equilibrium
depends on the information given. While we find that the frequency of choosing the
Pareto dominated PBE does not significantly vary from Treatment H to Treatment
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Table 3.5: Treatment H vs NH: Mann-Whitney Test
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
History Obs. Rank-sum Expected
Without History 192 31060 33120
With History 152 28280 26220
Combined 344 59340 59340
unadjusted variance 839040.00
adjustment for ties −267271.84
adjusted variance 571768.16
H0 : d(NH)− d(H)
z = −2.724
Pr ob > |z| = 0.0064
NH (t-stat:0.4999, statistically insignificant), for the FI, the treatment matters, as
shown next (Table 3.6).
Overall frequencies (for both High and Low signal realizations) are given
below:
Equilibrium Selection
Equilibrium Outcome\Treatment H NH Total
FI 244 (59.51%) 231 (50.22%) 475 (54.6%)
PBE 294 (71.71%) 317 (68.91%) 611(70.23%)
Total No of Equilibrium Plays 323 (78.78%) 336 (73.04%) 659 (75.75%)
For PBE, we check that the treatment does not significantly affect the pro-
portion of plays conforming to this Pareto-dominated equilibrium (both t-test and
Mann-Whitney test findings agree; t-stat: −.8991). For the Forward Induction equi-
librium, however, History matters. The following table (Table 3.7) shows the results
of the Mann-Whitney test to check if the proportion of play selecting the separating
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Table 3.6: FI Chosen More Often With History
Two-sample test with equal variance
Group Obs Mean Std Er 95% Conf. Interval
Treatment NH 192 .0989583 .0216064 .0563406 .1415761
Treatment H 152 .1907895 .0319757 .127612 .2539669
Combined 344 .1395349 .0187094 .1027352 .1763346
diff t = −2.4553 d.f. = 342
Ho: diff= 0
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0073 Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.0146 Pr(T > t) = 0.9927
equilibrium is significantly different in Treatment H, and I do find support in the
result.
We also observe that the proportion of plays conforming to an equilibrium
prediction is significantly different in Treatment H (mean: 78.78%) vs in Treatment
NH (mean: 73.04%) at 5% level (t-stat: −1.97). These results indicate that the
given information about past session affects belief formation and is more conducive
to forward induction reasoning.
1. The following table (Figure 1) shows the logistic regression results to see what
factors affect the Task 2 effort choices and delegation decisions in Treatment H.
As predicted in the theoretical model, the Green Agent’s effort choice signifi-
cantly depends on whether he is delegated Task 1; the Principal’s effort choice
depends on own delegation decision and private signal whereas her delegation
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Table 3.7: FI Chosen More Often: Mann-Whitney Test
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
History Obs. Rank-sum Expected
Without History 460 191565 200330
With History 410 187320 178555
Combined 870 378885 378885
unadjusted variance 13689217
adjustment for ties −3509103
adjusted variance 10180114
H0 : d(NH)− d(H)
z = −2.747
Pr ob > |z| = 0.0060
decision depends on private signal.
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Figure 3.3: Task 2 Effort Choice in Treatment H
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3.6 Discussion
Analyzing the results from last section, we can clearly see that:
(a) In general, the participants choose the pooling PBE. Delegation is not used
often and later in Task 2 (Low, Low) effort choice is observed. Thus, the forward
induction logic breaks down here.
(b) In Treatment H when subjects are given information about the past ses-
sion, participants increasingly choose the separating equilibrium. The effect of in-
formation on the frequency of choosing the other PBE, however, is not significant.
This suggests that this additional information helps the participants to form their
belief about how the other participants will play.
In this section, I will discuss these two central features of the results.
• On forward induction: The results indicate that the forward induction reason-
ing is unlikely to be empirically valid in this context. This finding is consistent
with the existing studies ([40], [80]) which discuss the limitations of forward in-
duction reasoning. It has been found that specially in cooperation games with
multiple Pareto ranked equilibria, forward induction refinement does not have
much predictive power. Forward induction relies essentially on the common
belief of rationality assumption. So, if the players are unsure of other players’
rationality, they can choose the “safe” option of playing low effort and this can
lead to the observed results.
• On the Importance of Information: In Treatment H, the information about the
150
past session is shown to increase the proportion of cooperation. To investigate
the effects of information, we notice that
(a) The proportion of times the separating equilibrium5 was chosen after ob-
serving a High signal does not significantly differ across sessions under Treat-
ment H. As the following figure (Figure 3.6) shows, the proportions of equilib-
rium play for both the equilibria do not exhibit any trend over time.
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium Selection by Session in Treatment H for High Signal
Also, as noted before in the logistic regression explaining the principals’ effort
choice in Treatment H (Figure 1), the variable “session” is not affecting the
choice significantly.
5As defined before, by “Coordination”, I refer to the outcome where principals delegate and
then in Task 2 end up with (High, High) effort choice.
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Clearly, the proportion of plays conforming to either of the equilibria does
not show any significant cumulative growth pattern over the sessions. Given
that each subsequent session was given data from a previous session which
already had historical information, this lack of pattern is all the more stark.
These results suggest that the effect of information on cooperation behavior
can not be explained by the given information itself; rather the availability of
information is what creates a significant difference.
So, we offer the conclusion that the equilibrium selection and belief forma-
tion depend on the informational environment of the game. In this particular
Bayesian game, the information about past play increased the predictive power
of forward induction refinement. These results thus stress the need of a fully
formulated behavioral model of equilibrium selection in Bayesian games.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this study I have shown that theoretically it is possible to explain the
delegation phenomenon in various real life contexts as a signal of trust in order to
achieve cooperation in a later phase. However, the experimental data show that the
subjects do not often choose this equilibrium. However, providing more information
about past play increases the proportion of subjects choosing this equilibrium, hence
using delegation to achieve cooperation.
On one hand, this paper sheds light on the determinants of cooperation in
many real life scenarios. In inter-organization partnerships, it is often crucial to
sustain cooperation among the employer and the employee in order to enhance the
value of the relationship. This study shows how the use of delegation can be used to
signal the employer’s trust in the employee’s devotion and bring about cooperation.
It also underlines the importance of factors like the workplace environment and
past information in forming new employee’s belief and consequently in equilibrium
selection.
On the other hand, this study provides fresh evidence on equilibrium selection
in a Bayesian game. The results suggest that to understand the issue of equilibrium
selection, we need a better model of how beliefs are formed and how these beliefs
depend on historical information.
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Appendices
3.8 Appendix A: Ambiguity Framework
Denote the space of consequences as X, which is a separable metric space with
a topology that can be given by a metric making it complete. Let Cb(X) denote the
set of bounded, continuous functions on X with the supnorm topology, and ∆(X) be
a weak∗ closed and separable, convex subset of the dual space of Cb(X). Let K∆(X) be
the set of non-empty, compact, convex subsets of ∆(X) with the Hausdorff metric.
Then, a weak∗ continuous rational preference relation on K∆(X) is a complete,
transitive relation, , such that for all B ∈ K∆(X), the sets {A : A  B} and
{B : B  A} are open. The continuous linear preferences satisfy the Independence
axiom given below.
Axiom 1. (Independence) For all A,B,C ∈ K∆(X), and all β ∈ (0, 1), A  B if
and only if βA+ (1− β)C  βB + (1− β)C.
Then, the representation theorem shows that a continuous rational preference
relation on K∆(X) satisfies Axiom 1 if and only if it can be represented by a continuous
linear functional.
Theorem 3.8.1 (Representation Theorem: Dumav and Stinchcombe, 2013). A con-
tinuous rational preference relation on K∆(X) satisfies Axiom 1 if and only if it can
be represented by a continuous linear functional L : K∆(X) → R.
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Using this representation theorem, we can define the value of ambiguous in-
formation analogous to the risky case.
In a risky case, for an expected utility maximizing decision maker, the in-
formation they will have when making a decision can be encoded in a posterior
distribution, β ∈ ∆(X). The value of β is
Vu(β) = max
a∈A
∫
u(a, x)dβ(x), where u : A×X → R.
In risky case, a prior is a point p ∈ ∆(X), and an information structure is a
dilation of p, that is, a distribution, Q ∈ ∆(∆(X)), such that∫
βdQ(β) = p.
The value of the information structure is given by
Vu(Q) :=
∫
∆(X)
Vu(β)dQ(β)
An information structure Q dominates Q′ if for all u, Vu(Q) ≥ Vu(Q′).
Analogously, for vNM utility maximizing decision maker facing an ambiguous
problem, the information they will have when making a decision can be encoded in
a set of posterior distributions, B ∈ K∆(X).
The value of B is
VU(B) = max
a∈A
U(δa ×B)
where U : A×K∆(X) → R is a continuous linear functional on compact convex subsets
of ∆(A× X) of the form δa ×B (where δa is point mass on a).
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A set-valued prior is a set A ∈ K∆(X),and an information structure is a distri-
bution, Q ∈ ∆(K∆(X)), such that∫
K∆(X)
BdQ(B) = A.
Then, the value of the information structure Q is given by
VU(Q) :=
∫
K∆(X)
VU(B)dQ(B).
As above, an information structure Q dominates Q′ if for all U, VU(Q) ≥
VU(Q
′).
This framework follows the standard Bayesian approach and models infor-
mation structures as dilations. By contrast, previous work has limited the class of
priors, A, and then studied a special class of dilations of each p ∈ A. The set of A for
which this can be done is non-generic in both the measure theoretic and the topo-
logical sense, and the problems that one can consider are limited to ones in which
the decision maker will learn only that the true value belong to some E ⊂ X.
In this approach, A is expressed as a convex combination of/integral of B’s
in K∆(X), and this is what makes the problem tractable and brings about dynamic
consistency.
In a two-consequence case which will be considered in this chapter, this ap-
proach simplifies to representing preferences as linear functionals in a simplex. If
X = {Good, Bad}, then K∆(X) is the class of non-empty closed, convex subsets of
the probabilities represented as a simplex:
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K∆(X) = {[p− r, p+ r] : 0 ≤ p− r ≤ p+ r ≤ 1}.
In this case, continuous linear functionals on the convex sets of probabilities
must be of the form
U([a, b]) = u1a+ u2b
for u1,u2 ∈ R.
Rewriting [a, b] as [p− r, p+ r], where p = a+b
2
and q = b−a
2
yields
U([p− r, p+ r]) = (u1 + u2)p− (u1 − u2)r = p− vr
with v = u1−u2 measuring the trade-off between risk and ambiguity, v > 0 represents
ambiguity averse attitude.
Graphically, a set-valued prior [a, b] can be represented as a point in the
simplex T with three vertices, (0, 0) representing Bad state, (1, 1) representing Good
state and the new epistemic state “Unknowable” represented by the vertex (0, 1).
Each [a, b] has a unique representation as
(a, b) = w1,1(1, 1) + w0,1(0, 1) + (1− w1,1 − w0,1)(0, 0)
solving,
w1,1 = a, w0,1 = b− a, w0,0 = 1− b.
Thus, the prior [a, b] assigns weight a on (1, 1), 1 − b on (0, 0) and b − a on
the state (0, 1), i. e. , according to the decision maker, the evidence is thoroughly
inconclusive with probability (b− a).
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In this setting, a signal is a dilation of the prior which enables Bayesian up-
dating of the weights on each vertex of T. For example, if a binary signal s ∈ {s1, s2},
Pr(s = s1|Good) = η1,1; Pr(s = s1|Bad) = η0,0 and Pr(s = s1|Unknowable) = η0,1,
then the decision maker with prior [a, b] updates his prior after observing s1 as fol-
lows:
Pr(Good|s1) = η1,1a
η1,1a+ η0,0(1− b) + η0,1(b− a)
Pr(Bad|s1) = η0,0(1− b)
η1,1a+ η0,0(1− b) + η0,1(b− a)
Pr(Unknowable|s1) = η0,1(b− a)
η1,1a+ η0,0(1− b) + η0,1(b− a)
Hence, posterior
[a′, b′]|s=s1 =
[
η1,1a
η1,1a+ η0,0(1− b) + η0,1(b− a) , 1−
η0,0(1− b)
η1,1a+ η0,0(1− b) + η0,1(b− a)
]
In this chapter we use this framework to model ambiguous decision making
in the innovation process.
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3.9 Appendix B: Proofs from Chapter 1 and 2
Proof of Lemma 1. The Policymaker’s problem is recursively written as:
V RAN(r, s) = max
∆H ,∆S ,KRAN
(Pr((r′, s′) ∈ ∆H)(pR− I) + Pr((r′, s′) ∈ ∆S)L−K)
+ δEV RAN(r′, s′)
We can define the operator T : C(K∆[0,1])→ C(K∆[0,1]) as:
T (V RAN) = max
∆H ,∆S ,KRAN
(Pr((r′, s′) ∈ ∆H)(pR− I) + Pr((r′, s′) ∈ ∆S)L−K)
+ δEV RAN(r′, s′)
As V RAN(r, s) ≤ V 1(r, s) ∀(r, s) ∈ K∆[0,1] , T (V RAN) ≤ T (V 1) for all (r, s) ∈ K∆[0,1]
as well. Also, the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) ensures that
[T (V RAN + a)](r, s) ≤ T (V RAN)(r, s) + δa
for all V RAN , a ≥ 0, (r, s) ∈ K∆[0,1] . By Theorem 3.3 in [132], T satisfies Blackwell’s
sufficiency conditions: monotonicity and discounting, so it is a contraction. Then,
by Contraction Mapping Theorem (Theorem 3.2 in [132]), T has exactly one fixed
point V RAN that solves the Policymaker’s problem.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose Ft(rt, st) ≥ Ft+1(rt, st). Consider if (rt, st) ∈ ∆H .
Ft(rt, st) = ptR− I
If (rt+1, st+1) ∈ ∆H for both St = sH and St = sL, then for all j,
Ft+j(rt, st) = δ
j
[
ptR− I −
t+j∑
s=t+1
Ks
]
≤ Ft
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so the result follows. If (rt+1, st+1)|St=sL ∈ ∆S and (rt+1, st+1)|St=sH ∈ ∆H ,
Ft+1(rt, st) = δ[µt+1(pt+1R− I) + (1− µt+1)L−Kt+1]
≤ ptR− I
⇐⇒ (1− δ)µt+1(pt+1|HR− I)
≥ δ(1− µt+1)[L+ pt+1|LR− I]−Kt+1] (3.1)
then,
Ft+2(rt, st) = Et
[
δ2 max{pt+2R− I, L} − δ2Kt+2 − δKt+1
]
Thus,
Ft+2(rt, st)− Ft+1(rt, st)
= Et
[
δ2 max{pt+2R− I, L} − δ2Kt+2
]− δ[µt+1(pt+1R− I) + (1− µt+1)L]
≤ δ
 δµt+2µt+1(pt+2|HHR− I) + 2δ(1− µt+1)µt+2(pt+2|LHR− I)+δ(1− µt+1)(1− µt+2)L
−[µt+1(pt+1R− I) + (1− µt+1)L]
− δ2Kt+2
= δ

δµt+2µt+1(pt+2|HHR− I) + 2δ(1− µt+1)µt+2(pt+2|LHR− I)
+δ(1− µt+1)(1− µt+2)L
−µt+2µt+1(pt+2|HHR− I)− (1− µt+2)µt+1(pt+2|LHR− I)
−(1− µt+1)L
− δ2Kt+2
= δ
 (1− µt+1)µt+2(pt+2|LHR− I)(2δ − 1)−(1− δ)µt+2µt+1(pt+2|HHR− I)
−(1− µt+1)(1− µt+2)(1− δ)L
− δ2Kt+2
= δ
 (1− µt+1)µt+2(pt+2|LHR− I)δ−(1− δ)µt+1(pt+1|HR− I)
−(1− µt+1)(1− µt+2)(1− δ)L
− δ2Kt+2
≤ δ
 −δ(1− µt+1)((pt+1|H − pt+2|LH)R− I)−L(1− δ)(1− µt+1)(1− µt+2)
−Kt+1
− δ2Kt+2
(using 3.1)
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Similarly, we can prove for (rt, st) ∈ ∆L.
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 2, Ats form a monotone sequence, by Theorem
3.3 from [37], the “One-stop ahead” rule is optimal, i.e. if stopping the experimen-
tation process today is better than continuing experimenting for exactly one more
period, then it is always optimal to stop today . Then, the optimal stopping rules
are found by equating Ft and Ft+1. If ptR− I ≥ L,
Ft(rt, st) = Ft+1(rt, st)
yields the equation:
βH1rt + βH2st = βH3
and if ptR− I < L, we obtain:
βS1rt + βS2st = βS3
where:
βH1 = R[1− δ(2λG − λU)] + δ2K(I + L)(λG − λU)
βH2 = R[1− δλU ] + δ2K(I + L)(λU − λB)
βH3 = 2I + 2Kδ(1− λB(I + L))
βS1 = δ[R(2λG − λU)− 2K(I + L)(λG − λU)]
βS2 = δ[RλU − 2K(I + L)(λU − λB)]
βS3 = 2L(1− δ) + 2KδλB(I + L)
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Proof of Proposition 2. Using a few lemmata leads us to the main result of the two
period example, captured in Proposition 2. Let us, for the sake of brevity, define:
T1 =
1 + λ1p1
(
1
(p1−vq1)λ1 +
I
p1−vq1
)
− δ
(
λ1p1 − (1− µ1)λ2p2
(
1
(p2−vq2)λ2 − Ip2−vq2
))
λ1p1 − δ (λ1p1 − (1− µ1)λ2p2)
T2 =
1 + λ2p2
(
1
(p2−vq2)λ2 +
I
p2−vq2
)
λ2p2
The first step identifies the values of ambiguity aversion coefficient v for which (T1−
T2) decreases with v.
Lemma 3.9.1. If the discount factor is not too high, δ ≤ δ < 1, for all v ∈ [0, 1], as
v increases, T1 − T2 falls, where δ is given by:
δ = 1−
(
p2 − vq2
p1 − vq1
)2
q1
q2
(
1
λ1
+ I
1
λ2
+ I
)
The proof follows directly from taking derivatives. Next, we show that if CF
is ambiguity neutral, then there is a possibility of delay.
Lemma 3.9.2. For v = 0, i. e. , if the principal is ambiguity neutral, then
T1 > T2
So, in equilibrium delay happens whenever T1 > R ≥ T2.
Proof. If v = 0,
T1 =
2 + λ1I − δ (λ1p1 − (1− µ1)λ2I)
λ1p1 − δ (λ1p1 − (1− µ1)λ2p2)
T2 =
2 + λ2I
λ2p2
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Hence,
T1 − T2 = [Iλ2p2λ1δ + λ1p1(δ − (1− δ)λ2I)]
(λ1p1 − δ (λ1p1 − (1− µ1)λ2p2))(λ2p2)
≥ 0
Next, we prove the existence of a threshold value of v = v˜ for which delay
does not happen.
Lemma 3.9.3. There exists v˜ ∈ (0, 1) for which T1 = T2.
Proof.
T1 − T2 = 1
(p2 − vq2)(p1 − vq1)

(p2 − vq2)
(
1
λ1
+ I
)
−(1− δ)(p1 − vq1)
(
1
λ2
+ I
)
−(p1 − vq1)(p2 − vq2){λ1p1(1− δ)
+λ2p2[δλ1p1 + δ(1− µ1)− 1]}

For v = 1,
T1 − T2|v=1 = 1
(p2 − q2)(p1 − q1)

(p2 − q2)
(
1
λ1
+ I
)
−(1− δ)(p1 − q1)
(
1
λ2
+ I
)
−(p1 − q1)(p2 − q2){λ1p1(1− δ)
+λ2p2[δλ1p1 + δ(1− µ1)− 1]}

Now,
(p2 − q2)
(
1
λ1
+ I
)
− (1− δ)(p1 − q1)
(
1
λ2
+ I
)
≤ 0
⇔ δ ≤ 1− p2 − q2
p1 − q1
1
λ1
+ I
1
λ2
+ I
(3.2)
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And
λ1p1(1− δ) + λ2p2[δλ1p1 + δ(1− µ1)− 1]
= (1− δ)(λ1p1 − λ2p2) + λ2p2δ[λ1p1 − µ1] > 0
Since
1− p2 − q2
p1 − q1
1
λ1
+ I
1
λ2
+ I
> δ = 1−
(
p2 − q2
p1 − q1
)2
q1
q2
(
1
λ1
+ I
1
λ2
+ I
)
,
∀δ ≤ δ, T1 − T2|v=1 < 0
So, T1 − T2 continuous in v and it decreases as v increases, T1 − T2|v=0 > 0 and
T1 − T2|v=1 < 0, hence there must exist a v˜ ∈ (0, 1), for which T1 = T2.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since CF stops experimenting the first time the posterior
crosses the patenting threshold, RL only chooses the contract to offer depending
on whether developing the project after being patented is more beneficial than
liquidating. Thus, whenever RL′s expected payoff if CF develops the product:
µtpt
[
R−
(
I+ 1
λt
)
pt−vqt
]
is greater than the expected payoff if CF liquidates: L − 1
λt
,
he chooses
xt = 1−
(
I + 1
λt
)
R(pt − vqt) , bt ≥ L−
1
λt
and the reverse otherwise. This gives us ∆D,∆L. The project is abandoned when
no contract satisfying both the incentive constraint for RL and the participation
constraint for CF can be offered. Combining both the constraints, it is most difficult
to hold if (rt, st) ∈ ∆L :
L− 1
λt
≥ 1
λt
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So, the project is abandoned if
(rt, st) ∈ ∆CS = {(rt, st)|L <
2
λt
}
Proof of Proposition 1.5.4. The first lemma finds the sufficient conditions under which
the project receives full funding till the end.
Lemma 3.9.4. Sufficient condition for the project to obtain full funding till the end
is:
λ0 ≥ 2− δ
L
(
1− δ
2
)
Let us look at the last period T, after which the project is abandoned forever.
At T th period, the incentive constraint binds:
µT
[
L− 1
λT
]
=
1
λT
So,
EVT (rT−1, sT−1) = KT
At the penultimate period, the dynamic IC is:
µT−1(L− 1
λT−1
)−KT−1 ≥ δ
[
λT−1
λT
− (1− µT−1)
]
EVT (rT−1, sT−1)
⇐⇒ µT−1(L− 1
λT−1
)−KT−1 ≥ δ
[
λT−1
λT
− (1− µT−1)
]
KT
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Clearly, this incentive constraint is most difficult to satisfy if KT = K. Thus, the
project receives full funding till the end if:
δ ≤ λT−1L− 2
λT−1
(
L
2
+K
)− 1
The sufficient condition becomes:
λ0 ≥ 2− δ
L
(
1− δ
2
) (4)
If 1.5.4 is violated, the project may not receive full funding till the end. Then,
we want to characterize the switching point, i. e. the posterior beliefs for which
the investment flow switches from full funding to partial funding. To characterize
the equilibrium switching point, we derive the difference equation for CF ′s funding
decision, provided the ICRLt is binding under restricted funding.
Denote ∆F = the region of posterior belief where the project does not receive
full funding.
There are two cases: one when the switching point lies in the region of poste-
rior beliefs where after being patented, the project is liquidated, i.e. ∆F ∩∆D = φ;
and the other when at the switching point, after being granted a patent, the project
is developed till the end, i.e. ∆F ∩∆D 6= φ.
First, let us focus on the case where at the switching point after being granted
patent it is optimal to liquidate the project.
Lemma 3.9.5. If ∆F ∩∆D = φ, then the switching point can be given as a quadratic
equation in (rt, st) :
ΦL(rt, st) = γL1r
2
t + γL2s
2
t + γL3rtst + γL1 = 0 (3.3)
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and
∆F := {(rt, st)|ΦL(rt, st) < 0}
= the region of posteriors where the project does not receive full funding.
Proof. The expected value of RL along the equilibrium path can be represented as:
EVt(rt−1, st−1) = µt(L− 1
λt
) + δ(1− µt)EVt+1(rt, st) (3.4)
Now, with restricted funding, ICRLt binds on the equilibrium path, so:
µt(L− 1
λt
)−Kt = δ
[
λt
λt+1
− (1− µt)
]
EVt+1(rt, st)
Using the Bayesian updating:
λt+1 =
(λG − λU)rt−1(1−Ktλt) + 1− λtKt − (1− st−1)(1− λBKt)(λU − λB)
1− λtKt
=
At −BtKt
1− µt
where At and Bt are expressions involving rt−1 and st−1 and do not depend on Kt.
EVt+1(rt, st) =
(
µt(L− 1λt )−Kt
)
(At −BtKt)
δ(1− µt) [λt − (1− µt)(At −BtKt)] (3.5)
= hL(Kt)
Taking derivatives, it can be shown that
∂hL
∂Kt
≤ 0 (3.6)
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Substituting 3.5 into 3.4, we obtain:
EVt(rt−1, st−1) = µt(L− 1
λt
) + δ(1− µt)hL(Kt)
= µt(L− 1
λt
) +
(
µt(L− 1λt )−Kt
)
(At −BtKt)
λt − (1− µt)(At −BtKt)
Moving it one period forward, an alternative expression for EVt+1(rt, st) is found:
EVt+1(rt, st) = µt+1(L− 1
λt+1
) (3.7)
+
(
µt+1(L− 1λt+1 )−Kt+1
)
(At+1 −Bt+1Kt+1)
λt+1 − (1− µt+1)(At+1 −Bt+1Kt+1)
= gL(Kt, Kt+1)
where it can be shown that
∂gL
∂Kt
≥ 0, ∂gL
∂Kt+1
≤ 0.
Then, the difference equation with restricted funding is obtained by equating 3.4 and
3.7:
gL(Kt, Kt+1) = hL(Kt) (3.8)
By Implicit function theorem,
dKt+1
dKt
= −
∂gL
∂Kt
− ∂hL
∂Kt
∂gL
∂Kt+1
≥ 0
Thus, the difference equation 3.8 expresses Kt+1 as an increasing function of Kt. This
ensures the existence of a fixed point of the equation 3.8 at the full funding level,
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denoted by:
µt+1(L− 1
λt+1
) +
(
µt+1(L− 1λt+1 )−K
) (
At+1 −Bt+1K
)
λt+1 − (1− µt+1)(At+1 −Bt+1K)
=
(
µt(L− 1λt )−K
) (
At −BtK
)
δ(1− µt)
[
λt − (1− µt)(At −BtK)
]
which can be succinctly rewritten as the quadratic equation:
ΦL(rt, st) = γL1r
2
t + γL2s
2
t + γL3rtst + γL1 = 0
This denotes the switching point. ∆F is the area below the switching point:
∆F := {(rt, st) ∈ K∆[0,1]\∆CS |ΦL(rt, st) ≤ 0}
Next lemma establishes that the switching point given by 3.3 lies above the stopping
threshold, i.e. ∆CS ⊂ ∆F , and also at the switching point the project is liquidates
after obtaining patent, i.e. ∆F ∩∆D = φ.
Lemma 3.9.6. The switching point locus always lies above the optimal stopping
threshold, i. e. ∆CS ⊂ ∆F .
There exists a δL such that, if
λ0L−2
λ0(L2 +K)−1
≤ δ ≤ δL, at the switching point the
project is liquidated after obtaining patent, i. e. ∆F ∩∆D = φ.
Proof. we show that at the last period, the posterior belief lies below the switching
point, which will show that ∆CS ⊂ ∆F . At t = T, L = 2λT . Plugging this in 3.3, it is
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shown that, if the sufficiency condition does not hold,
ΦL(rT , sT ) =
(
2
L
(1 +K)− 2) (AT −BTK)
2
L
− (1− 2K
L
)(AT −BTK)
−
(
AT−1 −BT−1K
)
δ(1− 2K
L
)
[
2
L
− (1− 2K
L
)(AT−1 −BT−1K)
]
< 0
Similarly, the boundary of ∆D is given by the locus where CF is indifferent
between developing the product and liquidating after being granted a patent (say, at
time t = tD ):
pt
[
R− 1
pt − vqt
(
I +
1
λt
)]
= L− 1
λt
plugging it in 3.3, we can show that
ΦL(rtD , stD) ≥ 0
if
δ ≤ δL
=
(
AtD −BtDK
)
λtD
[
λtD − (1− λtDK)(AtD+1 −BtD+1K)
] .
Now, we consider the second case: where at the switching point the project will be
developed after being granted a patent.
Lemma 3.9.7. If ∆F ∩∆D 6= φ, then the switching point can be given as a quadratic
equation in (rt, st) :
ΦD(rt, st) = γD1r
2
t + γD2s
2
t + γD3rtst + γD1 = 0 (3.9)
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and
∆F := {(rt, st)|ΦD(rt, st) < 0}
= the region of posteriors where the project does not receive full funding.
The expected value of RL along the equilibrium path can be represented as:
EVt(rt−1, st−1) = µtpt
[
R− 1
pt − vqt
(
I +
1
λt
)]
+ δ(1− µt)EVt+1(rt, st)
Now, with restricted funding, ICRLt binds on the equilibrium path, so:
µtpt
[
R− 1
pt − vqt
(
I +
1
λt
)]
−Kt = δ
[
λtpt
λt+1pt+1
− (1− µt)
]
EVt+1(rt, st) (3.10)
Using the expression for λt+1pt+1:
λt+1pt+1 =
λG − λU
λG + λB − 2λU λt +
(
λU − 2 λG − λU
λG + λB − 2λU
)
pt
= Fλt +Gpt
we can rewrite 3.10 as:
EVt+1(rt, st) =
µtpt
[
R− 1
pt−vqt
(
I + 1
λt
)]
−Kt
δ
[
λtpt
Fλt+Gpt
− (1− µt)
]
= hD(Kt)
with
∂hD
∂Kt
≤ 0
Using the similar technique as in the case of deriving ∆F , we obtain the difference
equation with restricted funding as:
gD(Kt, Kt+1) = hD(Kt) (3.11)
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where
EVt+1(rt, st) = µt+1pt+1
[
R− 1
pt+1 − vqt+1
(
I +
1
λt+1
)]
+
µt+1pt+1
[
R− 1
pt+1−vqt+1
(
I + 1
λt+1
)]
−Kt+1
δ
[
λt+1pt+1
Fλt+1+Gpt+1
− (1− µt+1)
]
= gD(Kt, Kt+1) (3.12)
with
∂gD
∂Kt
≥ 0, ∂gD
∂Kt+1
≤ 0.
Then, by Implicit function theorem,
dKt+1
dKt
= −
∂gD
∂Kt
− ∂hD
∂Kt
∂gD
∂Kt+1
≥ 0
Thus, the difference equation 3.11 expresses Kt+1 as an increasing function of Kt.
The fixed point can be written as the quadratic equation:
ΦD(rt, st) = γD1r
2
t + γD2s
2
t + γD3rtst + γD1 = 0 (3.13)
This denotes the switching point. Also, denote the area below the switching point
as:
∆F := {(rt, st) ∈ K∆[0,1]\∆CS |ΦD(rt, st) ≤ 0}
For δ > δL,∆
C
S ⊂ ∆F , and at the switching point the project is developed after
obtaining patent.
Next lemma shows that ∆D\∆F shrinks as v increases, i. e. as CF becomes
more ambiguity averse, the project receives full funding for longer horizon under the
case where at the switching point the project would be developed if granted a patent.
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Lemma 3.9.8. If ∆F ∩∆D 6= φ, then ∆D\∆F shrinks as v increases.
Proof. The switching point 3.13 is given as:
ΦD(rt, st) = gD(Kt, Kt+1)− hD(Kt) = 0
Taking derivative with respect to v, it can be shown that
∂ΦD
∂v
=
µtpt
[
qt
pt−vqt
(
I + 1
λt
)]
δ
[
λtpt
Fλt+Gpt
− (1− µt)
]
− µt+1pt+1
[
− qt+1
pt+1 − vqt+1
(
I +
1
λt+1
)]1 + 1
δ
[
λt+1pt+1
Fλt+1+Gpt+1
− (1− µt+1)
]

> 0
Thus, as v increases, the project receives full funding for a longer time if δ > δL.
Now, as v increases, the dynamic moral hazard decreases in the region where
the project will be developed if patented. Thus, in the region ∆D\∆F , the project
always receives full funding, and in the region ∆F , investment gradually declines.
This completes the proof of the proposition 1.5.4.
Proof of Proposition 5. Since ∆L 6= φ, the project is liquidated even after being
patented in that region. The optimal stopping region for the Policymaker is:
∆S = {(rt, st)|βS1rt + βS2st < βS3}
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where:
βS1 = δ[R(2λG − λU)− 2K(I + L)(λG − λU)]
βS2 = δ[RλU − 2K(I + L)(λU − λB)]
βS3 = 2L(1− δ) + 2KδλB(I + L)
For the partnership, the analogous region is:
∆CS = {(rt, st)|λt <
2
L
}
At rt = st, we can see the point on βS1rt+βS2st = βS3 is rS = sS =
L(1−δ)+K(I+L)δλB
δRλG−δK(I+L)(λG−λB)
and the point on λt =
2
L
is rCS = s
C
S =
2
L
−λB
λG−λB . Even for δ = 1, since R > I, it is
always the case that (rCS , s
C
S ) lies to the right of (rS, sS). Thus, ∆S ⊂ ∆CS . Also, we
have already established in Proposition 1.5.4 that the project may not obtain full
funding till the end, unlike the case with the Policymaker.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.4.
∂t∗
∂v
=
∂
∂v
[−(L+K∗1 +K∗2)
(p0 − vq0)
]
+
∂
∂v
[
1
(p0 − vq0)
∫
(p− vq) pi(K∗2)dQ(r, s)
]
=
∂
∂v
[−(L+K∗1 +K∗2)
(p0 − vq0)
]
+
∫
∂
∂v
[
(p− vq)
(p0 − vq0)
]
pi(K∗2)dQ(r, s)
Now,
∂
∂v
[
(p− vq)
(p0 − vq0)
]
=
1
(p0 − vq0)2
[(b− a) (s+ r)− (s− r)(b+ a)]
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Hence,
b− a
b+ a
R s− r
s+ r
⇔ ∂
∂v
[
(p− vq)
(p0 − vq0)
]
T 0
∫
∂
∂v
[
(p− vq)
(p0 − vq0)
]
pi(K∗2)dQ(r, s)
≤
∫
b−a
b+a
> s−r
s+r
p¯i [(b− a) (s+ r)− (s− r)(b+ a)] dQ
+
∫
b−a
b+a
< s−r
s+r
0. [(b− a) (s+ r)− (s− r)(b+ a)] dQ
= 0
Proof of 2.3.5. Under risk, r = s = p, v = 0. So, under risk,
gv=0V C (p) = p (pi(K
∗
1) + pi(K
∗
2)− t∗)−K∗2
∂gv=0V C
∂p
= pi(K∗1) + pi(K
∗
2)− t∗
+
p
p0
∫
pi(K∗2)dQ
= pi(K∗2) +
K∗1 + L+
∫
K∗2dQ
p0
+
p
p0
∫
pi(K∗2)dQ−
1
p0
∫
ppi(K∗2)dQ
Now, since pi(K∗2) is concave in p− vq, by Jensen’s inequality,∫
ppi(K∗2)dQ ≤ p0pi(p0)
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Thus,
p
p0
∫
pi(K∗2)dQ−
1
p0
∫
ppi(K∗2)dQ
≥ p
p0
∫
pi(K∗2)dQ− pi(K∗2(p0))
So,
∂gv=0V C
∂p
> 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1]
As (r, s) → (0, 0), gv=0V C (p = 0) → 0. Thus, gv=0V C (p) > 0 for all (r, s) ∈ K∆(0,1). Now,
for v > 0, we note that:
∂gvV C
∂s
= (1− v)
[
pi(K∗1) + pi(K
∗
2)− t∗ +
p− vq
p0 − vq0
∫
pi(K∗2)dQ
]
Around (r, s) = (0, 0),
∂gvV C
∂s
|(r,s)=(0,0) = (1− v) [pi(K∗1)− t∗]
≤ 0
⇐⇒ v ≥ v¯
At (r, s) = (0, 0), gvV C → 0, so from (r, s) = (0, 0), as we move along the s−axis,
gvV C < 0 . Clearly, as v increases, g
v
V C decreases, so CZ(v) expands.
Proof of 2.3.6. From the two problems, E’s share of the return under α = 0 :
t∗ =
1
(p0 − vq0) [(p0 − vq0)pi(K
∗
1)−K∗1 ]
+
∫ (
(p− vq)
(p0 − vq0)pi(K
∗
2)−
K∗2
(p0 − vq0)
)
dQ− L
(p0 − vq0)
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And, E’s share of the return under α = 1 :
t˜ =
1
(x− vy)
[
(x− vy)pi(K˜1)− K˜1
]
+
∫ (
(p− vq)
(x− vy)pi(K
∗
2)−
K∗2
(x− vy)
)
dQ− L
(x− vy)
since K∗2 = K˜2. Now,
xt˜− p0t∗ ≡ C2v2 + C1v + C0 (3.14)
where, we find that
C1 ≥ 0
C2, C0 < 0
C2 ≥ −C1
2
Using Descartes’ Rule, we know that the equation 3.14 has two real positive roots
and no real negative root. At v = 0, xt˜− p0t∗ < 0. At v = 1, xt˜− p0t∗ > 0 and
∂
∂v
[xt˜− p0t∗] = 2C2v + C1 > 0 for all v > 0
Thus, there exists at least one real positive root in the interval (0, 1). Call that root
as v∗. Clearly, as v > v∗, xt˜− p0t∗ ≥ 0 .
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3.10 Appendix C: Appendix of Chapter 3
3.10.1 Appendix C.1: Results From Treatment H
Here, I display the detailed results from the Treatment H sessions.
Behavior Trends of Treatment H (Part Two Group):
1. High signal principals delegate more often than low signal principals (t-stat:
−6.8925).
Signal\Delegation Delegate No Delegate Total
High 65 (42.76%) 87 (57.24%) 152
Low 36 (13.95%) 222 (86.05%) 258
Total 91 369 460
2. After Delegation, principals more often follow it up with high effort choice in
Task 2 (t-stat: −17.8545).
Delegation\Task 2 Effort High Low Total
After Delegation 67 (66.34%) 34 (33.66%) 101
After No Delegation 15 (4.85%) 294 (95.15%) 309
Total 82 328 410
3. After observing Delegation, Unbiased agents are more likely to respond by
choosing High Effort in task 2 (t-stat: −11.2993).
Delegation\Task 2 Effort High Low Total
After Delegation 37 (62.71%) 22 (37.29%) 59
After No Delegation 9 (5.96%) 142 (94.04%) 151
Total 46 164 210
Biased agents never choose high effort.
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Delegation\Task 2 Effort High Low Total
After Delegation 0 (0%) 42 (100%) 42
After No Delegation 0 (0%) 158 (100%) 158
Total 0 200 200
4. Hypothesis H (Treatment): The cooperation rate is higher with delegation.
Delegation\Task 2 Outcome Task 2: (9, 9) Task 2: (5, 5) Total
After Delegation 28 (27.72%) 34 (33.66%) 62
After No Delegation 0 (0%) 294 (95.15%) 294
Total 28 328 356
3.10.2 Appendix C.2: Instructions for Experimental Sessions
Instructions (PI’s Copy)
Comments and explanations of actions have been included in italics.
Part One
Thank you for participating in this experiment on economic decision making.
Please pay attention to this instruction and also the accompanying slides. If you
follow these instructions carefully and make careful decisions you might earn a con-
siderable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash and in private at the
end of the experiment.
(show them wads of cash)
The experiment will consist of two parts and last about one and a half hours.
The amount of money you make will depend on the decisions you and all other
participants make during the experiment.
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Your computer will assign you an ID number, and at the end of the session
you will be given an envelope with that ID number on it containing your monetary
earnings. The person handing you your envelope will not know how much money is
in the envelope. Thus, absolute anonymity and privacy will be maintained.
Please remain silent during the experiment. If you have any questions, or
need assistance of any kind, raise your hand; one of the experiment administrators
will come to you and you may whisper your question to him. Please do not talk,
laugh, or exclaim out loud. We expect and appreciate your adherence to these rules.
You will be making choices using the computer mouse and keyboard. You
may reposition the mouse pad so it is comfortable for you. Do NOT click the mouse
buttons until told to do so.
(Please look up at the first slide)
This experiment will consist of two Parts, in each Part there will be several
Stages. Each stage will feature a decision problem, which you will face for several
“rounds.” At the beginning of each stage, instructions about that stage will be given
verbally and also will be displayed on the screen in front of the room. A copy of the
instructions for Stage One of Part One are already handed out to you, for each stage
fresh instructions will be distributed.
Throughout the experiment, at the beginning of each round, you will be
assigned one of the two roles: PRINCIPAL or AGENT. You will be assigned to a
role randomly at the beginning of the experiment. After that, in each round, the
roles will be switched, i.e. , if you are a PRINCIPAL in round 1, you will be an
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AGENT in round 2 and so on. There will be an equal number of PRINCIPALS and
AGENTS in each round. At the beginning of each round, each participant will be
randomly and anonymously matched with another participant of the other role, thus
a matched pair will stay matched for at most one round.
The AGENTS can be one of two types: GREEN or RED. The AGENT’s type
will be randomly assigned at the beginning of EVERY round.
AGENT’s type will be GREEN or RED with equal probability in every round,
i.e. , with probability (1/2) it will be GREEN, with probability 1/2 it will be RED.
The AGENT will be informed of his or her type at the beginning of each round, but
the PRINCIPAL will not know the type of the AGENT he or she is matched to.
However, the PRINCIPAL will privately observe a signal about his/her matched
AGENT’S type. This signal is randomly drawn by the COMPUTER; AGENTS have
no control over it, and will not be able to observe it.
( Next slide shows the signals distribution.)
The signal can be LIME or PINK. On average, for 1 out of 2 GREEN
AGENTs, a LIME signal is observed, and for 2 out of 3 RED AGENTS a PINK
signal is observed.
For example, if there are 24 participants in a session, in each round 12 of
them are assigned as PRINCIPALS and the other 12 as AGENTS. Out of the 12
AGENTS in each round, on average 1/2 (or 6) of them will be GREEN and 6 will
be RED. Out of the 6 GREEN agents, on average a LIME signal will be sent to the
PRINCIPAL for 3 AGENTs, and a PINK signal will be sent for the other 3 of the
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6 GREEN AGENTs. Look now at the RED column: out of the 6 RED agents, on
average a LIME signal is sent for 2 of the 6, and a PINK signal is sent for the other
4 RED AGENTs.
So, in any round, if you are a PRINCIPAL and observe a LIME signal, it
means that your matched AGENT is GREEN with probability 3/(3+2)=3/5, or
60%. If you are a PRINCIPAL and observe a PINK signal, it means that your
matched AGENT is RED with probability 4/(4+3)=4/7 or 57.1%. This matching
and signalling structure will be followed throughout the experiment.
(please look up at the next slide)
In each round, depending on the decisions you and the participant matched
to you make, you will earn some payoff points.
(next slide discusses how your cash rewards from Part One will be calculated.
)
The computer will calculate the sum of payoff points you earned from all the
rounds in Part One. Also, in each round, given the role and type assigned to you
in that round, there is a maximum number of payoff points that you can earn. The
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computer will keep track of these maximum payoff points for each participant. The
sum of your earned payoff points relative to the sum of maximum payoff points you
could earn will determine your cash rewards for Part One as follows.
At the end of the experimental session, for each participant the computer will
draw a random integer between 0 and the maximum number of points the participant
can get in Part One, given the assigned roles and types in each round. If your earned
payoff points total is greater than that random integer, you will win a prize of $15,
otherwise you will receive $2 from Part One. A similar lottery will be conducted for
Part Two, to be discussed later.
(Please look up at the next slide)
Stage One
In Part One of this experiment, there will be two Tasks or decision problems.
To gain experience, we will first start with a decision task which we will call Task 2.
In each round, the PRINCIPAL and the AGENT of a matched pair will make
a choice in the following scenario. There are two possible choices: X and Y. You will
not know your matched participant’s choice until after you make your own choice,
and the participant matched to you will not know your choice until after he or she
has made it. In other words, you both make your decisions simultaneously without
knowing the choice that the other person is making.
(next slide shows the payoff table)
The payoff consequences depend on the choice the PRINCIPAL and the
AGENT make, and the AGENT’s type.
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You must choose either “X” or “Y” by clicking on your choice displayed above
in the game table. The left table is for GREEN agents, so if a GREEN AGENT
chooses “X” and the matched PRINCIPAL chooses “X” (point with laser), each
receives 9 payoff points, as indicated in the upper left cell. In each cell the lower
left corner entry (which is colored according to the AGENT’s type) is the payoff
for the AGENT and the upper-right corner black entry is for the PRINCIPAL. If
a GREEN AGENT chooses “X” and the matched PRINCIPAL chooses “Y,” the
AGENT receives 1 points and the PRINCIPAL receives 5 points (upper right-hand
cell). If the GREEN AGENT chooses “Y” and the PRINCIPAL chooses “X,” the
AGENT receives 5 points and the PRINCIPAL receives 1 points (lower left-hand
cell). If the GREEN AGENT and the PRINCIPAL both choose “Y,” each receives 5
points (lower right-hand cell). Similarly, if the AGENT is RED, the AGENT’s and
the matched PRINCIPAL’s payoff consequences are given by table on the right. For
example, if a RED AGENT chooses “X” and the matched PRINCIPAL chooses “X,”
the AGENT receives 1 points and PRINCIPAL receives 9 points.
However, remember that a PRINCIPAL does not know the matched AGENT’s
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type before making a choice. (point with laser) The PRINCIPAL will only receive a
LIME or a PINK signal.
A PRINCIPAL who receives a LIME signal, knows only that with 60% (3/5)
probability the AGENT is GREEN and the relevant payoff table is the one on the
LEFT, and with 40% (2/5) probability the AGENT is RED and the relevant payoffs
is the one on the RIGHT.
A PRINCIPAL who receives a PINK signal knows only that the AGENT is
RED with 57.1% (4/7) probability and the relevant payoff table is the one on the
RIGHT, and with 42.9% (3/7) probability, the AGENT is GREEN and the relevant
payoff table is the one on the LEFT.
After all the participants have entered a valid choice, the AGENT’s type and
the choices made by you and the participant you were matched with for this round
will be displayed on your monitor along with the resulting payoff points you earned
in this round.
Before we begin, we will have a short quiz. Please turn to the next page and
answer the short questions. We will discuss the answers in five minutes.
(quiz.
while they do quiz, the screen with payoff tables displayed.
change slide after quiz.)
Anyone needs more time to finish the quiz?
Okay, now we will discuss the answers to the Quiz. (please look up at the next
slide)
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Answer to Quiz:
1. You are assigned as a GREEN type AGENT in a particular round and
randomly and anonymously matched with a PRINCIPAL. If you choose X and the
PRINCIPAL chooses Y, what will be your payoff in this round?
Ans: 1.
(change slide)
Since you are assigned as a GREEN AGENT, the payoff table on the left is
relevant to you. If you pick X, the green shaded cells give the possible payoffs. The
PRINCIPAL chooses Y, which gives the grey shaded cells. The resulting payoffs are
displayed in the dark shaded cell and YOUR payoffs are on the left corner.
(change slide)
2. You are assigned as a PRINCIPAL in a particular round and randomly and
anonymously matched with an AGENT. You observe a LIME signal in this round.
If you choose X, what are the possible payoffs you can get?
Ans: 9 or 1.
If the matched AGENT is GREEN and picks X, you get 9. If the matched
AGENT is RED and picks X, you get 9. If the matched AGENT picks Y, you get 1
irrespective of which Type the AGENT is.
(slide change)
In the table, since the PRINCIPAL chooses X, the blue shaded cells give
possible payoffs, but the PRINCIPAL does not know which table is relevant. Since
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he has received LIME signal, AGENT is GREEN and the left table is relevant with
60% probability. So all four payoffs that are possible are: 9, 1, 9 and 1.
(change slide)
3. In Task 2, what is the maximum payoff you can expect to earn if you are
assigned as:
a. GREEN AGENT: Ans: 9 (if you and the matched PRINCIPAL both
choose X)
b. PRINCIPAL matched to a GREEN AGENT: Ans: 9 (both PRINCI-
PAL and AGENT choose X)
c. RED AGENT: Ans: 5 (if you choose Y, no matter what the PRINCI-
PAL chooses)
d. PRINCIPAL matched to a RED AGENT: Ans: 9 (you and RED
AGENT choose X)
(change slide and keep it at T2 table)
We will now begin interaction with the computers. If you have any questions
before we begin the experiment, please RAISE YOUR HAND and a moderator will
be with you shortly.
We will now begin the experiment. Please pay attention to your monitor and
click the mouse when prompted to do so. Please click on the Continue button on
each screen after you have read the information and/or made the choice. There are
four rounds in this stage, once we have finished all the rounds, I will direct your
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attention to the screen in the front of the room again for the instructions for Stage
Two.
Stage Two
Before starting Stage Two, we will discuss Task 1. Task 1 involves one of each
matched pair (either the PRINCIPAL or the AGENT) choosing LEFT or RIGHT,
where the payoff points each participant gets are given by this table:
Please look at your computer screen and take the quiz on this task.
(quiz on personal computer screen)
(slide change after done with quiz)
We will now begin Stage Two of Part One, which contains six rounds. In
this stage, you will do Task 1 and Task 2 sequentially. The sequence of actions is as
follows:
• You will be assigned as PRINCIPAL or AGENT, with roles switching in every
round as before. The AGENTs will receive their types (GREEN or RED) and
the PRINCIPALs will not know the types but observe PINK or LIME signals.
The matching and signalling will be exactly same as before.
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• First, each matched pair will do Task 1. In this stage, the PRINCIPALs
will be choosing LEFT or RIGHT and the AGENTs will have to wait for the
PRINCIPAL to make the decision. The payoff points are as before. AGENTs
will observe the PRINCIPAL’s choice only after the entire round is completed.
• After completing Task 1, you will do Task 2 with the participant you are
matched with. Task 2 is identical to what you did in Stage One. In each
pair, both of you will simultaneously choose X or Y, as in Stage One. The
instructions for AGENTs and PRINCIPALs will be displayed on your monitor.
Please turn to your monitors now.
(blank displayed while they play.)
Part Two
We are about to begin Part Two of the experiment. This part will consist of
only one stage, which will contain ten rounds.
In each round, depending on the decisions you and the participant matched
to you make, you will earn some payoff points. The computer will calculate the sum
of payoff points you earned from all the rounds in Part Two. Also, in each round,
given the role and type assigned to you in that round, there is a maximum number
of payoff points that you can earn. The computer will keep track of these maximum
payoff points as well. The sum of your earned payoff points relative to the sum of
maximum payoff points you could earn in Part Two will determine your cash rewards
for Part Two as follows.
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At the end of the experimental session, for each participant the computer will
draw a random integer between 0 and the maximum number of points the participant
can get in Part Two, given the assigned roles and types in each round. If your earned
total payoff points is greater than that random integer, you will win a prize of $15,
otherwise you will receive $4 from Part Two.
((please look up at the next slide)
Stage One
In Stage One of Part Two, you will do Task 1 and Task 2 sequentially. The
sequence of actions is as follows:
You will be assigned as PRINCIPAL or AGENT, with roles switching in every
round as before. The AGENTs will receive their Types (GREEN or RED) and the
PRINCIPALs will not know the Types but observe PINK or LIME signals. The
matching and signalling will be exactly same as before.
(please look up to the next slide)
First you will do Task 1 with the participant you are matched with in this
round. In this task, as before, the possible choices are LEFT or RIGHT, but there
is one important difference.
If you are a PRINCIPAL in a round, you can choose whether to delegate the
task to your matched AGENT, i.e. , let him/her choose between LEFT or RIGHT.
If you are an AGENT, you will observe if your matched PRINCIPAL has chosen
to delegate the task to you. If the PRINCIPAL does NOT delegate, he/she will be
making the choice on his/her own. If the PRINCIPAL DELEGATES the task, the
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matched AGENT will be choosing. The payoff consequences are given as before.
(slide change)
If the PRINCIPAL delegates Task 1, AGENT’s choices will not be visible to
the PRINCIPAL right after Task 1, but only after the completion of Task 2. After
the entire round is completed, the choice made in the tasks, consequent payoffs and
AGENT’s type will be revealed.
(please look up to the next slide)
After completing Task 1, each matched pair will do Task 2 as before. Both
of you will simultaneously choose X or Y.
(slide change and keep it blank)
Now, please turn to your computer to make choices in this Part. The in-
structions for AGENTs and PRINCIPALs and the payoffs will be displayed on your
monitors.
After the ten rounds of this stage, the COMPUTER will conduct the lotteries
for the two Parts to determine your cash rewards.
Please turn to your monitors now.
(later)
Please complete the questionnaire displayed on your screen. To preserve your
privacy, type xxx when asked for name; do not write your own name. While you give
us your valuable feedback, we will be putting your winning amounts in the respective
envelopes. Please fill out the receipt with your winning amount as well. Thanks for
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participating in this experiment!
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Figure 3.5: Task 2 Effort choice in the Part One Group of Treatment H
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